tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22631330536369243462024-02-08T08:43:30.995-08:00land reform in islamland ownership in islamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05414932490344169940noreply@blogger.comBlogger11125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2263133053636924346.post-16529834338643845252008-12-11T18:18:00.000-08:002008-12-11T18:22:46.242-08:00Islamic Land Tenures and ReformPaper 2: Islamic Land Tenures and Reform <br /><br />Every aspect of land tenure is intricately connected with the socio-political life of the community. Most conflicts seem to arise over access to land or rather the abuse of perceived rights to the land. Land issues in the Middle East are complicated because of the vast variety of forms of landholding- Al-ard btifriq bi-l-shibr (land differs from one foot of ground to the next). <br /> (Schaebler, 2000:242)<br /><br />OVERVIEW <br /><br />Land tenure concepts, categorisations and arrangements within the Islamic world are multi-faceted, generally distinctive and certainly varied. These ‘web of tenure’ regimes are often dismissed as intractable, inscrutable or outdated, but the lack of adequate systematic research hampers our understanding of the current manifestations of Islamic land concepts. The evolution of Islamic land tenure regimes from the classical and Ottoman periods to the colonial and contemporary times provides vital insights into the dynamics of Islamic land. What emerges is the interplay of a range of Islamic land approaches, State interventions, customary practices and external influences. This paper explores the socio-historical context and development of Islamic land tenure regimes. An appreciation of the historical context of land tenure in Muslim societies and the range of land tenure forms may well contribute towards development of authentic and innovative strategies for enhancing access to land and land rights. <br /><br />Scope of this Position Paper: This position paper contextualises Islamic land tenure in Section 1. In Section 2, it considers theories regarding Islamic land tenure. Section 3 explores land tenure regimes in Ottoman practice while Section 4 outlines the features of Ottoman land administration and regulation. Section 5 examines the impact of colonialist land administration influence considering the modern 'tenure web' while Section 6 considers the phenomenon of the post-colonial tenure web. Section 7 offers five strategies for empowerment through land tenure conceptions <br /><br />* Recognise historical contexts of contemporary land tenure regimes;<br />* Derive legitimacy from authenticated Islamic forms of tenure; <br />* Take advantage of the ‘Web of Tenure’; <br />* Facilitate a range of tenure models <br />* Engage with communal and indigenous land tenures. <br /><br /><br /> <br /><br />2.1 CONTEXTUALISING ISLAMIC LAND TENURE<br />2.1.1 Diversity of Islamic tenure systems<br /><br />Land tenure concepts have to be understood within the complex, dynamic and overlapping weave of Islamic legal principles, State and international legal frameworks, customary norms and informal legal rules. One of the key features of land tenure systems and legal categories in the Muslim world is that they were embedded and remain embedded in their complex, particular and in many ways local histories. <br /><br />2.1.2 Islamic contribution to land tenure regimes <br /><br />It is sometimes difficult to discern the Islamic content in the modern land tenure regimes of many Muslim countries, particularly outside the Middle East. However, it is undoubtedly present, to varying degrees, even where land law is driven largely by the seemingly wholly secular demands of the strict 'Torrens' registration system. <br /><br />2.1.3 Security of Tenure in the Muslim world<br /><br />The challenges of urbanisation, population and poverty, together with the increasing pressures on land and environment, arise throughout the Muslim world, although with variations between countries as elsewhere across the globe. Of particular concern is lack of secure land tenure for significant proportions of these populations. Research indicates the widest range of options should be considered in attempts to enhance security of tenure, bearing in mind local conditions and context. In the Muslim world, debates about the development of policy towards informal settlements often take a religious dimension. <br />2.1.4 Islamic ‘Web of tenures’ as a continuum<br /><br />Documented titles, particularly freehold titles, secured through the formal legal structures common in the West, have been projected as the best tenure option and goal for all States. Urban land tenure cannot be understood through simple and conventional binaries of legal/illegal, formal/informal or even secure/insecure. The residents of informal settlements in Muslim countries also exist on the tenure continuum. Islamic ‘webs of tenure’ could be mapped on a continuum that is neither hierarchical nor universal but adjusted to local contexts and choices. <br /><br />2.2 LAND TENURE IN ISLAMIC THEORY<br />2.2.1 Categorisation of land <br /><br />There are widely thought to be three broad types of land and land tenure in Islamic theory. These are land in full ownership (mulk) state owned land (miri) and endowed land (waqf). Fundamental to these categories is the traditional Islamic theory of taxation. Sustained and developed under Ottoman rule into the 19th Century, they continue as conceptions if not categories into modern Muslim societies. <br />2.2.2 Dead (mewat) land <br /><br />Individuals have the right to reclaim waste or empty land (mewat), that is land without an owner which is uncultivated and undeveloped. This demonstrates further the Islamic requirement that land should be used for productive purposes. The Mewat concept is important in the material sense, but also in the manner in which people 'think through' their relationship with land, as seen by the approach of squatters in Saudi Arabia. <br />2.2.3 Rent and sharecropping<br /><br />The legal prohibition against hoarding has led to considerable debate amongst Islamic scholars concerning the appropriate utilisation of land, particularly with respect to the question of rent and the related issue of sharecropping. Some Islamic economists argue for instance that land rent for surplus land is always unlawful. Others hold that the tradition prohibits only the payment of rent on land which has not been improved in some way. <br />2.2.4 Limits on individual ownership<br /><br />Islamic law (Shari'a) does not have a general theory of public property law and the rules in relation to land were not systematically organised, but derived from those dealing with taxation, conquest and the division of the spoils of war. Land ownership, belonging ultimately to God, is not absolute or unconditional and is subject to an overall social orientation, for land was given to the community of Muslims (umma) for the use and benefit of that community. <br />2.2.5 Acquiring ownership of land<br /><br />Private ownership may be obtained either through transaction, such as sale (bay) or gift (hiba), possession, including the reviving of dead land (mewat) and inheritance. Some scholars suggest that the high esteem given to sanctity of contracts and the promises within them preclude State intervention other than in limited circumstances to prevent exploitation. <br />2.2.6 Pre-emption (shuf'a)<br /><br />Pre-emption (shuf'a) is the means by which a co-inheritor or neighbour may use a privileged option to purchase land when it is for sale. It is a process capable of keeping strangers to communities on the outside and thereby placing limitations upon certain kinds of economic development. Different schools of law take different approaches to pre-emption but it is an important Islamic doctrine. <br /><br /><br />2.3 LAND TENURE REGIMES IN OTTOMAN PRACTICE<br />2.3.1 Making of Ottoman law <br /><br />Islamic categories of land and land tenure were not derived simply from the nature and quality of property rights or Islamic legal theory, but owed much to the demands of the State in the Ottoman world. Complex power relations shaped the forms of tenure that emerged and property rights in land in the Ottoman world should be viewed as a ‘bundle’ which was subject to a dynamic process of negotiation, re-negotiation and resistance. Various types of tenure, authorising land use or rights to revenue, 'did not correspond to an understanding of ownership' - whether State or private- at least in the Western liberal sense of the word. <br />2.3.2 Conferring full land ownership (mulk/milk)<br /><br />Mulk land gives the holder extensive power to use and enjoy the land, including disposing of it, making a gift of it, settling it as an endowment (waqf) in perpetuity or leaving it in a will in the form of a bequest. The origins of private land in full ownership (mulk) lie in land owned by Muslims and upon which a tithe of one tenth was collected (ushr), as opposed to a tax (kharaj). <br />2.3.3 Implications of State land (miri)<br /><br />Under the Ottomans (1299-1923) virtually all cultivated land, State land in the possession of individuals, became known as miri. It is a term which derives from, or is a shortened version, of the literal explanation that it was land under the control of the leader of the Muslims (Amir-al-Muslimin). However, Ottoman land tenure concepts , for example, should not to be confused with the British concept of crown land/public domain. <br />2.3.4 Empty land (Mewat)<br /><br />In contrast to the modern situation in many Muslim countries, the Ottoman State was not concerned with any 'shortage of land', rather it was keen to encourage the cultivation and use of land to ensure the continuance of subsistence farming and a regular supply of provisions to urban dwellers. In the Ottoman world, dead land (mewat), that is undeveloped land at a distance from any town or village, in accordance with Islamic legal theory, could be 'enlivened' through cultivation or other acts such as irrigation. The occupier who reported and received the permission of the State would be granted rightful possession. <br />2.3.5 Communal land (musha)<br /><br />Pastoral lands, as opposed to cultivated land, were held as the traditional communal domain of particular tribes both for residence and herding according to local custom. The term 'musha was used, at village level, to denote either common undivided land or communal grazing land.<br /><br />2.4 OTTOMAN LAND ADMINISTRATION <br />2.4.1 Regulation of state land (miri) and the Ottoman Land Code 1858<br /><br />The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 was based upon both Ottoman practice and Islamic law. It defined the five categories of land: private ownership (mulk), State land (miri) and endowment (waqf), dead land (mewat), and public land for general use such as pastures for the use of particular towns and villages, markets, parks and places to pray (metruke). The Code remains the basis for modern state legislation and the division into these forms of land tenure remains in place today. <br />2.4.2 Extension of possession rights in state land (miri)<br /><br />Land in private ownership (mulk) continued to be governed by Islamic law (Shari'a). However, the differences between State land (miri) and land in private ownership (mulk) were in practice fairly narrow. State land (miri), that is the grant of the usufruct rights (tapou/tapu), could now be inherited, though according to the principles and requirements of the Ottoman Land Code and not as stipulated in Islamic law (Shari'a). <br />2.4.3 Effecting the transfer of ownership<br /><br />In Shari'a courts across the Ottoman world the traditional method for registering property transactions and demonstrating ownership was by means of a document (hujja, literally proof), sealed by the court, which was often the only means for effecting land transactions between buyers and sellers. However, where no such documentary proof existed, the prospective seller could fall back on witnesses prepared to confirm both continuous possession of the land in question and also the absence of any other contenders as to its ownership. <br />2.4.4 Registration under the Ottoman Land Code<br /><br />The cadastral registers that were a feature of the Ottoman world in the 16th and 17th Century have survived and proved to be a rich source for historians. Alongside the central registers, were provincial registers, detailing revenues in relation to towns and villages. At the root of the Ottoman Land Code lay a system of compulsory registration of usufruct rights in State land (miri), in the government land register office and the issue of an official title deed as evidence of ownership (tapu), but it was not fully carried through. <br /><br />2.5 IMPACT OF COLONIALIST LAND ADMINISTRATION <br />2.5.1 Colonial responses to state land (miri)<br /><br />The period of the direct colonial engagement had a direct impact on conceptualisation of State land and further complicated land tenure regimes. Some colonial administrators construed land held as miri within a wider definition of State land than that envisaged within Islamic legal principles, or indeed even that pertaining under Ottoman rule. Confusion as to the precise nature of usufruct rights in miri land came at least in part from the translation of this category, which persists today and is used in this paper for convenience, into the term 'State land'. <br />3.5.2 Colonial attitudes to land use <br /><br />Under Ottoman law a person who possessed uncultivated miri land (mahlul) who informed the state would be able to obtain a grant of title (tapu). However, under the Mahlul Lands Ordinance of 1920 the best that he/she could hope for would be a lease. The colonial powers were also anxious to limit rights over dead (mewat) land, so that they could be drawn into state control. The early period of British Mandate rule in Palestine saw also the 1921 Land Transfer Ordinance, which deemed that all land transactions, with the exception of short leases, would require consent from the High Commissioner who was not obliged to supply any reason for refusal. <br />2.5.3 Re-establishment of the land registration system <br /><br />+<br />2.5.4 Impact of colonialism on land redistribution<br /><br />Colonial land measures have been internalised and the dual track of part secularisation/modernisation (arising from colonial heritage) and part Islamisation (from the Ottoman experience) of land tenure systems did take place through codification. These post-colonial codes preserved either explicitly, or implicitly in the case of Iraq, basic and traditional categories of land in full ownership (mulk), endowment (waqf) and state land (miri), although the emphasis varied depending upon the particular histories of these different countries and earlier reforms. <br /><br />2.6 THE POSTCOLONIAL LAND TENURE WEBS<br />2.6.1 Persistence of Islamic land tenure conceptions <br /><br />Islamic land tenure systems, which were filtered through Ottoman administration and then colonial constructions, have endured into the postcolonial world. At least in most of the Middle East, the Islamic tradition is relatively easy to detect in official land law systems, albeit overlaid in many countries with secular codes. The distinction between the land itself and its usufruct, the principle that ownership of land lies with God but is held in trust by the State for the community of Muslims still underpins categories of land which are utilised today. <br />2.6.2 Developing modern land administration systems<br /><br />Land administration, management, regulation and conflict resolution are usually a part of the public sphere. Land registration, which has a relatively long history across the Middle East, is embedded in some parts of the region, though there is some resitance. It carries with it at least a veneer of secularism, although it bumps against the Islamic legal framework and customary/unofficial tenure. <br />2.6.3 Privatisation and the Egyptian 1992 Tenancy Act<br /><br />The impact of land reform in terms of land redistribution, land administration and management with respect to access to land are generally evaluated as limited. Access to land in much of the Muslim world, as in other parts of the world, is considered to be considerably worse in comparison to the situation several decades ago. Perhaps the most highly visible of these legislative interventions is Egypt's 1992 Tenancy Act, fully implemented from 1997, which revoked much of Nasser's agrarian reforms of the 1950's and 1960's. The Tenancy Act may have laid the basis for stimulating and improving the land market, but significant progress in market development remains unlikely while landowners often fail to register title to their land. <br />2.6.4 The post colonial web of Islamic land tenure <br /><br />The 'web of tenancy' is used to denote the 'multiple interrelated tenancy relationships in which the landholder accesses land through combinations of more than one pattern'. The confluence of Islamic principles, Ottoman law, colonial interventions, custom and unofficial norms may not merely have led to a 'web of tenancy' in some households, but a broader 'tenure web'. There exist no 'clean patterns' or 'neat categories', but multiple combinations of relations which give access to land. <br />2.6.5 Safety webs for informal arrangements? <br /><br />Functioning informal markets sometimes use traditional documentation (hujja) as evidence in the legitimate transfer of property interests. As evidenced in Yajouz in Jordan communal elements form part of the web of tenure in some contexts. Several of these phenomena have proven highly resilient and resistant to the efforts of reformers, continuing to play a role in the lives and the minds of postcolonial actors. For instance, the Musha land system, that is communal land held in shares and involving the periodic redistribution of lots, survived the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the colonial mandate authorities that followed, despite attempts at abolition and land registration. <br />2.6.6 Women and Islamic land tenure arrangements<br /><br />Islamic law provides women with substantial rights to acquire, manage and alienate property. However, under classical Islamic law (Shari'a), which governed the devolution of land in full ownership (mulk), women were accorded smaller inheritance shares. State land (miri) was inherited according to state law, crucially in equal shares by both sons and daughters and with children placed first on the list of those with a right to inheritance, but some modern states have made state land (miri) subject to Islamic inheritance law. Ownership and management of endowment (waqf) property was historically important for women. The abolition, nationalisation and decline of the endowment (waqf) may deprive women of a further means of access to land. Modernist land reforms initiated across the Middle East bypassed most women, consolidating land in the hands of males. <br /><br /><br />2.7 STRATEGIES FOR EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ISLAMIC LAND TENURES<br />2.7.1 Recognise historical contexts of contemporary land tenure regimes <br /><br />Though the histories of individual Muslim countries vary, the contemporary land tenure regimes have evolved from, or have been influenced by, a variety of historical periods or episodes. To unravel or effectively engage with these complex and overlapping land tenure forms requires a sensitivity to land history, which often takes the form of local or communal narratives. These include the impact of distinctive pre-Ottoman Islamic land conceptions, the Ottoman land administration and regulatory framework, the colonialist modifications or extensions of land tenure practice and the post-colonial and modernist land reforms. The current dominant forms of land tenure are equally rooted in resilient customary practices and State interventions and together form the basis through which individuals and groups in particular contexts think through their relationships with land and with one another. Strategies to enhance access to land must be based upon detailed research as to the particular tenure categories, which are relevant in specific localities. <br />2.7.2 Derive legitimacy from authenticated Islamic forms of tenure <br /><br />Though land tenure systems in the Muslim world are often a convergence of State designs, customary practices and increasingly international pressures which are modernist and secular, there is generally a consciousness of Islamic land conceptions. The range of land tenures, classifications and categories in the postcolonial Middle East and many parts of the Muslim world are derived often from Islamic principles developed and manipulated by successive regimes, particularly during the long period of Ottoman rule, and to varying degrees the colonial and post colonial governments. With the increasing calls for ‘authenticity’ through return or reinvigoration of Islamic and indigenous principles and practices, the strategy of legitimising innovative land tenure arrangements through recourse to Islamic historical and spiritual principles could facilitate reforms. What is necessary though is the articulation that rather than being static, monolithic or exclusive formulae, Islamic land systems can be responsive, flexible and capable of catering to a wide range of contexts and diverse constituencies of claimants. <br /><br />Islamic law facilitates full ownership, conceives of ‘State’ lands which could be used in the public interest and also accommodates collectives and group land access and usufruct rights. Land readjustment strategies which find their authority and social legitimacy in enduring Islamic principles of equity and egalitarianism as in communal ('musha) villages, using plot exchanges and compensation, could in appropriate circumstances enhance access to land where there are often fragmented parcels and a web of tenures. Similarly, the institution of the endowment (waqf) can facilitate land rights that are often preserved within a smaller circle of the landed class. <br />2.7.3 Take advantage of the ‘Web of Tenure’ <br /><br />Rather than view the mesh of complex, sometimes seemingly ad hoc, tenure forms as necessarily a barrier to economic development and the provision of secure access to land, they may be used beneficially and can be a positive force. In reality, there exist few 'clean categories', but rather a web of tenure with a local distinctiveness which may be focused even at the level of particular communities. This fluidity and often overlapping situations could augment innovation and offer a range of choices. Some tenure forms are recognised by the State and incorporated into legislation or recognised as social practice However, whether they are formally part of policy or tolerated as customary arrangements, they work best because they are closer to the lived experiences of the people who use them, rather than a top-down approach. <br /><br />Fragmentation of land is a perceived problem with regard to this tenure web, with even those individuals possessing quite large total landholdings and operating as landlords, owning or co-owning small plots. These have been, in part, the consequence of the agrarian reform processes of the 1950's and 1960's, but Islamic inheritance rules also play a part. Current policy making around land regularisation in the Middle East that seeks to encourage the registration of individual land titles can only be one of the approaches, to address this issue. Equally strategies to enhance land rights for women or disadvantaged/vulnerable groups must be aware of Muslims, like others, may prefer to keep 'ownership' outside of official control attempts to avoid further land fragmentation even where it appears to be counter-intuitive to the outsider. <br /> <br />2.7.4 Facilitate a range of tenure models <br /><br />Islamic land tenure regimes offer a range of options relating to the protection of rights of occupation, possession, use, usufruct and full ownership for a wide range of constituencies including the urban poor, squatters and slum dwellers. It offers several avenues for regularising informal settlements. Land registration can have advantages but are not always preferred or possible. Land registration has a long history and is well embedded in many Muslim countries, including parts of the Middle East, with some sophisticated systems using modern technology. At first sight this would appear to lay solid foundations for land regularisation processes focused upon securing ownership and access to land through formal titling. However, vast tracts of land in the Middle East, even where modern registration systems exist, remain unregistered, not least much of the endowed land (waqf) and land falling under the control of government. <br /><br />Moreover, strategies at local, household and individual level to avoid registration of title are also entrenched and have a long history. Relatively large and wealthy landowners choose to remain outside the official land titling processes, even where this may preclude the use of credit mechanisms and full engagement in land markets. The motivations that underpin such strategies are multifarious. They include a desire to circumvent the strict application of Islamic inheritance rules, and the consequence fragmentation of ownership and landholdings and to avoid the high costs of registration, including those associated with fragmented plots.<br /> <br />Also registration may not be chosen because it is difficult to bring the prevailing local forms of land tenure within the officially recognised categories, or because the State refuses to register land ownership which challenges or places barriers to the State's own development plans. Fear of appropriation may also be a factor, as is the fact that 'unofficial' markets and tenure formations may operate relatively efficiently and be responsive to local needs. Contemporary policies surrounding the encouragement of land titling may be too abstract in the above climate and strategies concerned with access to land, rather than titling, may better encompass the requirements of many communities in relation to secure tenure. In practice, the seemingly complex web of Islamic tenures can be mapped against a continuum model, which is not hierarchical but promotes choice regarding a range of options. <br />2.7.5 Communal and indigenous land tenure<br /><br />Communal relations to land have endured both in practice and as a state of mind within the Muslim world. They have survived in the face of legal systems in which the concept of State land (miri) dominates and is manipulated by successive regimes to establish control over any land in which individual ownership claims cannot be maintained. In some areas these customary tenures have survived despite the attempts by tribal leaders to use land registration as a means to turn communal land into a large individual land holding. Communal land relationships exist often in areas where the people concerned are particularly vulnerable, amongst nomadic pastoralists, in areas of marginal rainfall, but also in the village, peri-urban or urban context. 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Bonine (ed) Population, Poverty and Politics in Middle East Cities (Gainesville, Fl: University Press of Florida) <br /><br />Wahlin, Lars (1994) 'Inheritance of land in the Jordanian Hill Country' 21(i) British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 57-84 <br /><br />Wilkinson, John C. (1990) 'Muslim Land and Water Law' 1 Journal of Islamic Studies 54-72 <br /><br />Ziadeh, Farhat J. (1985) 'Land Law and Economic Development in Arab Countries' 33 The American Journal of Comparative Law 93<br /><br />Zubaida, Sami (2003) Law and Power in the Islamic World (London and New York: IB Tauris)land ownership in islamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05414932490344169940noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2263133053636924346.post-2443615018400008062008-12-11T18:04:00.000-08:002008-12-11T18:16:03.785-08:00Pencabutan Hak Milik PribadiPencabutan Hak Milik Pribadi<br />Thursday, 13 April 2006<br /><br /><br />KEPUTUSAN FATWA<br />MAJELIS ULAMA <br /><br />INDONESIA<br />Nomor : 8/MUNAS <br /><br />VII/MUI/12/2005<br />Tentang<br />PENCABUTAN HAK MILIK <br /><br />PRIBADI UNTUK KEPENTINGAN UMUM<br /><br /><br />Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), dalam <br /><br />Musyawarah Nasional MUI VII, pada 19-22 Jumadil Akhir <br /><br />1426 H. / 26-29 Juli 2005 M., setelah<br />MENIMBANG : <br /><br /><br /><br />- Bahwa di tengah-tengah masyarakat sering terjadi <br /><br />adanya benturan anatara kepentingan pribadi dengan <br /><br />kepentingan umum yang tidak jarang menimbulkan <br /><br />ketidakserasian hubungan antara sebagian masyarakat <br /><br />dengan sebagian lain atau anatara masyarakat dengan <br /><br />pemerintah. <br /><br />- Bahwa benturan dua kepentingan tersebut seringkali <br /><br />berupa pencabutan hak milik pribadi untuk kepentingan <br /><br />umum; <br /><br />- Bahwa oleh karena itu, MUI memandang perlu <br /><br />menetapkan Fatwa tentang masalah tersebut untuk <br /><br />dijadikan pedoman oleh masyarakat. <br /><br />MENGINGAT : <br /><br /><br /><br />- Firman Allah SWT; a.I.:<br />Dan orang-orang yang <br /><br />telah menempati Kota Madinah dan telah beriman <br /><br />(Anshar) sebelum (Kedatangan) mereka (Muhajirin), <br /><br />mereka mencintai orang yang berhijrah kepada mereka. <br /><br />Dan mereka tiada menaruh keinginan dalam hati mereka <br /><br />terhadap apa-apa yang diberikan kepada mereka (orang <br /><br />Muhajirin); dan mereka mengutamakan (orang-orang <br /><br />Muhajirin), atas diri mereka sendiri. Sekalipun mereka <br /><br />memerlukan (apa yang mereka berikan itu). Dan siapa <br /><br />yang dipelihara dari kekikiran dirinya, mereka itulah <br /><br />orang-orang yang beruntung. (al-Hasyr: [59]: 9) <br /><br />"Dan janganlah kamu merugikan manusia kepada <br /><br />hak-haknya dan janganlah kamu merajalela di muka bumi <br /><br />dengan membuat kerusakan" (QS. Al-Syu'ara [26]: 183). <br /><br />"…KAmu tidak menganiaya dan tidak (pula) dianiaya" <br /><br />(QS. Al-Baqarah [2]: 279)<br /><br /><br />- Hadis Nabi s.a.w., : <br /><br /><br /><br />- "Sesungguhnya darah (jiwa) dan hartamu adalah <br /><br />haram (mulia, dilindungi)…" (H.R. al-Tirmidzi).<br /><br /><br />Halal Guide<br />http://www.halalguide.info Powered by Joomla! Generated: 9 May, 2008, 19:43<br />- Hadis bahwa Nabi s.a.w. ketika membangun Masjid <br /><br />Nabawi membebaskan tanah warga asli Madinah dengan <br /><br />membelinya. (HR al-Bukhari). <br /><br />- Tindkan Umar bin Khaththab yang membebaskan <br /><br />tanah penduduk dengan memberi ganti rugi ketika <br /><br />memperluas Masjid Haram. (lihat Naz'ul Milkiyyah). <br /><br />MEMPERHATIKAN : <br /><br /><br /><br />- Pendapat Ulama tentang definisi kepentingan umum <br /><br />(manfa'ah 'ammah):<br />"Kepentingan umum adalah segala <br /><br />sesuatu yang manfaatnya kembali kepada seluruh manusia <br /><br />(rakyat) atau kepada sebagian mereka tanpa di batasi <br /><br />individu-individunya." <br /><br />- Qa'idah Fiqh (Al-Muwafaqat, Juz 4, h. 196-197) : <br /><br />"Kemaslahatan umum harus di dahulukan atas <br /><br />kemaslahatan khusu" <br /><br />- Qa'idah Fiqh (Majalah al-Ahkam al-'Adiyah, Fasal <br /><br />58) :<br />"Tindakan pemerintah terhadap rakyat harus <br /><br />didasarkan kemaslahatan <br /><br />- Qa'idah Fiqh (Majalah al-Ahkam al-'Adiyah, Fasal <br /><br />26) :<br />"Mudharat yang khusus dapat dilakukan untuk <br /><br />menghindarkan mudharat yang bersifat umum." <br /><br />- Qa'idah Fiqh Irtiqab Akhaffi adl-Dlararain <br /><br />(Al-Mustashfa dll):<br />"Apabila terjadi Kontradiksi <br /><br />antara dua mafsadah maka yang harus dipilih adalah <br /><br />yang mafsadatnya paling ringan." <br /><br />- Keputusan Masjid IlmiahLembaga Pengkajian Fiqh <br /><br />Islam (majma' al-Fiqh al-Islami) Nomor 29 (4/4) dalam <br /><br />Muktamar IV di Jiddah Arab Saudi, tanggal 18-23 <br /><br />Jumadil Akhir 1408 H/16-11 Pebruari 1988 M tentang <br /><br />pencabutan hak milik (individu) untuk kepentingan Umum <br /><br />(majalah Majma' al-Fiqh al-Islami, No. IV, jilid II, <br /><br />h.897). <br /><br />- Pendapat Sidang Komisi C Bidang Fatwa pada Munas <br /><br />VII MUI 2005. <br /><br /><br /><br />Dengan bertawakal kepada Allah <br /><br />SWT<br />MEMUTUSKAN<br /><br /><br />MENETAPKAN : FATWA TENTANG PENCABUTAN <br /><br />HAK MILIK PRIBADI UNTUK KEPENTINGAN <br /><br />UMUM<br />PERTAMA : Ketentuan Umum<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Halal Guide<br />http://www.halalguide.info Powered by Joomla! Generated: 9 May, 2008, 19:43<br />- Hak milik pribadi adalah kepemilikan terhadap <br /><br />sesuatu yang manfaatnya hanya di nikmati oleh <br /><br />pemiliknya, seseorang atau beberapa orang tertentu. <br /><br />- Kepentingan umum adalah kepentingan yang <br /><br />manfaatnya dinikmati oleh masyarakat umum tanpa ada <br /><br />diskriminasi. KEDUA : Ketentuan <br /><br />Hukum<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />- Hak milik pribadi wajib dilindungi oleh negara/ <br /><br />pemerintah dan jaminan hak-haknya secara penuh. Tidak <br /><br />seorangpun termasuk pemerintah boleh mengurangi, <br /><br />mempersempit atau membatasinya. Pemiliknya berkuasa <br /><br />atas hak miliknya dan berhak mempergunakan atau <br /><br />memnfaatkannya dalam batas-batas yang dibenarkan oleh <br /><br />Syara'/ hukum Islam. <br /><br />- Bila terjadi benturan antara kepentingan pribadi <br /><br />dengan kepentingan umum maka yang di dahulukan adalah <br /><br />kepentingan umum dengan ketentuan sebagai berikut : <br /><br /><br /><br />- Ditempuh lewat musyawarah antara pemerintah dan <br /><br />pemilik hak tanpa adanya pemaksaan. <br /><br />- Harus di beri ganti rugi yang layak (tsamanul <br /><br />mitsli). <br /><br />- Penanggung jawab kepentingan umum adalah <br /><br />pemerintah. <br /><br />- Penetapan kepentingan umum oleh DPR atau DPRD <br /><br />dengan memperlihatkan Fatwa dan pendapat MUI. <br /><br />- Kepentingan umum tidak boleh dialihfungsikan <br /><br />untuk kepentingan lain terutama yang bersifat <br /><br />komersial.<br /><br /><br />Ditetapkan di : Jakarta<br />Pada Tanggal : <br /><br />22 Jumadil Akhir 1426 H.<br />29 Juli 2005 M.<br /><br /><br />MUSYAWARAH NASIONAL <br /><br />VII<br />MAJELIS ULAMA INDONESIA<br />Pimpinan Sidang <br /><br />Komisi C Bidang Fatwa<br />Ketua, <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Sekretaris,<br />K.H. MA'RUF AMIN <br /><br /><br /><br />HASANUDIN<br />Halal Guide<br />http://www.halalguide.info Powered by Joomla! Generated: 9 May, 2008, 19:43<br />Halal Guide<br />http://www.halalguide.info Powered by Joomla! Generated: 9 May, 2008, 19:43land ownership in islamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05414932490344169940noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2263133053636924346.post-61473571528925054582008-12-11T18:01:00.000-08:002008-12-11T18:04:11.341-08:00Fiqh TanahFIQH TANAH<br />Batas Hak Kepemilikan antara Rakyat dan Negara atas Tanah<br />Ridwan, M. Ag.<br />A. Abstrak<br /><br />Kepemilikan seseorang atas tanah sebagaimana kepemilikan atas harta benda yang lainya dalam konteks yuridis maupun etika sosial haruslah dipandang sebagai kepemilikan yang di dalamnya juga harus mempertimbangkan aspek-aspek yang bersifat sosial. Kebebasan seseorang atas hak propertinya hakikatnya juga dibatasi oleh hak-hak orang lain baik secara individual maupun kelompok. Dalam konteks ini telah diatur dalam hadis Nabi tentang fungsi-fungsi sosial yang melekat pada hak milik atas tanah dihubungkan dengan kepentingan-kepentingan orang lain dan public sphare (ruang publik). Dalam kaitan dengan relasi personal dan sosial di tengah-tengah masyarakat, persoalan pemanfaatan tanah oleh pemiliknya juga harus mempertimbangkan kepentingan orang lain <br />Islam memandang negara sebagai institusi yang mengelola masyarakat suatu negara. Atas dasar inilah maka Islam memberikan hak sekaligus kewajiban kepada institusi tersebut untuk mengatur relasi antar individu dan individu dengan masyarakat serta hubungan individu, masyarakat dengan negara. Dalam hal pengaturan fungsi-fungsi sosial tanah, pemerintah (imam) mempunyai otoritas untuk membuat regulasi terkait dengan tanah, untuk mengatur dan menata penggunaan tanah untuk menciptakan kemaslahatan umum. Otoritas pemerintah membuat regulasi pertanahan didasarkan pada hak yang dimiliki oleh pemerintah yaiu hak iqtha yaitu hak memberikan lahan pada pihak lain baik sebagai hak milik atau hak memanfaatkan saja dan hima’ yaitu otoritas untuk menetapkan tempat lindung sebagai public sphare untuk kemaslahatan bersama. .(kata kunci :Tanah, Hak milik, fungsi sosial, regulasi, iqtha’, hima’, public sphare, kepentingan umum) <br /><br />B. Pendahuluan<br /><br />Tema kajian tentang pertanahan dalam diskursus hukum Islam (fiqh) kurang mendapat perhatian dari pemikir hukum Islam dan ummat Islam pada umumnya. Padahal persoalan yang muncul diseputar pertanahan merupakan problem yang sering kita saksikan khususnya sengketa tentang status tanah ataupun penggunaan atas tanah yang melibatkan sengketa dalam relasi individual, antar kelompok sosial ataupun sengketa tanah antara rakyat dengan penguasa negara (pemerintah). Di Indonesia misalnya, fenomena mogok makan dan menjahit mulut yang dilakukan oleh sebagian masyarakat yang tanah dan tempat tinggalnya dilalui oleh saluran udara tegangan ekstra tinggi (sutet) PLN yang menuntut ganti rugi kepada negara merupakan contoh konkrit adanya sengketa tentang tanah antara rakyat dan pemerintah terkait dengan soal tanah. Contoh lain yang menggambarkan sengketa adalah kasus pembangunan waduk Nipah yang menyisakan sengketa antara rakyat yang ingin mempertahankan rumahnya agar tidak digusur oleh pemerintah.<br />Mengkaji tentang tanah dalam Islam sudah barang tentu akan berkaitan erat dengan persoalan dasar yuridis, etis-filosofis dan fungsi sosiologis dari tanah yang harus dicari sandaran normatifnya dari sumber otoritatif dalam Islam yaitu al-Qur’an, Hadits dan juga pendapat para ulama fiqh berkaitan dengan persoalan seputar tanah. <br />Islam mengajarkan kepada umatnya agar meletakan dan memposisikan persoalan harta (kekayaan duniawi) dalam tinjauan yang relatif, yaitu perlunya kesadaran bahwa harta kekayaan yang bersifat duniawi hakikatnya adalah milik Allah dan sifat kepemilikanya bersifat semu. Artinya, bahwa kepemilikan manusia terhadap hartanya dibatasi oleh dimensi ruang dan waktu. Kepemilikan manusia atas harta benda tidak lebih sebuah amanah (titipan, as a trust). <br />Dalam Islam, kepemilikan tanah oleh seseorang dalam konteks individual dalam relasi sosial secara yuridis diakui, di mana pemilik tanah mempunyai kewenangan untuk menggunakan (tasharruf) sesuai dengan keinginanya. Kewenangan manusia atas kepemilikan harta (proverty right) dalam kaidah hukum Islam dilindungi dalam bingkai hifdzu al-maal sebagai salah satu prinsip al-kulliyat al-khams. Tanah di samping sebagai instrumen ekonomis, juga mempunyai kandungan sosial-humanistik. Oleh karena itu dalam Islam tidak diperbolehkan untuk melakukan praktek monopoli asset / harta. Dengan demikian pemilikan harta oleh seseorang haruslah disertai dengan pertanggungjawaban secara moral.<br />Kepemilikan harta benda dalam Islam berbeda secara idiologis dengan system ekonomi yang beridiologi liberal-kapitalistik dan komunistik. Aliran liberal kapitalistik yang bersumber dari teori laisser faire laisser aller memandang hak milik sebagai hak mutlak, setiap orang (individu) bebas untuk mencari, memiliki dan menggunakan menurut kemauanya sendiri secara bebas sehingga memberi ruang yang bebas lahirnya praktek monopoli dan eksploitasi untuk menindas kelompok ekonomi lemah. Sedangkan system ekonomi komunisme tidak mengakui hak milik perorangan, karena semua harta benda dimiliki dan dikuasai oleh negara. Islam berada di antara dua ekstrimitas idiologi besar yang memposisikan sebagai sistem idiologi sintetis dengan mengedepankan prinsip moderatisme (wasyatiyah).<br />Kepemilikan seseorang atas tanah sebagaimana kepemilikan atas harta benda yang lainya dalam konteks yuridis maupun etika sosial haruslah dipandang sebagai kepemilikan yang di dalamnya juga harus mempertimbangkan aspek-aspek yang bersifat sosial. Kebebasan seseorang atas hak propertinya hakikatnya juga dibatasi oleh hak-hak orang lain baik secara individual maupun kelompok. Dalam konteks ini telah diatur dalam hadis Nabi tentang fungsi-fungsi sosial yang melekat pada hak milik atas tanah dihubungkan dengan kepentingan-kepentingan orang lain dan public sphare (ruang publik). <br />Dalam kaitan dengan relasi personal dan sosial di tengah-tengah masyarakat, persoalan pemanfaatan tanah oleh pemiliknya juga harus mempertimbangkan kepentingan orang lain (syarik; orang yang berdampingan) denganya. Menurut imam Malik bin Anas, seseorang yang akan membuat sumur yang berdekatan dengan sumur tetangganya tidak diperbolehkan kalau pembuatan sumur itu membahayakan tetangga sebelahnya. Begitu juga dilarang seseorang membangun/membuat jamban/WC yang menggangu sumur tetangganya karena terlalu berdekatan. Dalam hal seseorang pemilik tanah yang tanah tersebut bergandengan /bersamaan dalam hal kepemilikanya dengan orang lain kemudian pemilik tanah tersebut akan menjual tanahnya, maka dalam fiqh tetangganya (syarik) haruslah orang yang pertama ditawari tanah tersebut. Dalam konteks ini seorang tetangga mempunyai hak syuf’ah yaitu hak untuk memaksa pemilik tanah untuk menjual tanahnya kepada tetangganya. <br />Islam memandang negara sebagai institusi yang mengelola masyarakat suatu negara. Atas dasar inilah maka Islam memberikan hak sekaligus kewajiban kepada isntitusi tersebut untuk mengatur relasi antar individu dan individu dengan masyarakat serta hubungan individu, masyarakat dengan negara. Dalam hal pengaturan fungsi-fungsi sosial tanah, pemerintah (imam) mempunyai otoritas untuk membuat regulasi terkait dengan tanah, untuk mengatur dan menata penggunaan tanah untuk menciptakan kemaslahatan umum. Justifikasi yuridis atas otoritas pemerintah untuk membuat regulasi tersebut didasarkan pada hadits sebagai berikut:<br /> وعن ابن عباس أن الصعب بن جثامة أخبره أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم قال لا حمى إلا لله ولرسوله رواه البخاري <br /> Artinya :Diriwayatkan dari Ibn Abbas bahwasanya Sha’b ibn Jisamah menceritakan sesungguhnya Nabi bersabda: tidak ada batasan kecuali batasan Allah dan Rasulullah.<br /><br />Imam Syafi’I memahami hadis ini dengan dua kemungkinan pengertian. Pertama, bahwa tidak ada seorangpun yang berhak membuat batasan (penggunaan tanah) kecuali oleh Rasulullah dan tidak bisa digantikan oleh siapapun. Kedua, seseorang boleh membuat batasan-batasan sebagaimana batasan yang telah dibuat oleh Rasulullah yaitu para khalifah pengganti beliu (dalam kapasitas sebagai seorang imam). Pemahaman yang kedua inilah yang dinilai kuat. Berdasarkan hadis ini pula, seorang imam/kepala negara berhak untuk mengatur (membuat batasan) penggunaan tanah tentu dengan alasan yang rasional, logis dan objektif dengan dilandasi semangat merealisasikan kemaslahatan umum sebagai tugas pokok kepala negara. Dalam kaidah fiqhiyah disebutkan:<br /> تصرف الامام على الرعية منوط بالمصلحة<br />Artinya: bahwa kebijakan seorang kepala negara harus berorientasi pada upaya menciptakan kemaslahatan <br /><br />Pemerintah dalam upaya pembangunan tentu memerlukan tanah sebagai instrumen fisik bagi tegaknya sebuah bangunan. Diantara hak pemerintah dalam hal pengaturan tanah yang bersentuhan langsung dengan hak warga dan negara dalam fiqh Islam dikenal empat konsep dasar yaitu ihya’ul mawat, hima, irfaq dan iqta’. Pemerintah dengan alasan menciptakan kepentingan umum (maslahah ‘ammah) mempunyai otoritas untuk melakukan tahdid al-milkiyah (pembatasan hak milik), naz’u al-aradhi (pencabutan hak milik) di mana otoritas kebijakan ini bersinggungan langsung dengan kepemilikan tanah warga negara. Pada posisi ini negara akan dihadapkan pada dua kutub kepentingan yaitu antara kepentingan warga negara dan kepentingan negara atas nama pembangunan.<br />Hanya saja dalam konteks interpretasi apa makna dan kriteria kemaslahatan / kepentingan umum sebagai dasar pembenaran intervensi pemerintah atas hak tanah rakyat seringkali menjadi bias yang pada umumnya menggunakan paradigma kekuasaan untuk kepentingan kekuasaan juga. Ketika kekuasaan negara tidak lagi memerankan fungsinya sebagai instrumen untuk menyejahterakan rakyatnya, maka konflik kepentingan antara rakyat dan negara sangat mungkin terjadi. Gambaran dari berbagai fenomena konflik rakyat dan negara dalam realitas sosial yang kerap disertai dengan aksi kekerasan adalah bukti konkrit di mana batas-batas hak kepemilikan rakyat dan negara atas tanah tidak jelas bahkan kemungkinan terjadi penindasan. Dari latar belakang masalah di atas, tampak jelas adanya kesenjangan antara idialitas sebuah teori dengan realitas empiris mengenai relasi kuasa antara rakyat dan pemerintah dalam hal batasan hak atas tanah. <br />Adapun yang menjadi persoalan pokok penelitian ini adalah bagaimana konsep hukum Islam dalam hal pengaturan masalah seputar pertanahan. Masalah pokok tersebut dapat dirinci ke dalam beberapa sub bahasan yaitu konsep cara perolehan hak milik atas tanah, fungsi sosial tanah, batas-batas kepemilikan individu dan negara atas tanah serta kebijakan pemerintah dalam hal pengaturan tanah.<br />C. Metode Penelitian<br />Penelitian ini memusatkan kajian pada pada penelitian kepustakaan (library research) yang sifatnya deskriptif analitis berdasarkan kajian teks. Metode ini diperlukan untuk menggali data, fakta serta teori yang membuat suatu kepercayaan itu benar. Metode pendekatan yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah normative legal research13. yaitu penelaahan hukum normative dengan memusatkan kajian pada interpretasi teks al-Qur’an, Hadits, dan kitab fiqh yang ditulis para ulama. <br />Metode pengumpulan data penelitian ini adalah dengan metode dokumentasi. Metode ini digunakan untuk melacak data-data penelitian yang bersifat kepustakaan berupa dokumen tertulis dalam al-Qur’an dan Hadits dan kitab fiqh terkait dengan konsep kepemilikan, kedudukan, fungsi dan kewenangan pemerintah untuk membuat regulasi tentang pertanahan. Metode pengumpulan data yang lain adalah metode historis yaitu cara pengambilan data / fakta yang bertolak pada pemaknaan perkembangan dalam kaitan waktu di masa lampau.14. Metode ini diperlukan untuk melihat dimensi historisitas sebuah pendapat hukum dari seorang penulis kitab atau pejabat negara dalam membangun gagasanya soal tanah atau membuat kebijakan yang tidak lepas dari dimensi ruang dan waktu.<br />Sedangkan untuk analisis data penelitian ini adalah analisa kualitatif dengan menggunakan metode content analysis15. atau yang sering disebut sebagai analisis isi atau kajian isi yaitu teknik yang digunakan untuk menarik kesimpulan melalui usaha memunculkan karakteristik pesan yang dilakukan secara obyektif dan sistematis. Metode ini juga diartikan sebagai alat untuk mengobservasi dan menganalisis prilaku komunukasi yang terbuka dari komunikator yang dipilih.16 Dengan metode ini akan diperoleh suatu hasil atau pemahaman terhadap isi pesan pengarang/penulis kitab secara objektif, sistematis dan relevan secara sosiologis. Metode ini digunakan untuk menganalisis substansi pemikiran para ulama fiqh dengan menganalisis kerangka paradigmatik dan konsep-konsep dasarnya, untuk kemudian ditarik pada konteks kekinian. <br /> Di samping itu, peneliti juga menggunakan metode komparatif17 yaitu metode yang digunakan untuk memperoleh suatu kesimpulan dengan meneliti faktor-faktor yang berhubungan dengan suatu situasi atau fenomena yang diteliti dan membandingkan dengan factor lain. Metode ini digunakan untuk memetakan kerangka paradigmatik dan konsep-konsep dasar yang digagas oleh para ahli fiqh tentanh hukum pertanahan untuk kemudian dicari titik persamaan dan perbedaan sebagai bahan merumuskan fiqh tanah yang utuh dan sistematis. Metode ini digunakan dengan tujuan untuk mendapatkan abstraksi atau generalisasi dari hasil temuan penelitian.<br />D. Hasil Penelitian dan Analisis<br />Tanah merupakan tempat di mana bangunan tempat tinggal manusia didirikan. Tanah juga merupakan bagian dari asset yang seringkali dalam tata pergaulan social menjadi persoalan yang menjadi objek atau menjadi sebab lahirnya persengketaan. Dalam proses kepemilikan tanah dan penggunaannya seringkali terjadi persinggungan kepentingan antara kepentingan rakyat vis a vis pemerintah, kepemilikan individu dengan masyarakat atau kepemilikan masyarakat dengan pemerintah.<br />Dalam kaitan dengan tulisan ini, penulis paparkan beberapa temuan penelitian yang fokusnya pada bagaimana otoritas pemerintah dalam membuat regulasi tentang tanah dan bagiamana pula persinggungan kepentingan antara kepemilikan rakyat dengan kepentingan negara serta beberapa model solusi penyelesian sengketa tentang tanah.<br />I. Konsep Maslahat ‘Ammah dan Ri’ayat al-Ra’iyyah dalam Membuat Kebijakan Masalah Tanah<br /><br />Misi utama kehadiran Islam di muka bumi adalah menciptakan kedamaian hidup yaitu kehidupan yang penuh dengan kemaslahatan yang dapat dinikmati mahluk semesta alam (rahmatan lil ‘alamin).Visi Islam membangun kemaslahatan bersama ini dibangun dengan mendasarkan pada fondasi etika Islam yang implementasinya dibumikan melalui instrumen politik yaitu system kenegaraan Islam. <br />Dalam Islam dikenal konsep siyasah syar’iyyah (kepemimpinan politik Islam) yang ciata-cita dasarnya pada pembumian kemaslahatan bersama (tahqiq mashalih al-‘ibad). Nilai-nilai kemaslahatan yang melekat dan menjadi hak dasar setiap manusia dalam hukum Islam dikenal dengan al-kulliyat al-khams atau adh-dharuriyat al-khams yaitu menjaga agama, jiwa, akal, harta dan keturunan. Oleh karena itu setiap kebijakan politik yang diambil oleh pemimpin politik Islam (khalifah/imam) haruslah berorientasi pada penciptaan kemaslahatan bersama.<br />Dengan mendasarkan pada konsep di atas, maka siyasah islamiyah tidak hanya dipahami terbatas pada politik yang bersifat structural dan formal. Tetapi lebih dari itu, ia mempunyai kekuatan dan kemampuan untuk mendinamisir warga masyarakat untuk bersikap dan berprilaku politis dengan pertimbangan maslahah yang luas. Yusuf Qardhawi sebagaimana dikutip oleh KH Sahal Mahfudh menegaskan, politik yang adil (as-siyasa al-‘adila) bukan harus sesuai dengan syari’at, melainkan tidak bertentangan dengan syari’at.18<br />Kewenangan pemerintah membuat regulasi tentang pertanahan dalam fiqh dikenal dua konsep yaitu Hima’ yaitu kewenangan yang dimiliki pemerintah untuk menetapkan kawasan lindung untuk kepentingan binatang ternak atau untuk kemaslahatan umum. Otoritas kedua adalah Iqtha’ yaitu pemberian tanah oleh pemerintah kepada orang atau kelompok orang baik untuk dimiliki atau disewakan. Kebijakan memutuskan Iqtha’ maupun Hima oleh pemerintah harus didasarkan pada pertimbangan kemaslahatan ummat.19 Kalaupun pemerintah (imam) akan melakukan pembebasan tanah dengan otoritas iqtha’ yang melekat padanya, maka rakyat atau pihak-pihak yang tanahnya terambil mempunyai hak untuk memperoleh ganti rugi / imbalan (al-ujrah) yang diambil dari uang baitul maal (kas negara).20 Kalau tidak ada ganti rugi maka pemerintah melakukan kedholiman kepada rakyatnya<br />Seorang imam/kepala negara berhak untuk mengatur (membuat batasan) penggunaan tanah tertentu dengan alasan yang rasional, logis dan objektif dengan dilandasi semangat merealisasikan kemaslahatan umum بشرط أن لا يضر بكافة المسلمين sebagai tugas pokok kepala negara. Dalam kaidah fiqhiyah disebutkan: bahwa kebijakan seorang kepala negara harus berorientasi pada upaya menciptakan kemaslahatan تصرف الامام على الرعية منوط بالمصلحة<br />Kebolehan membuat kebijakan hima yang diambil oleh pemerintah adalah untuk kemaslahatan ummat dan sebaliknya kalau kebijakan itu berimplikasi lahirnya madharat maka tidak boleh.21 Salah satu instrumen kebijakan pemerintah dalam hal pengaturan tanah adalah hak imam membuat hima (tanah lindung) untuk kepentingan rakyat banyak.22 Namun demikian seorang imam tidak boleh menentukan kebijakan hima untuk kepentingan dirinya.23 Dasar kebijakan penguasa dalamr pembuatan kebijakan hima adalah terciptanya kemaslahatan manusia (ma lam yudhayyaq ‘ala an-naas).24 Dasar filosofis dari kebijakan pemerintah membuat regulasi tentang harta berangkat dari sebuah kesadaran akan hakikat harta bahwa semua harta itu hakikatnya adalah milik Allah. Berkaitan dengan ini Khalifah Umar ibn Khattab berkata :<br />فقال عمر المال مال الله والعباد عبادالله <br />Artinya: Umar berkata “ Semua harta adalah milik Allah dan semua hamba (manusia) hakikatnya juga milik Allah”.25<br /><br />Ketika seorang imam membuat kebijakan hima’ untuk dirinya sendiri akan dikhawatirkan munculnya penyalahgunaan kewenangan untuk memperkaya diri sendiri atau kelompoknya dan konsekuensi logisnya adalah akan merugikan orang lain. Dengan kata lain kebijakan hima’ untuk kalangan para pejabat akan melahirkan monopoli kekayaan yang terselubung dengan bingkai dan legitimasi dari pemilik otoritas politik. Monopoli dan oligapoli adalah praktek yang dilarang dalam Islam.<br /> Demikian juga kewenangan imam membuat kebijakan iqtha’ (pemberian lahan) juga harus mempertimbangkan kemaslahatan umum. Oleh karena itu ketika orang yang menerima tanah iqtha tidak digunakan (dikelola) maka seorang imam boleh menarik kembali tanah yang diberikanya. Persoalan yang muncul kemudian adalah bolehkah seorang membatalkan pemberian imam lain ?. Dalam masalah ini mayoritas ulama fiqh membolehkan membatalkan iqtha imam lainya.26 Adapun Level imam yang punya otoritas membuat kebijakan iqtha adalah kepala negara (imam al-a‘dham).27 <br /><br />II. Relasi Individu, Masyarakat dan Negara dalam Pemilikan Tanah<br /><br />Setiap hak milik pribadi selalu akan bersinggungan dengan berbagai kepentingan dengan pihak lain. Persinggungan kepentingan tersebut bisa mewujud dalam relasi antara individu, individu dengan masyarakat dan individu dengan negara. Titik persinggungan tersebut berkaitan dengan berbagai kepentingan yang timbul dari banyaknya kepentingan seputar kepemilikan individu atas tanah.<br />Batas-batas hak milik pribadi dan kepemilikan itu menyaratkan tanah itu ditempati selama sebulan atau setahun.28 Hak kepemilikan tanah oleh individu akan menjadi hilang ketika mandat yang diberikan oleh pemerintah tidak bisa digunakan atau dimanfaatkan secara maksimal sesuai dengan fungsi dan tujuan awalnya. Dari konsep ini tampak ada batasan kedaluarsa kepemilikan atas tanah yang dasar pemikiranya adalah ketika tanah tersebut tidak lagi menjadi produktif yang jelas akan mengabaikan fungsi sosial tanah karena tidak ada nilai ekonomis apapun bagi kesejahteraan sosial. Ketentuan waktu kedaluarsa hak kepemilikan seseorang adalah tiga tahun.29 Salah satu hak masyarakat atas kepemilikan individu adalah berkaitan dengan hak penggunaan air oleh ibn sabil / para musafir yang membutuhkan air untuk keperluan hidupnya.30 Oleh karena itulah, maka seorang Imam tidak boleh mengeluarkan kebijakan iqtha kalau berakibat pada menyulitkan masyarakat.31 Kalaupun seorang imam mempunyai otoritas memberi sebidang tanah melalui hak iqtha’ maka pemberian tersebut sesuai kebutuhan, kalau berlebihanan akan mengakibatkan dharar kepada kaum muslimin.32 Contoh lain dari persinggungan hak milik pribadi antara lain pada pengaturan hak atas hak orang lain. Seseorang yang akan membuat rumah misalnya maka setiap rumah haruslah mempunyai pintu atau jendela sendiri. Oleh karena itu dilarang seseorang memanfaatkan jendela (sebagai ventilasi) dari orang lain.33<br />Dalam Islam, setiap individu mempunyai hak untuk memiliki harta/aset termasuk tanah dan berhak pula untuk mentasharufkanya sesuai dengan dengan keinginan pemilik. Hak milik secara individual memang diakui keberadaanya sebagai hak yang melekat pada setiap individu yang didasarkan pada prinsip hifzd al-maal. Namun demikian, kebebasan individu atas hak miliknya dalam penggunaanya dibatasi oleh hak-hak orang lain. Hak orang lain atas tanah individu mengandaikan akan fungsi social dari tanah. <br />Dalam bebarapa literatur fiqh diatur beberapa kerangka etika kepemilikan atas tanah, antara lain :<br />1. Larangan duduk di jalan, karena mengganggu pemakai jalan. Fungsi pokok dari jalan adalah ruang publik di mana setiap orang berhak melintas di atasnya. Berhenti atau duduk di jalan dibolehkan selama tidak mengganggu pengguna jalan.34 Jalan umum (al-thariq al-‘amm) adalah milik umum sehingga tidak boleh seseorang mendirikan tempat untuk berjualan di atasnya atau dijadikan tempat duduk yang akan mengganggu pemakai jalan.35<br />2. Dilarang seseorang melintas jalan milik orang lain tanpa izinya, karena perbuatan tersebut termasuk ghasab.36 Dalam kitan dengan masalah jalan ini, seseorang tidak boleh membuat pintu atau jendela yang posisinya pas berada di atas jalan tersebut kecuali ada izin dari pemilik jalan. Jalan milik perorangan disebut dengan al-thariq al-khas.37 <br />3. Kelebihan air dan rumput yang dimiliki oleh seseorang hendaknya diberikan kepada orang lain ketika kebutuhan dirinya telah tercukupi. Melarang orang lain untuk mengambil kelebihan air yang oleh seseorang, maka menurut Rasululalah menyebabkan tertutupnya rahmat Allah kepada orang tersebut.38 <br />4. Tidak boleh menyerobot hak orang lain.39 Larangan ini mendasarkan pada hadits Rasulullah : <br />عن يعلى بن مرة قال سمعت رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم يقول ثم أيما رجل ظلم شبرا من الأرض كلفه الله أن يحفره حتى يبلغ سبع أرضين ثم يطوقه يوم القيامة حتى يفصل بين الناس<br /><br />Artinya: Dari Ya’la ibn Abdillah bekata: saya mendengar Rasulallah bersabda Barang siapa yang mengambi sebidang tanah dari bumi maka orang tersebut disiksa pada hari kiamat dengan dikalungi tujuh bumi…40<br /><br />5. Pengaturan berkaitan dengan pepohonan yang yang condong ke rumah tetangga haruslah ada ganti rugi41 . Dalam kaitan dengan masalah ini Rasulullah telah mengatur sebagaimana disebutkan dalam Hadits:<br /><br />وحدثنا حماد بن سلمة عن أيوب عن عكرمة عن أبي هريرة أن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم نهى أن يمنع الرجل جاره أن يضع خشبة على جداره<br /><br />Artinya: Dari Hammad ibn Salamah dari Ayyub dari Ikrimah dari Abi Hurairah sesungguhnya Rasulullah melarang seseorang yang menghalangi kepada tetangganya yang pohon/kayunya pada tembok rumah tetangganya.<br /><br />6. Hak pemilik rumah susun yaitu perumahan yang terdiri dari beberapa lantai Ketika pemilik lantai bawah berkeinginan menjual rumahnya, maka pemilik lantai ats lebih berhak atas lantai bawah. Apabila bangunan lantai bawah roboh yang berdampak pada kerusakan lantai atas, maka apabila robohnya lantai bawah itu karena kesalahan pemilik lantai bawah, maka pemilik lantai bawah berkewajiban menanggung segala kerugian yang diderita pemilik lantai atas.42 <br /> 7. Setiap orang yang membuka lahan baru (ihya al-mawat) maka pada dirinya melekat dua kewajiban pokok yaitu kewajiban untuk mengelurakan al-‘usyur yaitu pajak 10 % yang disetorkan kepada pemerintah dan kewajiban untuk membuat batas-batas tanahnya (al-hariim)..Kewajiban pasca ihyaul mawat 10% dan perbatasan.43 Kewajiban membayar sejumlah uang ke kas negara oleh pemilik tanah adalah merupaka salah satu bagian dari relasi hak individu dengan kewajiban pada negara. Inilah titik persinggungan antara kepemilikan secara individu dengan kepentingan negara. <br />8. Setiap pemilik tanah wajib membuat batas-batas atas tanahnya yaitu batas tanah dengan teras, pohon, batas sumur. Pemberian batasan secara jelas dikasudkan untuk meminimalisir lahirnya konflik yang dipicu oleh sengketa perbatasan hak atas tanah.44 <br />III. Model-model Penyelesaian Sengketa Tanah<br />Persoalan hak kepemilikan atas harta termasuk masalah seputar pertanahan merupakan masalah yang seringkali terjadi di tengah-tengah masyarakat. Akar persoalan sengketa tentang tanah pada umumnya berkaitan dengan hak penggunaan, batas-batas tanah, transaksi dan yang berkaitan dengan persoalan ganti rugi atas tanah. Ruang lingkup persengketaan dilihat dari subjeknya bisa dalam relasi antar individu, individu dengan masyarakat, individu dengan negara dan masyarakat dengan negara. <br />Berkaitan dengan model penyelesaian sengketa tentang pertanahan dan pengairan antara seorang laki-laki dari suku Quraisy dengan Bani Quraidhah berkaitan dengan masalah pembagian air dengan mengadukan masalahnya kepada Rasulullah. Dari pengaduan ini Rasulullah memberikan keputusan bahwa pembagian air kepada orang lain baru diberikan ketika jumlah air yang dimiliki seseorang telah mencapai tinggi dua mata kaki. Ketika sudah mancapai tinggi dua mata kaki maka pemilik air yang berada di atas baru berkewajiban mengalirkan kepada kelompok orang yang posisinya berada di bawah. Hak atas air didasarkan pada kedekatan tanah yang dimilikinya dengan sumber mata air. <br />Apabila ada seseorang yang menanami sebidang tanah orang lain dengan tanaman kurma, maka Rasulallah memutuskan bahwa tanah tersebut adalah masih milik pemiliknya, sedangkan pohon kurma itu adalah milik dari orang yang menanam dan kepadanya diminta untuk mengelurkan pohon kurma tresebut dari kebun.45 Dalam pandangan Rasulallah, kepemilikan atas hak milik adalah hak dasar yang harus dijaga. Ketika beliu dihadapkan pada sengketa tentang pertanahan, beliu menyatakan : Sesungguhnya darah dan harta kamu sekalian terlindungi, maka tidak halal bagi seseorang memanfaatkan harta orang lain tanpa izin pemiliknya.46 Perbuatan menanam pepohonan di atas tanah orang lain menurut Rasulallah adalah bagian dari prilaku dhalim.47<br />Pada zaman Rasulallah pernah terjadi sengketa seputar kebun korma. Hadist diriwayatkan dari Yahya ibn ’Urwah ibn Zubair dari bapaknya bahwasanya ada seorang laki-laki menanami pohon di kebun korma milik orang lain. Kemudian Rasululllah memberikan keputusan atas kasus ini dengan menyatakan bahwa pemilik kebun korma tetap menjadi pemilik korma tersebut dan seorang yang menanam pohon korma diminta untuk mengeluarkan pohon korma tersebut dari kebun.48 <br />Sedangkan berkaitan dengan sengketa pembagian giliran memperoleh air, hal ini pernah terjadi sengketa pada zaman Rasulullah antara seorang laki-laki Quraisy dengan bani Quraidhah yang diadukan kepada Rasul. Kemudian Rasul memberikan keputusan dalam masalah ini dengan dengan pernyataanya sebagai berikut :<br />فقضي بينهم رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم أن الماء إلى الكعبين لا يحبس الأعلى على الأسفل<br />Dari Hadits di atas jelas bagimana Rasulullah memberikan keputusan hukum diantara para pihak yang bersengketa bahwasanya batas hak pengairan itu diukur dengan batasan ketika air tingginya sudah mencapai dua mata kaki. Ketika sudah mencapai ukuran dua mata kaki maka tidak ada alasan pemilik air yang berada di atas untuk menahan airnya bagi orang yang mempunyai lahan di bawahnya.49 <br />Berkaitan dengan sengketa masalah hak pengairan ini juga pernah terjadi pada masa khalifah Umar ibn Khattab antara Adh-Dhahhak ibn Khulaifah dengan Muhammad ibn Maslamah di mana Adh-Dhahhak meminta kepada Muhammad ibn Maslamah untuk diberi jalan aliran air untuk mengairi kebunnya, akan tetapi Muhammad ibn Maslamah menolaknya. Kemudian Umar memerintahkan pada Muhammad ibn Maslamah untuk memberi jalan aliran air kepada Adh-Dhahhak, tetapi Muhammad ibn Maslamah menolaknya. Kemudian Umar berkata kepada Muhammad, apakah pemberian jalan itu membahayakanmu? Muhammad menjawab, tidak. Umar berkata, mengapa anda menolak memberi jalan air ? demi Allah akan saya alirkan air itu sekalipun melalui perutmu.50<br /><br />Kemudian berkaitan dengan sengketa batas-batas teras rumah dengan jalan milik umum, maka Rasulullah memberikan keputusan bahwa batas antara teras rumah dengan jalan adalah tujuh dira’. Pemberian batas tanah milik dengan jalan dimaksudkan untuk memberikan ruang yang cukup bagi para pengguna jalan sebagai tempat publik. Dengan demikian maka semangat hadits ini adalah perlunya diperhatikan bahwa ada dimensi social yang harus ditunaikan oleh pemilik lahan yaitu mempertimbangkan kepentingan-kepentingan masyarakat dalam mengakses jalam secara mudah. Bahkan dalam sebuah riwayat Rasulullah mempersilahkan masyarakat untuk menuntut hak-hak social kepada pemilik tanah ketika kewajiban pemilik tanah berupa memberi jalan kepada pengguna jalan tidak dipenuhi. Adapun batas-batas pemberian hak jalan dari tanah adalah 7 dhira.51 Akan tetapi ketika pemilik tanah membuat jalan secara khusus untuk dirinya sendiri, maka orang yang akan melintasi jalan tersebut padahal jalan untuk umum sudah ada, maka orang tersebut haruslah meminta izin dari pemilik jalan.52 <br />Pengaturan tentang batas-batas hak pengairan juga berkaitan dengan aturan pembuatan sumur tempat sumber mata air. Menurut imam Malik seseorang tidak boleh membuat sumur yang mana sumur tersebut berdekatan dengan sumur tetangganya. Menurutnya, kalau pembuatan sumur tersebut betul-betul membahayakan bagi sumur tetangganya, maka pembuatan sumur tesebut dilarang. Rasulullah memberikan batas / jarak antara satu sumur dengan sumur lain dengan berbagi sisinya yaitu empat puluh dzira’.53 Demikian juga seseorang dilarang membuat jamban (kakus) yang sangat berdekatan dengan sumur tetangganya.54<br />Dari berbagai kasus actual baik yang terjadi pada masa Rasulullah, masa sahabat ataupun pada masa-masa imam mazhab berkaitan dengan sengketa pertanahan tampak bahwa persoalan seputar sengketa tanah merupakan persoalan yang sering terjadi dalam proses kehidupan. Dengan memperhatikan berbagai kasus sebagaimana penulis deskripsikan di atas sangat jelas bagaimana Rasulullah dan kaum salafus shalih telah memberikan panduan teknis bagi penyelesaian masalah pertanahan. Paradigma yang dikembangkan dalam proses penyelesaian masalah tanah adalah menciptakan dan membumikan nilai-nilai kemaslahatan sebagai dasar pijakanya. Pembumian nilai-nilai kemaslahatan adalan inti dari ajaran Islam.<br />Beberapa panduan teknis penyelesaian masalah sengketa tanah baik dalam relasi personal, atau relasi personal dengan komunal atau relasi komunal dengan negara di samping mempertimbangkan bingkai yuridis juga mempertimbangkan dimensi etis. Perpaduan dimensi yuridis dan etis dalam membuat regulasi pertanahan sebagaimana dicontohkan oleh Rasulullah dan kaum salafus shalih merupakan gambaran penyelesaian masalah tanah secara bermartabat dan terhormat dengan menghindarkan pada eksploitasi atau bahkan mendeskriditkan pihak lain yang bertentangan dengan spirit dasar syari’at Islam yaitu tahqiq al-mashalih al-‘ammah.<br />F. Kesimpulan <br /><br />Dalam Islam, kepemilikan tanah oleh seseorang dalam konteks individual dalam relasi sosial secara yuridis diakui, di mana pemilik tanah mempunyai kewenangan untuk menggunakan (tasharruf) sesuai dengan keinginanya. Kewenangan manusia atas kepemilikan harta (proverty right) dalam kaidah hukum Islam dilindungi dalam bingkai hifdzu al-maal sebagai salah satu prinsip al-kulliyat al-khams. Tanah di samping sebagai instrumen ekonomis, juga mempunyai kandungan sosial-humanistik. <br />Kepemilikan seseorang atas tanah sebagaimana kepemilikan atas harta benda yang lainya dalam konteks yuridis maupun etika sosial haruslah dipandang sebagai kepemilikan yang di dalamnya juga harus mempertimbangkan aspek-aspek yang bersifat sosial. Kebebasan seseorang atas hak propertinya hakikatnya juga dibatasi oleh hak-hak orang lain baik secara individual maupun kelompok. Dalam konteks ini telah diatur dalam hadis Nabi tentang fungsi-fungsi sosial yang melekat pada hak milik atas tanah dihubungkan dengan kepentingan-kepentingan orang lain dan public sphare (ruang publik). Dalam kaitan dengan relasi personal dan sosial di tengah-tengah masyarakat, persoalan pemanfaatan tanah oleh pemiliknya juga harus mempertimbangkan kepentingan orang lain (syarik; orang yang berdampingan) denganya. <br />Islam memandang negara sebagai institusi yang mengelola masyarakat suatu negara. Atas dasar inilah maka Islam memberikan hak sekaligus kewajiban kepada isntitusi tersebut untuk mengatur relasi antar individu dan individu dengan masyarakat serta hubungan individu, masyarakat dengan negara. Dalam hal pengaturan fungsi-fungsi sosial tanah, pemerintah (imam) mempunyai otoritas untuk membuat regulasi terkait dengan tanah, untuk mengatur dan menata penggunaan tanah untuk menciptakan kemaslahatan umum. <br />Otoritas pemerintah membuat regulasi pertanahan didasarkan pada hak yang dimiliki oleh pemerintah yaiu hak iqtha yaitu hak memberikan lahan pada pihak lain baik sebagai hak milik atau hak memanfaatkan saja dan hima’ yaitu otoritas untuk menetapkan tempat lindung sebagai public sphare untuk kemaslahatan bersama. Kalaupun pemerintah (imam) akan melakukan pembebasan tanah dengan otoritas iqtha’ yang melekat padanya, maka rakyat atau pihak-pihak yang tanahnya terambil mempunyai hak untuk memperoleh ganti rugi / imbalan (al-ujrah) yang diambil dari uang baitul maal (kas negara) dengan mendasarkan pada nilai kepatutan secara sosial (‘urf) yang diputuskan secara bersama-sama dengan prinsip saling rela.<br />Seorang imam/kepala negara berhak untuk mengatur (membuat batasan) penggunaan tanah tertentu dengan alasan yang rasional, logis dan objektif dengan dilandasi semangat merealisasikan kemaslahatan umum بشرط أن لا يضر بكافة المسلمين sebagai tugas pokok kepala negara. Dalam kaidah fiqhiyah disebutkan: bahwa kebijakan seorang kepala negara harus berorientasi pada upaya menciptakan kemaslahatan تصرف الامام على الرعية منوط بالمصلحة<br />Kebolehan membuat kebijakan hima yang diambil oleh pemerintah adalah untuk kemaslahatan ummat dan sebaliknya kalau kebijakan itu berimplikasi lahirnya madharat maka tidak boleh. Salah satu instrumen kebijakan pemerintah dalam hal pengaturan tanah adalah hak imam membuat hima (tanah lindung) untuk kepentingan rakyat banyak. Namun demikian seorang imam tidak boleh menentukan kebijakan hima untuk kepentingan dirinya. Dasar kebijakan penguasa dalamr pembuatan kebijakan hima adalah terciptanya kemaslahatan manusia (ma lam yudhayyaq ‘ala an-naas). Dasar filosofis dari kebijakan pemerintah membuat regulasi tentang harta berangkat dari sebuah kesadaran akan hakikat harta bahwa semua harta itu hakikatnya adalah milik Allah.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Endnote<br /><br /> Lihat al-Qur’an surat al-Maidah ayat 17. <br />2 Dalam kaidah hukum Islam dikenal lima prinsip dasar yang terumuskan dalam konsep al-Kulliyat al-khams yaitu: khifdz al-din (agama) , nafs (jiwa), aql (akal), maal (harta) dan nasl (keturunan).<br />3 Lihat al-Qur’an surat Adz-Dzariyat ayat 19.<br />4Larangan monopoli dalam Islam secara konseptual diqiyaskan dengan larangan menimbun barang (al-ihtikar) berdasarkan hadits : <br />عن سعيد بن المسيب عن معمر بن عبد الله بن نضلة قال قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم ثم لا يحتكر إلا خاطئ<br />Lihat, Imam Ibnu Majah, Sunan Ibn Majah, Juz 2 (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, tt) hal. 728.<br />5 Dirjen Bimas Islam Depag RI, Panduan Pemberdayaan Tanah Wakaf Produktif Strategis di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Depag RI, 2003), hal. 12-13.<br />6 Muhammad Abi Sahl al-Syarakhsyi, Al-Mabsuth, Juz 15 (Bairut: Daar al-Ma’rifah, tt) hal. 55-56.<br />7 Imam Malik ibn Anas, Al-Mudawwanat al-Kubra, Juz 15, (Bairut: Daar al-Sadr, tt) hal. 197<br />8 Muhammad ibn Yaziz Abu Abdillah al-Qazwaini, Sunan Ibn Majah, juz 2, (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, tt) hal. 833.<br />9 Abi Hasan al-Mawardi, Kitab Ahkam al-Sulthaniyah, (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, 1960), hal. 185.<br />10 Muhammad Ibn Idris Asy-Syafi’I, Al-Umm, Juz 4 (Bairut: Daar al-Ma’rifah, 1393 H), hal. 48. lihat pula, Syams al-Haq al- ‘Adzim, ‘Aun al-Ma’bud Syarh Sunan Abi Daud, Juz 8, (Bairut: Daar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah, 1415), hal. 135. Bandingkan dengan As-Shan’ani, Subulus Salam, (Indonesia: Maktabah Dahlan, tt) hal. 83<br />11 Abdurahman as-Suyuthi, Al-Asybah wa an-Nadhair, (Indonesia: Maktabah Nur, tt) hal. 83.<br />12 Abi Hasan al-Mawardi, Kitab. hal. 177-190. Bandingkan dengan, Abu Ishaq Asy-Syairazi, Al-Muhaddzab fi Fiqh Imam Syafi’I juz 1, (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, tt) hal. 426.<br />13. Soerjono Soekanto, Pengantar Penelitian Hukum, (Jakarta: UI Press, 1998), hal. 250.<br />14 . Imam Suprayogo dan Tobroni, Metodologi Penelitian Sosial-Agama, (Bandung: Rosdakarya, 2001), hal. 65. <br />15. Sujono dan Abdurahman, Metodologi Penelitian, Suatu pemikiran dan Penerapan, (Jakarta: Rineka Cipta, 1998), hal. 13. <br />16 Imam Suprayogo dan Tobroni, Metodologi. hal. 154.<br />17.Soerjono Soekanto, Op. Cit, hal.261.<br />18. KH. MA. Sahal Mahfudh, Nuansa Fiqih Sosial (Jogjakarta: LkiS, 1994) hal. 231.<br />19.Lihat Abi Hasan Al-Mawardi, Kitab Ahkam al-Sulthaniyah, (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, 1960) hal.195-190. Bandingkan dengan, Wahbah az-Zuhaily, al-Fiqh al-Islam wa Adillatuhu (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, tt ) hal. 574-575.<br />20. Syihabuddin Ar-Ramli, Nihayat al-Muhtaj Juz 5. hal, 339.<br />21. Ibnu Qudamah, Al-Kaafi. hal. 510.<br />22. Muhammad Ibn Muflikh al-Maqdisi, Al -Furu’ juz 4. hal. 442. Lihat pula, Muhammad Ibn Muflikh al-Maqdisi, Al-Mubda’ fi Syarh al-Muqni Juz 5, hal. 259.<br />23.Syihabuddin Ar-Ramli, Nihayat al-Muhtaj Juz 5. hal, 338<br />24.Muhammad Ibn Muflikh al-Maqdisi, Al-Mubda’ fi Syarh al-Muqni Juz 5, hal. 265.<br /><br />25 Ibid, hal. 265.<br />26Ibid, Bandingkan pula dengan, Abi Zakariya Muhyiddin ibn Syaraf An-Nawawi, al-Majmu’. hal. 208.<br />27 Ibid, 117. lihat pula, Ibnu Qudamah, Al-Mughni. hal. 462.<br />28 Syihabuddin Ar-Ramli, Nihayat al-Muhtaj Juz 5. hal, 341.<br />29 Abi Zakariya Muhyiddin ibn Syaraf An-Nawawi, al-Majmu’. hal. 108.<br />30 Ibnu Qudamah, Al-Mughni. hal. 474.<br />31 Ibid. hal. 463.<br />32 Sayyidi Ahmad Ad-Dardiri, Asy-Syarh al-Kabir juz 4 (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, t.tp) hal. 68.<br />33 Ibn Hazm Adh-Dhahiri, Al-Muhalla juz 8 (Bairut: Daar al-Afaq al-Jadidah, t.tp) hal. 241.<br />34 Abi Zakariya Muhyiddin ibn Syaraf An-Nawawi, al-Majmu’. hal. 104.<br />35 Muhammad Kamaludin Imam, Nadhariyat al-Fiqh fi Al-Islamy (Bairut: Jamiat al-Iskandariyat, t.tp) hal. 447.<br />36 Ibrahim ibn Abi al-Yamni Muhammad al-Hanafi, Lisanul Hukkam fi Marifatil Ahkam juz 1 (Kairo: Al-Babi al-Halabi, 1973) hal. 305-306.<br />37 Muhammad Kamaludin Imam, Nadhariyat. hal. 446.<br />38 Ibnu Qudamah, Al-Kaafi. hal. 511.<br />39 Muhammad Kamaludin Imam, Nadhariyat. hal. 444. Bandingkan dengan, Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Minhaji, Jawahirul Uqud wa Mu’inul Quddhat wal Muwaqqiina wa Syuhud (Bairut: Daar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah, 1996) hal. 238.<br />40 Hadis riwayat Ibn Hibban dari Ya’la ibn Murrah dalam Shahih Ibn Hibban.<br />41Burhanudin Abi Wafa’, Tabshiratul Hukkam (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, t.tp) hal. 252.<br />42Muhammad Kamaludin Imam, Nadhariyat. hal. 443-447.<br />43 Alauddin al-Kissai, Badai’u Ash-Shana’I fi Tartib Asy-Syara’Ijuz 6 (Bairut: Daar al-Kutub al-Arabi, t.tp) hal. 195. Musa Abu Bakar al-Baihaqi, Sunan al-Baihaqi al-Kubra juz 6 (Makkah Mukarramah, Maktabah Daar al-Baaz, t.tp) hal. 165-166.<br />44 Musa Abu Bakar al-Baihaqi, Sunan, hal. 165-166.<br /><br />45 Ibnu Hazm Adh-Dhahiri, Al-Muhalla. hal. 236.<br />46 Ibnu Hazm Adh-Dhahiri, Al-Muhalla juz 8. hal. 240.<br />47Abu Daud Al-Sijistani, Sunan Abi Daud, 179.<br />48 Ibnu Hazm Adh-Dhahiri, Al-Muhalla juz 8. hal. 236. lihat pula, Ibnu Hajar Al-Asqalani, Fathul Baari. hal. 19.<br />49 Abu Daus Al-Sijistani, Sunan Abi Daud juz 3. hal. 316.<br />50 Musa Abu Bakar al-Baihaqi, Sunan, hal. 156. Bandingkan dengan, Ibnu Hajar Al-Asqalani, Fathul. hal. 111.<br />51 Musa Abu Bakar al-Baihaqi, Sunan, hal. 154.<br />52 Ibrahim ibn Abi al-Yamni Muhammad al-Hanafi, Lisanul Hukkam. hal. 306.<br />53Musa Abu Bakar al-Baihaqi, Sunan, hal. 155.<br />54 Malik ibn Anas, Al-Mudawanatul Kubra juz 15 (Bairut: Daar al-Shadr, t.tp) hal. 195.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />DAFTAR PUSTKA<br />Abi Hasan al-Mawardi, Kitab Ahkam al-Sulthaniyah, (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, 1960)<br />As-Shan’ani, Subulus Salam, (Indonesia: Maktabah Dahlan, tt) <br />Abdurahman as-Suyuthi, Al-Asybah wa an-Nadhair, (Indonesia:Maktabah Nur, tt) <br />Abu Ishaq Asy-Syairazi, Al-Muhaddzab fi Fiqh Imam Syafi’I juz 1, (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, tt) <br />Dirjen Bimas Islam Depag RI, Panduan Pemberdayaan Tanah Wakaf Produktif Strategis di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Depag RI, 2003)<br />Imam Malik ibn Anas, Al-Mudawwanat al-Kubra, Juz 15, (Bairut: Daar al-Sadr,<br />Imam Ibnu Majah, Sunan Ibn Majah, Juz 2 (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, tt) <br />Idris Asy-Syafi’I, Al-Umm, Juz 4 (Bairut: Daar al-Ma’rifah, 1393 H)<br />Soerjono Soekanto, Pengantar Penelitian Hukum, (Jakarta: UI Press, 1998)<br />Imam Suprayogo dan Tobroni, Metodologi Penelitian Sosial-Agama, (Bandung: Rosdakarya, 2001 <br />Sujono dan Abdurahman, Metodologi Penelitian, Suatu pemikiran dan Penerapan, (Jakarta: Rineka Cipta, 1998). <br />Ibn Hazm Adh-Dhahiri, Al-Muhalla juz 8 (Bairut: Daar al-Afaq al-Jadidah, t.tp) <br />Ibrahim ibn Abi al-Yamni Muhammad al-Hanafi, Lisanul Hukkam. <br />Muhammad Abi Sahl al-Syarakhsyi, Al-Mabsuth, Juz 15 (Bairut: Daar al-Ma’rifah,tt) <br />Muhammad ibn Yaziz Abu Abdillah al-Qazwaini, Sunan Ibn Majah, juz 2, (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, tt) <br />KH. MA. Sahal Mahfudh, Nuansa Fiqih Sosial (Jogjakarta: LkiS, 1994)<br />Syams al-Haq al- ‘Adzim, ‘Aun al-Ma’bud Syarh Sunan Abi Daud, Juz 8, (Bairut: Daar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah, 1415) <br />Muhammad Ibn Muflikh al-Maqdisi, Al-Mubda’ fi Syarh al-Muqni Juz <br />Ibn Hazm Adh-Dhahiri, Al-Muhalla juz 8 (Bairut: Daar al-Afaq al-Jadidah, t.tp) <br />Ibnu Hajar Al-Asqalani, Fathul Baari Syarh Shahih Bukhari Juz 5 (Bairut: Daar al-Ma’rifah, 1379 H) <br />Ibrahim ibn Abi al-Yamni Muhammad al-Hanafi, Lisanul Hukkam fi Ma’rifatil Ahkam (Kairo: Bab a-Halabi, 1973)<br />Wahbah az-Zuhaily, al-Fiqh al-Islam wa Adillatuhu (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, tt ) <br />Syihabuddin Ar-Ramli, Nihayat al-Muhtaj Juz 5 (Kairo: Musthafa bab al-Halabi wa Auladuhu, t.tp)<br />Sayyidi Ahmad Ad-Dardiri, Asy-Syarh al-Kabir juz 4 (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, t.tp) <br />Musa Abu Bakar al-Baihaqi, Sunan, hal. 155.<br />Malik ibn Anas, Al-Mudawanatul Kubra juz 15 (Bairut: Daar al-Shadr, t.tp)<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />FIQH TANAH<br />Batas Hak Kepemilikan antara Rakyat dan Negara atas Tanah<br />Ridwan, M. Ag.<br />A. Abstrak<br /><br />Kepemilikan seseorang atas tanah sebagaimana kepemilikan atas harta benda yang lainya dalam konteks yuridis maupun etika sosial haruslah dipandang sebagai kepemilikan yang di dalamnya juga harus mempertimbangkan aspek-aspek yang bersifat sosial. Kebebasan seseorang atas hak propertinya hakikatnya juga dibatasi oleh hak-hak orang lain baik secara individual maupun kelompok. Dalam konteks ini telah diatur dalam hadis Nabi tentang fungsi-fungsi sosial yang melekat pada hak milik atas tanah dihubungkan dengan kepentingan-kepentingan orang lain dan public sphare (ruang publik). Dalam kaitan dengan relasi personal dan sosial di tengah-tengah masyarakat, persoalan pemanfaatan tanah oleh pemiliknya juga harus mempertimbangkan kepentingan orang lain <br />Islam memandang negara sebagai institusi yang mengelola masyarakat suatu negara. Atas dasar inilah maka Islam memberikan hak sekaligus kewajiban kepada institusi tersebut untuk mengatur relasi antar individu dan individu dengan masyarakat serta hubungan individu, masyarakat dengan negara. Dalam hal pengaturan fungsi-fungsi sosial tanah, pemerintah (imam) mempunyai otoritas untuk membuat regulasi terkait dengan tanah, untuk mengatur dan menata penggunaan tanah untuk menciptakan kemaslahatan umum. Otoritas pemerintah membuat regulasi pertanahan didasarkan pada hak yang dimiliki oleh pemerintah yaiu hak iqtha yaitu hak memberikan lahan pada pihak lain baik sebagai hak milik atau hak memanfaatkan saja dan hima’ yaitu otoritas untuk menetapkan tempat lindung sebagai public sphare untuk kemaslahatan bersama. .(kata kunci :Tanah, Hak milik, fungsi sosial, regulasi, iqtha’, hima’, public sphare, kepentingan umum) <br /><br />B. Pendahuluan<br /><br />Tema kajian tentang pertanahan dalam diskursus hukum Islam (fiqh) kurang mendapat perhatian dari pemikir hukum Islam dan ummat Islam pada umumnya. Padahal persoalan yang muncul diseputar pertanahan merupakan problem yang sering kita saksikan khususnya sengketa tentang status tanah ataupun penggunaan atas tanah yang melibatkan sengketa dalam relasi individual, antar kelompok sosial ataupun sengketa tanah antara rakyat dengan penguasa negara (pemerintah). Di Indonesia misalnya, fenomena mogok makan dan menjahit mulut yang dilakukan oleh sebagian masyarakat yang tanah dan tempat tinggalnya dilalui oleh saluran udara tegangan ekstra tinggi (sutet) PLN yang menuntut ganti rugi kepada negara merupakan contoh konkrit adanya sengketa tentang tanah antara rakyat dan pemerintah terkait dengan soal tanah. Contoh lain yang menggambarkan sengketa adalah kasus pembangunan waduk Nipah yang menyisakan sengketa antara rakyat yang ingin mempertahankan rumahnya agar tidak digusur oleh pemerintah.<br />Mengkaji tentang tanah dalam Islam sudah barang tentu akan berkaitan erat dengan persoalan dasar yuridis, etis-filosofis dan fungsi sosiologis dari tanah yang harus dicari sandaran normatifnya dari sumber otoritatif dalam Islam yaitu al-Qur’an, Hadits dan juga pendapat para ulama fiqh berkaitan dengan persoalan seputar tanah. <br />Islam mengajarkan kepada umatnya agar meletakan dan memposisikan persoalan harta (kekayaan duniawi) dalam tinjauan yang relatif, yaitu perlunya kesadaran bahwa harta kekayaan yang bersifat duniawi hakikatnya adalah milik Allah dan sifat kepemilikanya bersifat semu. Artinya, bahwa kepemilikan manusia terhadap hartanya dibatasi oleh dimensi ruang dan waktu. Kepemilikan manusia atas harta benda tidak lebih sebuah amanah (titipan, as a trust). <br />Dalam Islam, kepemilikan tanah oleh seseorang dalam konteks individual dalam relasi sosial secara yuridis diakui, di mana pemilik tanah mempunyai kewenangan untuk menggunakan (tasharruf) sesuai dengan keinginanya. Kewenangan manusia atas kepemilikan harta (proverty right) dalam kaidah hukum Islam dilindungi dalam bingkai hifdzu al-maal sebagai salah satu prinsip al-kulliyat al-khams. Tanah di samping sebagai instrumen ekonomis, juga mempunyai kandungan sosial-humanistik. Oleh karena itu dalam Islam tidak diperbolehkan untuk melakukan praktek monopoli asset / harta. Dengan demikian pemilikan harta oleh seseorang haruslah disertai dengan pertanggungjawaban secara moral.<br />Kepemilikan harta benda dalam Islam berbeda secara idiologis dengan system ekonomi yang beridiologi liberal-kapitalistik dan komunistik. Aliran liberal kapitalistik yang bersumber dari teori laisser faire laisser aller memandang hak milik sebagai hak mutlak, setiap orang (individu) bebas untuk mencari, memiliki dan menggunakan menurut kemauanya sendiri secara bebas sehingga memberi ruang yang bebas lahirnya praktek monopoli dan eksploitasi untuk menindas kelompok ekonomi lemah. Sedangkan system ekonomi komunisme tidak mengakui hak milik perorangan, karena semua harta benda dimiliki dan dikuasai oleh negara. Islam berada di antara dua ekstrimitas idiologi besar yang memposisikan sebagai sistem idiologi sintetis dengan mengedepankan prinsip moderatisme (wasyatiyah).<br />Kepemilikan seseorang atas tanah sebagaimana kepemilikan atas harta benda yang lainya dalam konteks yuridis maupun etika sosial haruslah dipandang sebagai kepemilikan yang di dalamnya juga harus mempertimbangkan aspek-aspek yang bersifat sosial. Kebebasan seseorang atas hak propertinya hakikatnya juga dibatasi oleh hak-hak orang lain baik secara individual maupun kelompok. Dalam konteks ini telah diatur dalam hadis Nabi tentang fungsi-fungsi sosial yang melekat pada hak milik atas tanah dihubungkan dengan kepentingan-kepentingan orang lain dan public sphare (ruang publik). <br />Dalam kaitan dengan relasi personal dan sosial di tengah-tengah masyarakat, persoalan pemanfaatan tanah oleh pemiliknya juga harus mempertimbangkan kepentingan orang lain (syarik; orang yang berdampingan) denganya. Menurut imam Malik bin Anas, seseorang yang akan membuat sumur yang berdekatan dengan sumur tetangganya tidak diperbolehkan kalau pembuatan sumur itu membahayakan tetangga sebelahnya. Begitu juga dilarang seseorang membangun/membuat jamban/WC yang menggangu sumur tetangganya karena terlalu berdekatan. Dalam hal seseorang pemilik tanah yang tanah tersebut bergandengan /bersamaan dalam hal kepemilikanya dengan orang lain kemudian pemilik tanah tersebut akan menjual tanahnya, maka dalam fiqh tetangganya (syarik) haruslah orang yang pertama ditawari tanah tersebut. Dalam konteks ini seorang tetangga mempunyai hak syuf’ah yaitu hak untuk memaksa pemilik tanah untuk menjual tanahnya kepada tetangganya. <br />Islam memandang negara sebagai institusi yang mengelola masyarakat suatu negara. Atas dasar inilah maka Islam memberikan hak sekaligus kewajiban kepada isntitusi tersebut untuk mengatur relasi antar individu dan individu dengan masyarakat serta hubungan individu, masyarakat dengan negara. Dalam hal pengaturan fungsi-fungsi sosial tanah, pemerintah (imam) mempunyai otoritas untuk membuat regulasi terkait dengan tanah, untuk mengatur dan menata penggunaan tanah untuk menciptakan kemaslahatan umum. Justifikasi yuridis atas otoritas pemerintah untuk membuat regulasi tersebut didasarkan pada hadits sebagai berikut:<br /> وعن ابن عباس أن الصعب بن جثامة أخبره أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم قال لا حمى إلا لله ولرسوله رواه البخاري <br /> Artinya :Diriwayatkan dari Ibn Abbas bahwasanya Sha’b ibn Jisamah menceritakan sesungguhnya Nabi bersabda: tidak ada batasan kecuali batasan Allah dan Rasulullah.<br /><br />Imam Syafi’I memahami hadis ini dengan dua kemungkinan pengertian. Pertama, bahwa tidak ada seorangpun yang berhak membuat batasan (penggunaan tanah) kecuali oleh Rasulullah dan tidak bisa digantikan oleh siapapun. Kedua, seseorang boleh membuat batasan-batasan sebagaimana batasan yang telah dibuat oleh Rasulullah yaitu para khalifah pengganti beliu (dalam kapasitas sebagai seorang imam). Pemahaman yang kedua inilah yang dinilai kuat. Berdasarkan hadis ini pula, seorang imam/kepala negara berhak untuk mengatur (membuat batasan) penggunaan tanah tentu dengan alasan yang rasional, logis dan objektif dengan dilandasi semangat merealisasikan kemaslahatan umum sebagai tugas pokok kepala negara. Dalam kaidah fiqhiyah disebutkan:<br /> تصرف الامام على الرعية منوط بالمصلحة<br />Artinya: bahwa kebijakan seorang kepala negara harus berorientasi pada upaya menciptakan kemaslahatan <br /><br />Pemerintah dalam upaya pembangunan tentu memerlukan tanah sebagai instrumen fisik bagi tegaknya sebuah bangunan. Diantara hak pemerintah dalam hal pengaturan tanah yang bersentuhan langsung dengan hak warga dan negara dalam fiqh Islam dikenal empat konsep dasar yaitu ihya’ul mawat, hima, irfaq dan iqta’. Pemerintah dengan alasan menciptakan kepentingan umum (maslahah ‘ammah) mempunyai otoritas untuk melakukan tahdid al-milkiyah (pembatasan hak milik), naz’u al-aradhi (pencabutan hak milik) di mana otoritas kebijakan ini bersinggungan langsung dengan kepemilikan tanah warga negara. Pada posisi ini negara akan dihadapkan pada dua kutub kepentingan yaitu antara kepentingan warga negara dan kepentingan negara atas nama pembangunan.<br />Hanya saja dalam konteks interpretasi apa makna dan kriteria kemaslahatan / kepentingan umum sebagai dasar pembenaran intervensi pemerintah atas hak tanah rakyat seringkali menjadi bias yang pada umumnya menggunakan paradigma kekuasaan untuk kepentingan kekuasaan juga. Ketika kekuasaan negara tidak lagi memerankan fungsinya sebagai instrumen untuk menyejahterakan rakyatnya, maka konflik kepentingan antara rakyat dan negara sangat mungkin terjadi. Gambaran dari berbagai fenomena konflik rakyat dan negara dalam realitas sosial yang kerap disertai dengan aksi kekerasan adalah bukti konkrit di mana batas-batas hak kepemilikan rakyat dan negara atas tanah tidak jelas bahkan kemungkinan terjadi penindasan. Dari latar belakang masalah di atas, tampak jelas adanya kesenjangan antara idialitas sebuah teori dengan realitas empiris mengenai relasi kuasa antara rakyat dan pemerintah dalam hal batasan hak atas tanah. <br />Adapun yang menjadi persoalan pokok penelitian ini adalah bagaimana konsep hukum Islam dalam hal pengaturan masalah seputar pertanahan. Masalah pokok tersebut dapat dirinci ke dalam beberapa sub bahasan yaitu konsep cara perolehan hak milik atas tanah, fungsi sosial tanah, batas-batas kepemilikan individu dan negara atas tanah serta kebijakan pemerintah dalam hal pengaturan tanah.<br />C. Metode Penelitian<br />Penelitian ini memusatkan kajian pada pada penelitian kepustakaan (library research) yang sifatnya deskriptif analitis berdasarkan kajian teks. Metode ini diperlukan untuk menggali data, fakta serta teori yang membuat suatu kepercayaan itu benar. Metode pendekatan yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah normative legal research13. yaitu penelaahan hukum normative dengan memusatkan kajian pada interpretasi teks al-Qur’an, Hadits, dan kitab fiqh yang ditulis para ulama. <br />Metode pengumpulan data penelitian ini adalah dengan metode dokumentasi. Metode ini digunakan untuk melacak data-data penelitian yang bersifat kepustakaan berupa dokumen tertulis dalam al-Qur’an dan Hadits dan kitab fiqh terkait dengan konsep kepemilikan, kedudukan, fungsi dan kewenangan pemerintah untuk membuat regulasi tentang pertanahan. Metode pengumpulan data yang lain adalah metode historis yaitu cara pengambilan data / fakta yang bertolak pada pemaknaan perkembangan dalam kaitan waktu di masa lampau.14. Metode ini diperlukan untuk melihat dimensi historisitas sebuah pendapat hukum dari seorang penulis kitab atau pejabat negara dalam membangun gagasanya soal tanah atau membuat kebijakan yang tidak lepas dari dimensi ruang dan waktu.<br />Sedangkan untuk analisis data penelitian ini adalah analisa kualitatif dengan menggunakan metode content analysis15. atau yang sering disebut sebagai analisis isi atau kajian isi yaitu teknik yang digunakan untuk menarik kesimpulan melalui usaha memunculkan karakteristik pesan yang dilakukan secara obyektif dan sistematis. Metode ini juga diartikan sebagai alat untuk mengobservasi dan menganalisis prilaku komunukasi yang terbuka dari komunikator yang dipilih.16 Dengan metode ini akan diperoleh suatu hasil atau pemahaman terhadap isi pesan pengarang/penulis kitab secara objektif, sistematis dan relevan secara sosiologis. Metode ini digunakan untuk menganalisis substansi pemikiran para ulama fiqh dengan menganalisis kerangka paradigmatik dan konsep-konsep dasarnya, untuk kemudian ditarik pada konteks kekinian. <br /> Di samping itu, peneliti juga menggunakan metode komparatif17 yaitu metode yang digunakan untuk memperoleh suatu kesimpulan dengan meneliti faktor-faktor yang berhubungan dengan suatu situasi atau fenomena yang diteliti dan membandingkan dengan factor lain. Metode ini digunakan untuk memetakan kerangka paradigmatik dan konsep-konsep dasar yang digagas oleh para ahli fiqh tentanh hukum pertanahan untuk kemudian dicari titik persamaan dan perbedaan sebagai bahan merumuskan fiqh tanah yang utuh dan sistematis. Metode ini digunakan dengan tujuan untuk mendapatkan abstraksi atau generalisasi dari hasil temuan penelitian.<br />D. Hasil Penelitian dan Analisis<br />Tanah merupakan tempat di mana bangunan tempat tinggal manusia didirikan. Tanah juga merupakan bagian dari asset yang seringkali dalam tata pergaulan social menjadi persoalan yang menjadi objek atau menjadi sebab lahirnya persengketaan. Dalam proses kepemilikan tanah dan penggunaannya seringkali terjadi persinggungan kepentingan antara kepentingan rakyat vis a vis pemerintah, kepemilikan individu dengan masyarakat atau kepemilikan masyarakat dengan pemerintah.<br />Dalam kaitan dengan tulisan ini, penulis paparkan beberapa temuan penelitian yang fokusnya pada bagaimana otoritas pemerintah dalam membuat regulasi tentang tanah dan bagiamana pula persinggungan kepentingan antara kepemilikan rakyat dengan kepentingan negara serta beberapa model solusi penyelesian sengketa tentang tanah.<br />I. Konsep Maslahat ‘Ammah dan Ri’ayat al-Ra’iyyah dalam Membuat Kebijakan Masalah Tanah<br /><br />Misi utama kehadiran Islam di muka bumi adalah menciptakan kedamaian hidup yaitu kehidupan yang penuh dengan kemaslahatan yang dapat dinikmati mahluk semesta alam (rahmatan lil ‘alamin).Visi Islam membangun kemaslahatan bersama ini dibangun dengan mendasarkan pada fondasi etika Islam yang implementasinya dibumikan melalui instrumen politik yaitu system kenegaraan Islam. <br />Dalam Islam dikenal konsep siyasah syar’iyyah (kepemimpinan politik Islam) yang ciata-cita dasarnya pada pembumian kemaslahatan bersama (tahqiq mashalih al-‘ibad). Nilai-nilai kemaslahatan yang melekat dan menjadi hak dasar setiap manusia dalam hukum Islam dikenal dengan al-kulliyat al-khams atau adh-dharuriyat al-khams yaitu menjaga agama, jiwa, akal, harta dan keturunan. Oleh karena itu setiap kebijakan politik yang diambil oleh pemimpin politik Islam (khalifah/imam) haruslah berorientasi pada penciptaan kemaslahatan bersama.<br />Dengan mendasarkan pada konsep di atas, maka siyasah islamiyah tidak hanya dipahami terbatas pada politik yang bersifat structural dan formal. Tetapi lebih dari itu, ia mempunyai kekuatan dan kemampuan untuk mendinamisir warga masyarakat untuk bersikap dan berprilaku politis dengan pertimbangan maslahah yang luas. Yusuf Qardhawi sebagaimana dikutip oleh KH Sahal Mahfudh menegaskan, politik yang adil (as-siyasa al-‘adila) bukan harus sesuai dengan syari’at, melainkan tidak bertentangan dengan syari’at.18<br />Kewenangan pemerintah membuat regulasi tentang pertanahan dalam fiqh dikenal dua konsep yaitu Hima’ yaitu kewenangan yang dimiliki pemerintah untuk menetapkan kawasan lindung untuk kepentingan binatang ternak atau untuk kemaslahatan umum. Otoritas kedua adalah Iqtha’ yaitu pemberian tanah oleh pemerintah kepada orang atau kelompok orang baik untuk dimiliki atau disewakan. Kebijakan memutuskan Iqtha’ maupun Hima oleh pemerintah harus didasarkan pada pertimbangan kemaslahatan ummat.19 Kalaupun pemerintah (imam) akan melakukan pembebasan tanah dengan otoritas iqtha’ yang melekat padanya, maka rakyat atau pihak-pihak yang tanahnya terambil mempunyai hak untuk memperoleh ganti rugi / imbalan (al-ujrah) yang diambil dari uang baitul maal (kas negara).20 Kalau tidak ada ganti rugi maka pemerintah melakukan kedholiman kepada rakyatnya<br />Seorang imam/kepala negara berhak untuk mengatur (membuat batasan) penggunaan tanah tertentu dengan alasan yang rasional, logis dan objektif dengan dilandasi semangat merealisasikan kemaslahatan umum بشرط أن لا يضر بكافة المسلمين sebagai tugas pokok kepala negara. Dalam kaidah fiqhiyah disebutkan: bahwa kebijakan seorang kepala negara harus berorientasi pada upaya menciptakan kemaslahatan تصرف الامام على الرعية منوط بالمصلحة<br />Kebolehan membuat kebijakan hima yang diambil oleh pemerintah adalah untuk kemaslahatan ummat dan sebaliknya kalau kebijakan itu berimplikasi lahirnya madharat maka tidak boleh.21 Salah satu instrumen kebijakan pemerintah dalam hal pengaturan tanah adalah hak imam membuat hima (tanah lindung) untuk kepentingan rakyat banyak.22 Namun demikian seorang imam tidak boleh menentukan kebijakan hima untuk kepentingan dirinya.23 Dasar kebijakan penguasa dalamr pembuatan kebijakan hima adalah terciptanya kemaslahatan manusia (ma lam yudhayyaq ‘ala an-naas).24 Dasar filosofis dari kebijakan pemerintah membuat regulasi tentang harta berangkat dari sebuah kesadaran akan hakikat harta bahwa semua harta itu hakikatnya adalah milik Allah. Berkaitan dengan ini Khalifah Umar ibn Khattab berkata :<br />فقال عمر المال مال الله والعباد عبادالله <br />Artinya: Umar berkata “ Semua harta adalah milik Allah dan semua hamba (manusia) hakikatnya juga milik Allah”.25<br /><br />Ketika seorang imam membuat kebijakan hima’ untuk dirinya sendiri akan dikhawatirkan munculnya penyalahgunaan kewenangan untuk memperkaya diri sendiri atau kelompoknya dan konsekuensi logisnya adalah akan merugikan orang lain. Dengan kata lain kebijakan hima’ untuk kalangan para pejabat akan melahirkan monopoli kekayaan yang terselubung dengan bingkai dan legitimasi dari pemilik otoritas politik. Monopoli dan oligapoli adalah praktek yang dilarang dalam Islam.<br /> Demikian juga kewenangan imam membuat kebijakan iqtha’ (pemberian lahan) juga harus mempertimbangkan kemaslahatan umum. Oleh karena itu ketika orang yang menerima tanah iqtha tidak digunakan (dikelola) maka seorang imam boleh menarik kembali tanah yang diberikanya. Persoalan yang muncul kemudian adalah bolehkah seorang membatalkan pemberian imam lain ?. Dalam masalah ini mayoritas ulama fiqh membolehkan membatalkan iqtha imam lainya.26 Adapun Level imam yang punya otoritas membuat kebijakan iqtha adalah kepala negara (imam al-a‘dham).27 <br /><br />II. Relasi Individu, Masyarakat dan Negara dalam Pemilikan Tanah<br /><br />Setiap hak milik pribadi selalu akan bersinggungan dengan berbagai kepentingan dengan pihak lain. Persinggungan kepentingan tersebut bisa mewujud dalam relasi antara individu, individu dengan masyarakat dan individu dengan negara. Titik persinggungan tersebut berkaitan dengan berbagai kepentingan yang timbul dari banyaknya kepentingan seputar kepemilikan individu atas tanah.<br />Batas-batas hak milik pribadi dan kepemilikan itu menyaratkan tanah itu ditempati selama sebulan atau setahun.28 Hak kepemilikan tanah oleh individu akan menjadi hilang ketika mandat yang diberikan oleh pemerintah tidak bisa digunakan atau dimanfaatkan secara maksimal sesuai dengan fungsi dan tujuan awalnya. Dari konsep ini tampak ada batasan kedaluarsa kepemilikan atas tanah yang dasar pemikiranya adalah ketika tanah tersebut tidak lagi menjadi produktif yang jelas akan mengabaikan fungsi sosial tanah karena tidak ada nilai ekonomis apapun bagi kesejahteraan sosial. Ketentuan waktu kedaluarsa hak kepemilikan seseorang adalah tiga tahun.29 Salah satu hak masyarakat atas kepemilikan individu adalah berkaitan dengan hak penggunaan air oleh ibn sabil / para musafir yang membutuhkan air untuk keperluan hidupnya.30 Oleh karena itulah, maka seorang Imam tidak boleh mengeluarkan kebijakan iqtha kalau berakibat pada menyulitkan masyarakat.31 Kalaupun seorang imam mempunyai otoritas memberi sebidang tanah melalui hak iqtha’ maka pemberian tersebut sesuai kebutuhan, kalau berlebihanan akan mengakibatkan dharar kepada kaum muslimin.32 Contoh lain dari persinggungan hak milik pribadi antara lain pada pengaturan hak atas hak orang lain. Seseorang yang akan membuat rumah misalnya maka setiap rumah haruslah mempunyai pintu atau jendela sendiri. Oleh karena itu dilarang seseorang memanfaatkan jendela (sebagai ventilasi) dari orang lain.33<br />Dalam Islam, setiap individu mempunyai hak untuk memiliki harta/aset termasuk tanah dan berhak pula untuk mentasharufkanya sesuai dengan dengan keinginan pemilik. Hak milik secara individual memang diakui keberadaanya sebagai hak yang melekat pada setiap individu yang didasarkan pada prinsip hifzd al-maal. Namun demikian, kebebasan individu atas hak miliknya dalam penggunaanya dibatasi oleh hak-hak orang lain. Hak orang lain atas tanah individu mengandaikan akan fungsi social dari tanah. <br />Dalam bebarapa literatur fiqh diatur beberapa kerangka etika kepemilikan atas tanah, antara lain :<br />1. Larangan duduk di jalan, karena mengganggu pemakai jalan. Fungsi pokok dari jalan adalah ruang publik di mana setiap orang berhak melintas di atasnya. Berhenti atau duduk di jalan dibolehkan selama tidak mengganggu pengguna jalan.34 Jalan umum (al-thariq al-‘amm) adalah milik umum sehingga tidak boleh seseorang mendirikan tempat untuk berjualan di atasnya atau dijadikan tempat duduk yang akan mengganggu pemakai jalan.35<br />2. Dilarang seseorang melintas jalan milik orang lain tanpa izinya, karena perbuatan tersebut termasuk ghasab.36 Dalam kitan dengan masalah jalan ini, seseorang tidak boleh membuat pintu atau jendela yang posisinya pas berada di atas jalan tersebut kecuali ada izin dari pemilik jalan. Jalan milik perorangan disebut dengan al-thariq al-khas.37 <br />3. Kelebihan air dan rumput yang dimiliki oleh seseorang hendaknya diberikan kepada orang lain ketika kebutuhan dirinya telah tercukupi. Melarang orang lain untuk mengambil kelebihan air yang oleh seseorang, maka menurut Rasululalah menyebabkan tertutupnya rahmat Allah kepada orang tersebut.38 <br />4. Tidak boleh menyerobot hak orang lain.39 Larangan ini mendasarkan pada hadits Rasulullah : <br />عن يعلى بن مرة قال سمعت رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم يقول ثم أيما رجل ظلم شبرا من الأرض كلفه الله أن يحفره حتى يبلغ سبع أرضين ثم يطوقه يوم القيامة حتى يفصل بين الناس<br /><br />Artinya: Dari Ya’la ibn Abdillah bekata: saya mendengar Rasulallah bersabda Barang siapa yang mengambi sebidang tanah dari bumi maka orang tersebut disiksa pada hari kiamat dengan dikalungi tujuh bumi…40<br /><br />5. Pengaturan berkaitan dengan pepohonan yang yang condong ke rumah tetangga haruslah ada ganti rugi41 . Dalam kaitan dengan masalah ini Rasulullah telah mengatur sebagaimana disebutkan dalam Hadits:<br /><br />وحدثنا حماد بن سلمة عن أيوب عن عكرمة عن أبي هريرة أن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم نهى أن يمنع الرجل جاره أن يضع خشبة على جداره<br /><br />Artinya: Dari Hammad ibn Salamah dari Ayyub dari Ikrimah dari Abi Hurairah sesungguhnya Rasulullah melarang seseorang yang menghalangi kepada tetangganya yang pohon/kayunya pada tembok rumah tetangganya.<br /><br />6. Hak pemilik rumah susun yaitu perumahan yang terdiri dari beberapa lantai Ketika pemilik lantai bawah berkeinginan menjual rumahnya, maka pemilik lantai ats lebih berhak atas lantai bawah. Apabila bangunan lantai bawah roboh yang berdampak pada kerusakan lantai atas, maka apabila robohnya lantai bawah itu karena kesalahan pemilik lantai bawah, maka pemilik lantai bawah berkewajiban menanggung segala kerugian yang diderita pemilik lantai atas.42 <br /> 7. Setiap orang yang membuka lahan baru (ihya al-mawat) maka pada dirinya melekat dua kewajiban pokok yaitu kewajiban untuk mengelurakan al-‘usyur yaitu pajak 10 % yang disetorkan kepada pemerintah dan kewajiban untuk membuat batas-batas tanahnya (al-hariim)..Kewajiban pasca ihyaul mawat 10% dan perbatasan.43 Kewajiban membayar sejumlah uang ke kas negara oleh pemilik tanah adalah merupaka salah satu bagian dari relasi hak individu dengan kewajiban pada negara. Inilah titik persinggungan antara kepemilikan secara individu dengan kepentingan negara. <br />8. Setiap pemilik tanah wajib membuat batas-batas atas tanahnya yaitu batas tanah dengan teras, pohon, batas sumur. Pemberian batasan secara jelas dikasudkan untuk meminimalisir lahirnya konflik yang dipicu oleh sengketa perbatasan hak atas tanah.44 <br />III. Model-model Penyelesaian Sengketa Tanah<br />Persoalan hak kepemilikan atas harta termasuk masalah seputar pertanahan merupakan masalah yang seringkali terjadi di tengah-tengah masyarakat. Akar persoalan sengketa tentang tanah pada umumnya berkaitan dengan hak penggunaan, batas-batas tanah, transaksi dan yang berkaitan dengan persoalan ganti rugi atas tanah. Ruang lingkup persengketaan dilihat dari subjeknya bisa dalam relasi antar individu, individu dengan masyarakat, individu dengan negara dan masyarakat dengan negara. <br />Berkaitan dengan model penyelesaian sengketa tentang pertanahan dan pengairan antara seorang laki-laki dari suku Quraisy dengan Bani Quraidhah berkaitan dengan masalah pembagian air dengan mengadukan masalahnya kepada Rasulullah. Dari pengaduan ini Rasulullah memberikan keputusan bahwa pembagian air kepada orang lain baru diberikan ketika jumlah air yang dimiliki seseorang telah mencapai tinggi dua mata kaki. Ketika sudah mancapai tinggi dua mata kaki maka pemilik air yang berada di atas baru berkewajiban mengalirkan kepada kelompok orang yang posisinya berada di bawah. Hak atas air didasarkan pada kedekatan tanah yang dimilikinya dengan sumber mata air. <br />Apabila ada seseorang yang menanami sebidang tanah orang lain dengan tanaman kurma, maka Rasulallah memutuskan bahwa tanah tersebut adalah masih milik pemiliknya, sedangkan pohon kurma itu adalah milik dari orang yang menanam dan kepadanya diminta untuk mengelurkan pohon kurma tresebut dari kebun.45 Dalam pandangan Rasulallah, kepemilikan atas hak milik adalah hak dasar yang harus dijaga. Ketika beliu dihadapkan pada sengketa tentang pertanahan, beliu menyatakan : Sesungguhnya darah dan harta kamu sekalian terlindungi, maka tidak halal bagi seseorang memanfaatkan harta orang lain tanpa izin pemiliknya.46 Perbuatan menanam pepohonan di atas tanah orang lain menurut Rasulallah adalah bagian dari prilaku dhalim.47<br />Pada zaman Rasulallah pernah terjadi sengketa seputar kebun korma. Hadist diriwayatkan dari Yahya ibn ’Urwah ibn Zubair dari bapaknya bahwasanya ada seorang laki-laki menanami pohon di kebun korma milik orang lain. Kemudian Rasululllah memberikan keputusan atas kasus ini dengan menyatakan bahwa pemilik kebun korma tetap menjadi pemilik korma tersebut dan seorang yang menanam pohon korma diminta untuk mengeluarkan pohon korma tersebut dari kebun.48 <br />Sedangkan berkaitan dengan sengketa pembagian giliran memperoleh air, hal ini pernah terjadi sengketa pada zaman Rasulullah antara seorang laki-laki Quraisy dengan bani Quraidhah yang diadukan kepada Rasul. Kemudian Rasul memberikan keputusan dalam masalah ini dengan dengan pernyataanya sebagai berikut :<br />فقضي بينهم رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم أن الماء إلى الكعبين لا يحبس الأعلى على الأسفل<br />Dari Hadits di atas jelas bagimana Rasulullah memberikan keputusan hukum diantara para pihak yang bersengketa bahwasanya batas hak pengairan itu diukur dengan batasan ketika air tingginya sudah mencapai dua mata kaki. Ketika sudah mencapai ukuran dua mata kaki maka tidak ada alasan pemilik air yang berada di atas untuk menahan airnya bagi orang yang mempunyai lahan di bawahnya.49 <br />Berkaitan dengan sengketa masalah hak pengairan ini juga pernah terjadi pada masa khalifah Umar ibn Khattab antara Adh-Dhahhak ibn Khulaifah dengan Muhammad ibn Maslamah di mana Adh-Dhahhak meminta kepada Muhammad ibn Maslamah untuk diberi jalan aliran air untuk mengairi kebunnya, akan tetapi Muhammad ibn Maslamah menolaknya. Kemudian Umar memerintahkan pada Muhammad ibn Maslamah untuk memberi jalan aliran air kepada Adh-Dhahhak, tetapi Muhammad ibn Maslamah menolaknya. Kemudian Umar berkata kepada Muhammad, apakah pemberian jalan itu membahayakanmu? Muhammad menjawab, tidak. Umar berkata, mengapa anda menolak memberi jalan air ? demi Allah akan saya alirkan air itu sekalipun melalui perutmu.50<br /><br />Kemudian berkaitan dengan sengketa batas-batas teras rumah dengan jalan milik umum, maka Rasulullah memberikan keputusan bahwa batas antara teras rumah dengan jalan adalah tujuh dira’. Pemberian batas tanah milik dengan jalan dimaksudkan untuk memberikan ruang yang cukup bagi para pengguna jalan sebagai tempat publik. Dengan demikian maka semangat hadits ini adalah perlunya diperhatikan bahwa ada dimensi social yang harus ditunaikan oleh pemilik lahan yaitu mempertimbangkan kepentingan-kepentingan masyarakat dalam mengakses jalam secara mudah. Bahkan dalam sebuah riwayat Rasulullah mempersilahkan masyarakat untuk menuntut hak-hak social kepada pemilik tanah ketika kewajiban pemilik tanah berupa memberi jalan kepada pengguna jalan tidak dipenuhi. Adapun batas-batas pemberian hak jalan dari tanah adalah 7 dhira.51 Akan tetapi ketika pemilik tanah membuat jalan secara khusus untuk dirinya sendiri, maka orang yang akan melintasi jalan tersebut padahal jalan untuk umum sudah ada, maka orang tersebut haruslah meminta izin dari pemilik jalan.52 <br />Pengaturan tentang batas-batas hak pengairan juga berkaitan dengan aturan pembuatan sumur tempat sumber mata air. Menurut imam Malik seseorang tidak boleh membuat sumur yang mana sumur tersebut berdekatan dengan sumur tetangganya. Menurutnya, kalau pembuatan sumur tersebut betul-betul membahayakan bagi sumur tetangganya, maka pembuatan sumur tesebut dilarang. Rasulullah memberikan batas / jarak antara satu sumur dengan sumur lain dengan berbagi sisinya yaitu empat puluh dzira’.53 Demikian juga seseorang dilarang membuat jamban (kakus) yang sangat berdekatan dengan sumur tetangganya.54<br />Dari berbagai kasus actual baik yang terjadi pada masa Rasulullah, masa sahabat ataupun pada masa-masa imam mazhab berkaitan dengan sengketa pertanahan tampak bahwa persoalan seputar sengketa tanah merupakan persoalan yang sering terjadi dalam proses kehidupan. Dengan memperhatikan berbagai kasus sebagaimana penulis deskripsikan di atas sangat jelas bagaimana Rasulullah dan kaum salafus shalih telah memberikan panduan teknis bagi penyelesaian masalah pertanahan. Paradigma yang dikembangkan dalam proses penyelesaian masalah tanah adalah menciptakan dan membumikan nilai-nilai kemaslahatan sebagai dasar pijakanya. Pembumian nilai-nilai kemaslahatan adalan inti dari ajaran Islam.<br />Beberapa panduan teknis penyelesaian masalah sengketa tanah baik dalam relasi personal, atau relasi personal dengan komunal atau relasi komunal dengan negara di samping mempertimbangkan bingkai yuridis juga mempertimbangkan dimensi etis. Perpaduan dimensi yuridis dan etis dalam membuat regulasi pertanahan sebagaimana dicontohkan oleh Rasulullah dan kaum salafus shalih merupakan gambaran penyelesaian masalah tanah secara bermartabat dan terhormat dengan menghindarkan pada eksploitasi atau bahkan mendeskriditkan pihak lain yang bertentangan dengan spirit dasar syari’at Islam yaitu tahqiq al-mashalih al-‘ammah.<br />F. Kesimpulan <br /><br />Dalam Islam, kepemilikan tanah oleh seseorang dalam konteks individual dalam relasi sosial secara yuridis diakui, di mana pemilik tanah mempunyai kewenangan untuk menggunakan (tasharruf) sesuai dengan keinginanya. Kewenangan manusia atas kepemilikan harta (proverty right) dalam kaidah hukum Islam dilindungi dalam bingkai hifdzu al-maal sebagai salah satu prinsip al-kulliyat al-khams. Tanah di samping sebagai instrumen ekonomis, juga mempunyai kandungan sosial-humanistik. <br />Kepemilikan seseorang atas tanah sebagaimana kepemilikan atas harta benda yang lainya dalam konteks yuridis maupun etika sosial haruslah dipandang sebagai kepemilikan yang di dalamnya juga harus mempertimbangkan aspek-aspek yang bersifat sosial. Kebebasan seseorang atas hak propertinya hakikatnya juga dibatasi oleh hak-hak orang lain baik secara individual maupun kelompok. Dalam konteks ini telah diatur dalam hadis Nabi tentang fungsi-fungsi sosial yang melekat pada hak milik atas tanah dihubungkan dengan kepentingan-kepentingan orang lain dan public sphare (ruang publik). Dalam kaitan dengan relasi personal dan sosial di tengah-tengah masyarakat, persoalan pemanfaatan tanah oleh pemiliknya juga harus mempertimbangkan kepentingan orang lain (syarik; orang yang berdampingan) denganya. <br />Islam memandang negara sebagai institusi yang mengelola masyarakat suatu negara. Atas dasar inilah maka Islam memberikan hak sekaligus kewajiban kepada isntitusi tersebut untuk mengatur relasi antar individu dan individu dengan masyarakat serta hubungan individu, masyarakat dengan negara. Dalam hal pengaturan fungsi-fungsi sosial tanah, pemerintah (imam) mempunyai otoritas untuk membuat regulasi terkait dengan tanah, untuk mengatur dan menata penggunaan tanah untuk menciptakan kemaslahatan umum. <br />Otoritas pemerintah membuat regulasi pertanahan didasarkan pada hak yang dimiliki oleh pemerintah yaiu hak iqtha yaitu hak memberikan lahan pada pihak lain baik sebagai hak milik atau hak memanfaatkan saja dan hima’ yaitu otoritas untuk menetapkan tempat lindung sebagai public sphare untuk kemaslahatan bersama. Kalaupun pemerintah (imam) akan melakukan pembebasan tanah dengan otoritas iqtha’ yang melekat padanya, maka rakyat atau pihak-pihak yang tanahnya terambil mempunyai hak untuk memperoleh ganti rugi / imbalan (al-ujrah) yang diambil dari uang baitul maal (kas negara) dengan mendasarkan pada nilai kepatutan secara sosial (‘urf) yang diputuskan secara bersama-sama dengan prinsip saling rela.<br />Seorang imam/kepala negara berhak untuk mengatur (membuat batasan) penggunaan tanah tertentu dengan alasan yang rasional, logis dan objektif dengan dilandasi semangat merealisasikan kemaslahatan umum بشرط أن لا يضر بكافة المسلمين sebagai tugas pokok kepala negara. Dalam kaidah fiqhiyah disebutkan: bahwa kebijakan seorang kepala negara harus berorientasi pada upaya menciptakan kemaslahatan تصرف الامام على الرعية منوط بالمصلحة<br />Kebolehan membuat kebijakan hima yang diambil oleh pemerintah adalah untuk kemaslahatan ummat dan sebaliknya kalau kebijakan itu berimplikasi lahirnya madharat maka tidak boleh. Salah satu instrumen kebijakan pemerintah dalam hal pengaturan tanah adalah hak imam membuat hima (tanah lindung) untuk kepentingan rakyat banyak. Namun demikian seorang imam tidak boleh menentukan kebijakan hima untuk kepentingan dirinya. Dasar kebijakan penguasa dalamr pembuatan kebijakan hima adalah terciptanya kemaslahatan manusia (ma lam yudhayyaq ‘ala an-naas). Dasar filosofis dari kebijakan pemerintah membuat regulasi tentang harta berangkat dari sebuah kesadaran akan hakikat harta bahwa semua harta itu hakikatnya adalah milik Allah.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Endnote<br /><br /> Lihat al-Qur’an surat al-Maidah ayat 17. <br />2 Dalam kaidah hukum Islam dikenal lima prinsip dasar yang terumuskan dalam konsep al-Kulliyat al-khams yaitu: khifdz al-din (agama) , nafs (jiwa), aql (akal), maal (harta) dan nasl (keturunan).<br />3 Lihat al-Qur’an surat Adz-Dzariyat ayat 19.<br />4Larangan monopoli dalam Islam secara konseptual diqiyaskan dengan larangan menimbun barang (al-ihtikar) berdasarkan hadits : <br />عن سعيد بن المسيب عن معمر بن عبد الله بن نضلة قال قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم ثم لا يحتكر إلا خاطئ<br />Lihat, Imam Ibnu Majah, Sunan Ibn Majah, Juz 2 (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, tt) hal. 728.<br />5 Dirjen Bimas Islam Depag RI, Panduan Pemberdayaan Tanah Wakaf Produktif Strategis di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Depag RI, 2003), hal. 12-13.<br />6 Muhammad Abi Sahl al-Syarakhsyi, Al-Mabsuth, Juz 15 (Bairut: Daar al-Ma’rifah, tt) hal. 55-56.<br />7 Imam Malik ibn Anas, Al-Mudawwanat al-Kubra, Juz 15, (Bairut: Daar al-Sadr, tt) hal. 197<br />8 Muhammad ibn Yaziz Abu Abdillah al-Qazwaini, Sunan Ibn Majah, juz 2, (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, tt) hal. 833.<br />9 Abi Hasan al-Mawardi, Kitab Ahkam al-Sulthaniyah, (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, 1960), hal. 185.<br />10 Muhammad Ibn Idris Asy-Syafi’I, Al-Umm, Juz 4 (Bairut: Daar al-Ma’rifah, 1393 H), hal. 48. lihat pula, Syams al-Haq al- ‘Adzim, ‘Aun al-Ma’bud Syarh Sunan Abi Daud, Juz 8, (Bairut: Daar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah, 1415), hal. 135. Bandingkan dengan As-Shan’ani, Subulus Salam, (Indonesia: Maktabah Dahlan, tt) hal. 83<br />11 Abdurahman as-Suyuthi, Al-Asybah wa an-Nadhair, (Indonesia: Maktabah Nur, tt) hal. 83.<br />12 Abi Hasan al-Mawardi, Kitab. hal. 177-190. Bandingkan dengan, Abu Ishaq Asy-Syairazi, Al-Muhaddzab fi Fiqh Imam Syafi’I juz 1, (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, tt) hal. 426.<br />13. Soerjono Soekanto, Pengantar Penelitian Hukum, (Jakarta: UI Press, 1998), hal. 250.<br />14 . Imam Suprayogo dan Tobroni, Metodologi Penelitian Sosial-Agama, (Bandung: Rosdakarya, 2001), hal. 65. <br />15. Sujono dan Abdurahman, Metodologi Penelitian, Suatu pemikiran dan Penerapan, (Jakarta: Rineka Cipta, 1998), hal. 13. <br />16 Imam Suprayogo dan Tobroni, Metodologi. hal. 154.<br />17.Soerjono Soekanto, Op. Cit, hal.261.<br />18. KH. MA. Sahal Mahfudh, Nuansa Fiqih Sosial (Jogjakarta: LkiS, 1994) hal. 231.<br />19.Lihat Abi Hasan Al-Mawardi, Kitab Ahkam al-Sulthaniyah, (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, 1960) hal.195-190. Bandingkan dengan, Wahbah az-Zuhaily, al-Fiqh al-Islam wa Adillatuhu (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, tt ) hal. 574-575.<br />20. Syihabuddin Ar-Ramli, Nihayat al-Muhtaj Juz 5. hal, 339.<br />21. Ibnu Qudamah, Al-Kaafi. hal. 510.<br />22. Muhammad Ibn Muflikh al-Maqdisi, Al -Furu’ juz 4. hal. 442. Lihat pula, Muhammad Ibn Muflikh al-Maqdisi, Al-Mubda’ fi Syarh al-Muqni Juz 5, hal. 259.<br />23.Syihabuddin Ar-Ramli, Nihayat al-Muhtaj Juz 5. hal, 338<br />24.Muhammad Ibn Muflikh al-Maqdisi, Al-Mubda’ fi Syarh al-Muqni Juz 5, hal. 265.<br /><br />25 Ibid, hal. 265.<br />26Ibid, Bandingkan pula dengan, Abi Zakariya Muhyiddin ibn Syaraf An-Nawawi, al-Majmu’. hal. 208.<br />27 Ibid, 117. lihat pula, Ibnu Qudamah, Al-Mughni. hal. 462.<br />28 Syihabuddin Ar-Ramli, Nihayat al-Muhtaj Juz 5. hal, 341.<br />29 Abi Zakariya Muhyiddin ibn Syaraf An-Nawawi, al-Majmu’. hal. 108.<br />30 Ibnu Qudamah, Al-Mughni. hal. 474.<br />31 Ibid. hal. 463.<br />32 Sayyidi Ahmad Ad-Dardiri, Asy-Syarh al-Kabir juz 4 (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, t.tp) hal. 68.<br />33 Ibn Hazm Adh-Dhahiri, Al-Muhalla juz 8 (Bairut: Daar al-Afaq al-Jadidah, t.tp) hal. 241.<br />34 Abi Zakariya Muhyiddin ibn Syaraf An-Nawawi, al-Majmu’. hal. 104.<br />35 Muhammad Kamaludin Imam, Nadhariyat al-Fiqh fi Al-Islamy (Bairut: Jamiat al-Iskandariyat, t.tp) hal. 447.<br />36 Ibrahim ibn Abi al-Yamni Muhammad al-Hanafi, Lisanul Hukkam fi Marifatil Ahkam juz 1 (Kairo: Al-Babi al-Halabi, 1973) hal. 305-306.<br />37 Muhammad Kamaludin Imam, Nadhariyat. hal. 446.<br />38 Ibnu Qudamah, Al-Kaafi. hal. 511.<br />39 Muhammad Kamaludin Imam, Nadhariyat. hal. 444. Bandingkan dengan, Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Minhaji, Jawahirul Uqud wa Mu’inul Quddhat wal Muwaqqiina wa Syuhud (Bairut: Daar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah, 1996) hal. 238.<br />40 Hadis riwayat Ibn Hibban dari Ya’la ibn Murrah dalam Shahih Ibn Hibban.<br />41Burhanudin Abi Wafa’, Tabshiratul Hukkam (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, t.tp) hal. 252.<br />42Muhammad Kamaludin Imam, Nadhariyat. hal. 443-447.<br />43 Alauddin al-Kissai, Badai’u Ash-Shana’I fi Tartib Asy-Syara’Ijuz 6 (Bairut: Daar al-Kutub al-Arabi, t.tp) hal. 195. Musa Abu Bakar al-Baihaqi, Sunan al-Baihaqi al-Kubra juz 6 (Makkah Mukarramah, Maktabah Daar al-Baaz, t.tp) hal. 165-166.<br />44 Musa Abu Bakar al-Baihaqi, Sunan, hal. 165-166.<br /><br />45 Ibnu Hazm Adh-Dhahiri, Al-Muhalla. hal. 236.<br />46 Ibnu Hazm Adh-Dhahiri, Al-Muhalla juz 8. hal. 240.<br />47Abu Daud Al-Sijistani, Sunan Abi Daud, 179.<br />48 Ibnu Hazm Adh-Dhahiri, Al-Muhalla juz 8. hal. 236. lihat pula, Ibnu Hajar Al-Asqalani, Fathul Baari. hal. 19.<br />49 Abu Daus Al-Sijistani, Sunan Abi Daud juz 3. hal. 316.<br />50 Musa Abu Bakar al-Baihaqi, Sunan, hal. 156. Bandingkan dengan, Ibnu Hajar Al-Asqalani, Fathul. hal. 111.<br />51 Musa Abu Bakar al-Baihaqi, Sunan, hal. 154.<br />52 Ibrahim ibn Abi al-Yamni Muhammad al-Hanafi, Lisanul Hukkam. hal. 306.<br />53Musa Abu Bakar al-Baihaqi, Sunan, hal. 155.<br />54 Malik ibn Anas, Al-Mudawanatul Kubra juz 15 (Bairut: Daar al-Shadr, t.tp) hal. 195.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />DAFTAR PUSTKA<br />Abi Hasan al-Mawardi, Kitab Ahkam al-Sulthaniyah, (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, 1960)<br />As-Shan’ani, Subulus Salam, (Indonesia: Maktabah Dahlan, tt) <br />Abdurahman as-Suyuthi, Al-Asybah wa an-Nadhair, (Indonesia:Maktabah Nur, tt) <br />Abu Ishaq Asy-Syairazi, Al-Muhaddzab fi Fiqh Imam Syafi’I juz 1, (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, tt) <br />Dirjen Bimas Islam Depag RI, Panduan Pemberdayaan Tanah Wakaf Produktif Strategis di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Depag RI, 2003)<br />Imam Malik ibn Anas, Al-Mudawwanat al-Kubra, Juz 15, (Bairut: Daar al-Sadr,<br />Imam Ibnu Majah, Sunan Ibn Majah, Juz 2 (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, tt) <br />Idris Asy-Syafi’I, Al-Umm, Juz 4 (Bairut: Daar al-Ma’rifah, 1393 H)<br />Soerjono Soekanto, Pengantar Penelitian Hukum, (Jakarta: UI Press, 1998)<br />Imam Suprayogo dan Tobroni, Metodologi Penelitian Sosial-Agama, (Bandung: Rosdakarya, 2001 <br />Sujono dan Abdurahman, Metodologi Penelitian, Suatu pemikiran dan Penerapan, (Jakarta: Rineka Cipta, 1998). <br />Ibn Hazm Adh-Dhahiri, Al-Muhalla juz 8 (Bairut: Daar al-Afaq al-Jadidah, t.tp) <br />Ibrahim ibn Abi al-Yamni Muhammad al-Hanafi, Lisanul Hukkam. <br />Muhammad Abi Sahl al-Syarakhsyi, Al-Mabsuth, Juz 15 (Bairut: Daar al-Ma’rifah,tt) <br />Muhammad ibn Yaziz Abu Abdillah al-Qazwaini, Sunan Ibn Majah, juz 2, (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, tt) <br />KH. MA. Sahal Mahfudh, Nuansa Fiqih Sosial (Jogjakarta: LkiS, 1994)<br />Syams al-Haq al- ‘Adzim, ‘Aun al-Ma’bud Syarh Sunan Abi Daud, Juz 8, (Bairut: Daar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah, 1415) <br />Muhammad Ibn Muflikh al-Maqdisi, Al-Mubda’ fi Syarh al-Muqni Juz <br />Ibn Hazm Adh-Dhahiri, Al-Muhalla juz 8 (Bairut: Daar al-Afaq al-Jadidah, t.tp) <br />Ibnu Hajar Al-Asqalani, Fathul Baari Syarh Shahih Bukhari Juz 5 (Bairut: Daar al-Ma’rifah, 1379 H) <br />Ibrahim ibn Abi al-Yamni Muhammad al-Hanafi, Lisanul Hukkam fi Ma’rifatil Ahkam (Kairo: Bab a-Halabi, 1973)<br />Wahbah az-Zuhaily, al-Fiqh al-Islam wa Adillatuhu (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, tt ) <br />Syihabuddin Ar-Ramli, Nihayat al-Muhtaj Juz 5 (Kairo: Musthafa bab al-Halabi wa Auladuhu, t.tp)<br />Sayyidi Ahmad Ad-Dardiri, Asy-Syarh al-Kabir juz 4 (Bairut: Daar al-Fikr, t.tp) <br />Musa Abu Bakar al-Baihaqi, Sunan, hal. 155.<br />Malik ibn Anas, Al-Mudawanatul Kubra juz 15 (Bairut: Daar al-Shadr, t.tp)land ownership in islamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05414932490344169940noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2263133053636924346.post-17148899703623248942008-12-11T18:00:00.000-08:002008-12-11T18:01:51.478-08:00LAND TENURE: AN INTRODUCTIONLAND TENURE: AN INTRODUCTION<br />by<br />Sumner J. La Croix<br />Working Paper No. 02-13<br />May 2002<br />Land Tenure: An Introduction<br />By<br />Sumner J. La Croix<br />Department of Economics, University of Hawaii<br />East-West Center<br />Working Paper No. 02-13<br />May 2002<br />Abstract<br />Land tenure refers to the bundle of rights and responsibilities under which land is held,<br />used, transferred, and succeeded. This essay surveys land tenure arrangements<br />throughout the world since the Roman Empire. Particular attention is paid to how six<br />forms of land tenure emerge, function, and change. The six forms of land tenure<br />analyzed are (1) owner cultivation of small, private lands; (2) squatting on public or<br />private lands; (3) large estates or latifundia; (4) feudal tenures with bound and unbound<br />labor; (5) communal tenures; and (6) smallholder leasing from private landowners.<br />Land tenure refers to the bundle of rights and responsibilities under which land is<br />held, used, transferred, and succeeded. The meaning of the term varies with context. It is<br />used to refer to land tenure prescribed by statutory or common law; to customary land<br />tenure; and to observed land tenure practices in a particular historical context. Land<br />tenure arrangements vary enormously across urban and rural areas primarily because of<br />the use of land for agriculture in rural areas and for residential and business use in urban<br />areas. Economic historians have focused on analyzing tenure systems on agricultural<br />lands, as until the twentieth century the majority of people in most societies earned their<br />livelihood by cultivating the land; accumulated wealth by improving the land; and<br />transferred wealth to the next generation by bequeathing the land.<br />Land tenure can be categorized along three essential dimensions: (1) the presence<br />or absence of formal land title, defined as registration of ownership rights with a<br />government authority; (2) the extent of landowner and landholder rights to contract<br />voluntarily for use of the land; and (3) the spectrum of private-communal property rights<br />to the land. At one end of the spectrum is the independent farmer owning land with<br />freehold (or fee-simple) title. Freehold title is perpetual; inheritable to a successor<br />designated at will; freely alienable; often registered with a central authority that has<br />undertaken a survey of the land (sometimes called a cadastral survey); and characterized<br />by fixed annual obligations. At the other end of the spectrum, bound laborers work on<br />parcels of land temporarily assigned to them by authorities in a communal land system.<br />Changes in land tenure are induced by a wide variety of factors including relative<br />prices of inputs and outputs; transaction costs; government policies; preferences of<br />farmers and landlords; and technology. To illustrate how forms of land tenure emerge,<br />function, and change, six forms of land tenure are analyzed below.<br />1. Owner Cultivation of Small, Private Lands. Owner cultivation of small<br />private land parcels was a major form of land tenure in the Roman Republic, as soldiers<br />were granted small parcels from lands taken from conquered peoples. Despite its early<br />emergence, owner operation of small farms is relatively recent, emerging in Europe and<br />Asia as feudal institutions were dismantled; in North America from the beginning of<br />colonial settlement; in Japan after land reforms were implemented in the late nineteenth<br />century and after World War II; in Taiwan in the early 1950s; in the former British<br />colonies of India, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand in the nineteenth<br />and twentieth centuries; and in South America in the second half of the twentieth century.<br />Owner-cultivated farms have been praised as an ideal arrangement to foster and<br />encourage democratic institutions and for the incentives offered to small farmers to<br />properly manage their lands and to adapt to changing circumstances. Wage laborers on<br />farms often set a goal of moving up the “agricultural ladder”—from wage laborers to<br />share tenants to owner operators.<br />Family-managed farms may, however, not always be the most efficient forms of<br />agricultural organization. Families may have inadequate managerial skills to manage the<br />farm; may not have sufficient family labor; and may not reap full economies of scale on<br />their small land parcel, among other things.<br />2. Squatting on Public or Private Lands. Some citizens of the Roman Republic<br />received grants from the government to occupy conquered lands, while others—<br />squatters—occupied and farmed these public lands without first obtaining a formal lease<br />or land grant. Squatting is observed on privately owned lands and in run-down sections<br />of urban areas in developed countries, on public lands near or at the frontier of<br />settlement, and in the urban areas of poor developing countries. It was prevalent<br />throughout the Americas from the beginning of European colonization through the<br />nineteenth century and is still a major form of land tenure in South and Central America,<br />particularly in Costa Rica, Brazil, and Columbia. Sheep and cattle herders in the Cape<br />Colony in the eighteenth century and in Australia from the 1820s to 1840s squatted on<br />frontier lands at and beyond official boundaries.<br />The impact of squatting on economic development has been much debated.<br />Squatting has been criticized as encouraging disorderly settlement; bringing settlers to<br />regions without churches, schools, or proper infrastructure; and encouraging violence<br />between competing claimants to lands. It has also been praised as facilitating<br />development by superseding overly restrictive government land policies of settlement at<br />the frontier. In urban areas in many developing countries, squatting on public and private<br />lands has emerged as a response to large-scale immigration and growth of populations<br />living in poverty. It has been criticized as impeding growth in these same urban areas by<br />forsaking the use of land for collateral; by restricting transfers of parcels; and reducing<br />the value of land in intergenerational wealth transfers.<br />3. Large Estates or Latifundia. In the second century BC, wealthy Roman<br />families received leases of newly conquered lands and were able to consolidate lands of<br />some farmers serving in the army into ranches and large farms known as latifundia.<br />Centered around a central villa, these lands were typically worked by slaves from<br />conquered territories or by tenants at will. With the establishment of the Pax Romana in<br />the first century AD, supplies of slaves from conquered territories declined, and latifundia<br />managers responded by dividing the latifundia into smaller parcels and leasing them to<br />small holders (coloni). In other instances, small landowners would commend themselves<br />and their land to latifundia in exchange for protection against central government<br />exactions and invading tribes.<br />Similar land holding arrangements have emerged in other societies in which<br />governments have leased or granted large tracts of land to wealthy families or small<br />holders at the frontier have commended their lands to a patron. In South America, the<br />Spanish Crown granted lands and the rights to the labor of their indigenous people to a<br />small number of families in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Some economists<br />have argued that land laws in South America were heavily influenced by this initial<br />allocation of lands and were structured to enhance the position of the large property<br />owners to the detriment of small independent farmers. As landowners in South America<br />gradually lost their rights to indigenous labor in the seventeenth century, they secured a<br />new supply of labor by requiring peasants to provide labor services in order to gain<br />access to land. Large estates with patron-client labor arrangements—latifundia—<br />persisted throughout much of Latin America until the mid-twentieth century.<br />4. Feudal Tenures With Bound and Unbound Labor. With the fall of the<br />Western Roman Empire in the fifth century A.D. and the consequent decline in law and<br />order came the rise of the manorial system in Europe. The system had many variations<br />across time and place, thus the following description is a stylized account. A king<br />owning all lands kept some lands (demesne) and granted others to lay and ecclesiastic<br />lords in exchange for military service and loyalty. Some lords assigned their lands to<br />followers in exchange for services and loyalty, a process known as subinfeudation.<br />Peasants commended themselves to a lord in exchange for protection, provision of<br />justice, and a plot of land, in the process becoming bound to the land. These peasants<br />(serfs) held land subject to servitudes of work and produce as well as approval of<br />marriage, inheritance, and migration. Production was partially organized by the village,<br />with individuals typically cooperating on plowing the land and allowing communal<br />grazing on stubble left after harvest. During the growing and harvest seasons, each serf<br />tended individual parcels, which were often scattered in small strips throughout the<br />manor lands. Serfs were obligated to work on the lord’s demesne for a fixed number of<br />days.<br />In the manorial system, individual rights to rent, transfer, succeed, and use land<br />were limited due to communal property rights over the land. Attenuated individual<br />property rights required that the manorial system adopt elaborate rules to structure<br />production and distribution of agricultural output. These rules prevented participants<br />from shirking or claiming a disproportionately large share of output.<br />The growth of markets and population in Western Europe between the eleventh<br />and thirteenth centuries induced changes in the feudal system. Labor dues were<br />commuted into money payments; the demesne was leased for money rents; tenant lands<br />became increasingly alienable. The Statute Qula Emptores (1290) formally abolished the<br />feudal system in England, although many of its habits and institutions would linger on for<br />centuries. While the Black Death crisis of the fourteenth century made labor more scarce<br />and led to attempts to re-impose feudal obligations on tenants, the dismantling of<br />traditional land tenures continued in Western Europe, as exemplified by the English<br />enclosure movements of the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Lands enclosures were<br />the results of a legal process that converted the common rights of villagers on specified<br />waste, arable, and meadow lands to private titles and consolidated existing private<br />holdings in land.<br />Feudalism’s decline in Western Europe was mirrored by its rise in Eastern<br />Europe, as relatively free laborers became bound to the land during the fifteenth and<br />sixteenth centuries. Feudalism would not decline in Eastern Europe until the eighteenth<br />and nineteenth centuries. Serfdom was partially reformed in Russia in 1861 —the<br />workers remained bound to the commune—and was finally ended by the Stolypin<br />Reforms of 1906-1911 which freed Russian laborers from bondage to the commune,<br />established private titles, and consolidated peasant holdings. In Japan, bound labor was<br />still predominant in the early Tokugawa period, and tenancy only emerged in the<br />eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the 1870s, the Meiji government abolished feudal<br />tenures and established private property in land in conjunction with its reform of<br />agricultural taxation.<br />5. Communal Tenures. Communal land tenures have been prevalent in the<br />Pacific Islands and Africa; were the norm in North America, South America, and parts of<br />Asia until the European conquests; and are still used today in many indigenous<br />communities. Details of communal tenures differ across societies, so the following is a<br />stylized description of communal tenure in a Pacific Island village. There is a common<br />area that is used for future land development and can be used with certain limits for<br />gathering by villagers. Families carry out cultivation on scattered plots, with plots being<br />redistributed by chiefs or village elders as family size and land fertility change. For lands<br />requiring extensive improvement, tenure of particular households and their heirs may be<br />longer. Rights to continued use of village land by a household persist as long as the<br />household continues to cultivate its assigned lands.<br />Historians have often interpreted communal land systems as efficient responses to<br />social and economic environments with significant environmental risks, high information<br />costs, and poorly developed input, output, and insurance markets. Their flexibility has<br />frequently enabled adaptations to changing demographic, ecological, and social<br />conditions. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, economists have, however,<br />sometimes viewed communal land systems as impeding the growth of a modern market<br />economy.<br />Communal land systems were established by central governments in China and<br />Russia in the twentieth century after communist revolutions. After the 1917 Russian<br />revolution, the Soviet government under Lenin abolished private property rights in land<br />but in the early 1920s promulgated a pragmatic system of agricultural production (“New<br />Economic Policy”) that retained many features of smallholder-owner production.<br />Beginning in the late 1920s, Stalin began forced collectivization of peasant landholdings<br />and established central government ownership of farmlands and control of agricultural<br />production.<br />A similar process took place in China after the 1949 communist revolution when<br />lands were initially redistributed to tenants. By the late 1950s, peasant farmers had lost<br />their lands and were forced into collective farming institutions (communes) controlled by<br />the central government. In 1978 the Chinese government initiated land reforms<br />providing households with individual parcels of village land. The “Household<br />Responsibility System” allowed farmers to choose crops, methods of production, hours of<br />work, and capital and labor inputs. Villages frequently reallocated these lands among<br />households, thereby restricting their use as collateral. Agricultural output and<br />productivity rose significantly in the decade after its introduction.<br />6. Smallholder Leasing from Private Landowners. Contracts between owners<br />of agricultural lands and farm labor have varied enormously across time and place.<br />Different market structures in labor, capital, resources, and land markets; government<br />regulations; and geographic constraints have often produced a variety of smallholder<br />leasing arrangements that co-exist alongside one another. Economic historians have paid<br />close attention to three contractual provisions exhibiting wide variation over time and<br />across locations: land owner’s role in farm management, type of land rent, and contract<br />duration. Small land owners often choose to manage their lands themselves, using family<br />and wage labor in production. In other instances, small and large landowners have better<br />opportunities on other lands or in other occupations, and they lease some lands to tenant<br />farmers. Only a few crops exhibit substantial economies of scale in production, leaving<br />large landowners with incentives to lease parcels of land to small holders. Some leases<br />allow tenants to manage the farm themselves, while others provide limited roles for<br />landowners in farm management. They make crop choices, arrange for credit, and<br />procure various inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, and farm animals, leaving tenants to<br />manage day-to-day production and monitor farm labor.<br />Tenancy often co-exists with self-managed farms. In the United States, numerous<br />farmers were tenants even when new land was available at the frontier. U.S. census data<br />show that mobility up the “agricultural ladder,” was common, with workers often starting<br />as landless laborers, becoming a tenant farmer, and finally becoming an owner-occupier.<br />Such mobility was lacking in India throughout the twentieth century as social sanctions<br />often stopped lower castes from owning or leasing land. In the Tamil Nadu province of<br />India, sharecropping predominated in 1916; was partially replaced by fixed rent tenancy<br />in 1937 as landlords moved to cities; and declined further with land-to-the-tiller land<br />reform in 1959.<br />Controversy reigns over the incentive and efficiency effects of different types of<br />smallholder leasing. In his comparison of agriculture in France and England in the late<br />eighteenth century, Alan Young argued that sharecropping was responsible for the<br />relatively poor state of French agriculture. Alfred Marshall argued that sharecropping<br />implicitly imposed a tax on the labor input of tenant farmers and would reduce farm<br />productivity unless landlords carefully monitored tenant inputs. Some economists have<br />argued that sharecropping exists due to the willingness of risk-averse sharecroppers to<br />pay a premium to reduce their income variability. Some empirical studies of share<br />tenancy in India in the 1950s and 1960s show that output is lower under sharecropping.<br />Other economists have argued that sharecropping reduces incentives for tenants to<br />overuse (“mine”) valuable land and provides vital incentives for landlords to provide<br />managerial services. Empirical studies of African-American sharecroppers in the postbellum<br />U.S. South and of farmers in the U.S. midwest during the 1970s lend support to<br />efficiency theories.<br />Does the type of land tenure affect the adoption of new technologies? Only a few<br />studies exist, and they generally show that new technologies are adopted at about the<br />same rate by sharecroppers and other types of tenants. For example, studies of the<br />adoption of new rice varieties in the 1960s and 1970s generally show that sharecroppers<br />adopted the new technologies at about the same rate as other landholders. Technological<br />change has, however, often induced changes in the choice of land tenure. For example,<br />the introduction of the tractor after 1910 and the mechanical cotton picker after World<br />War II were major factors in reducing the incidence of share cropping throughout the<br />U.S. South during the twentieth century.<br />References<br />Alston, Lee J., and Joseph P. Ferrie, Southern Paternalism and the American Welfare<br />State: Economics, Politics, and Institutions in the South 1865-1965. New York:<br />Cambridge University Press, 1998.<br />Alston, Lee J., Gary D. Libecap, and Bernardo Mueller, Titles, Conflict, and Land Use:<br />The Development of Property Rights and Land Reform on the Brazilian Amazon<br />Frontier. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999.<br />Cheung, Steven N.S. The Theory of Share Tenancy. Chicago: University of Chicago<br />Press, 1969.<br />De Soto, Hernando, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and<br />Fails Everywhere Else. New York: Basic Books, 2000.<br />Hayami, Yujiro, and Keijiro Otsuka, The Economics of Contract Choice: An Agrarian<br />Perspective. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.<br />Hayami, Yujiro, and Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An International<br />Perspective. Rev. edn. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985<br />Powelson, John P., The Story of Land: A World History of Land Tenure and Agrarian<br />Reform. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1988.<br />Roumasset, James. Rice and Risk: Decision Making Among Low Income Farmers.<br />Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1976.<br />Sokoloff, K., and Stanley Engerman, “Institutions, Factor Endowments and Paths of<br />Development in the New World, Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3),<br />(Summer 2000): 217-232.<br />Tuma, Elias, Twenty-Six Centuries of Agrarian Reform. Berkeley and Los Angeles:<br />University of California Press, 1965.land ownership in islamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05414932490344169940noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2263133053636924346.post-80306238278041549822008-12-11T17:57:00.000-08:002008-12-11T18:00:04.026-08:00The Ottoman System of TaxationPublished in Review of Social Economy, 2004, 33(3): 329-341.<br />Department of Economics Working Paper Series<br />Efficiency and Continuity in Public Finance: The Ottoman System<br />of Taxation<br />Metin M. Cos¸gel<br />University of Connecticut<br />Working Paper 2004-02R<br />February 2004, revised October 2004<br />341 Mansfield Road, Unit 1063<br />Storrs, CT 06269–1063<br />Phone: (860) 486–3022<br />Fax: (860) 486–4463<br />http://www.econ.uconn.edu/<br />This working paper is indexed on RePEc, http://repec.org/<br />Abstract<br />Economic historians have recently emphasized the importance of integrating<br />economic and historical approaches in studying institutions. The literature on the<br />Ottoman system of taxation, however, has continued to adopt a primarily historical<br />approach, using ad hoc categories of classification and explaining the system<br />through its continuities with the historical precedent. This paper integrates economic<br />and historical approaches to examine the structure, efficiency, and regional<br />diversity of the tax system. The structure of the system made it possible for the Ottomans<br />to economize on the transaction cost of measuring the tax base. Regional<br />variations resulted from both efficient adaptations and institutional rigidities.<br />This working paper previously circulated under the title ”The Economics of<br />Ottoman Taxation”<br />EFFICIENCY AND CONTINUITY IN PUBLIC FINANCE:<br />THE OTTOMAN SYSTEM OF TAXATION<br />Metin M. Coşgel<br />Metin M. Coşgel is Professor in the Department of Economics, The University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06268, USA; email: Cosgel@uconn.edu.<br />Economic historians have recently made great progress in studying the past by applying the tools and concepts of New Institutional Economics. A fundamental element of this achievement has been to go beyond the narrow confines of previous approaches. Whereas the applications of narrow neoclassical economic analysis had typically lacked an appreciation for the role of history and focused primarily on the efficiency properties of institutions, the new trend has been to integrate economic and historical approaches for richer and more comprehensive explanations of how and why history mattered. Similarly, whereas unsystematic historical approaches had lacked sound theoretical basis and proceeded narrowly by focusing on how previous customs and traditions were responsible for the existence of an institution, the new approach has been to also examine the properties of the institution that ensured its survival.<br />The literature on Ottoman taxation, however, has somehow failed to benefit from these developments. A narrow historical approach has dominated the literature, as scholars have studied the regional, legal, political, and economic complexities of the tax system primarily by identifying continuities with the historical precedent in the Islamic law, the Byzantine state, or various other institutions of previous states. The Ottomans are said to have adopted the local<br />customs and methods of taxation that they inherited in a newly conquered region, combining with the tax codes of other regions as necessary. Referring to the Sultanic law code for land holding and taxation, Halil İnalcık provides this type of an explanation when he writes: “It was this law code, actually a combination of Islamic and local practices related to the Roman-Byzantine legacy, which administered the relationships in Ottoman landholding and taxation.” In an exemplary statement of how the dominant historical approach has tried to explain the tax system, he continues: “In fact, the system was closely analogous to that of previous Islamic and Byzantine states, and there was no reason for the Ottomans to revolutionize tested methods as long as the state received its revenues.”1<br />While İnalcık’s statement may be accurate in general terms, it cannot be taken as the basis for an argument against using a systematic, theoretical approach. Although the similarities between the tax systems of the Ottomans and their predecessors seem to support a narrow historical approach, identifying the historical precedents of tax categories does not by itself provide a complete explanation for why a certain mixture of taxes, and not something else, was adopted. The origins and the persistence of a tax system are different things. The key problem with İnalcık’s approach is that it does not explain why the Ottomans chose certain elements of the Islamic or Byzantine legacy and not others. That there were many components of previous tax systems, such as labor services, that the Ottomans carefully and systematically discontinued suggests the presence of some rules and a selection process that kept some elements of previous systems and discarded others. While conquering land from multiple predecessor states, the Ottomans inherited the tax systems of multiple legal and political traditions that needed to be molded into a coherent whole. History did matter, of course, at least by way of providing a menu of choices available to the Ottomans and in shaping the regional variety. But a satisfactory<br />1<br />explanation of the system as a whole demands that an appeal to history must be complemented with knowledge of the general structure of taxes and the forces that affected the Ottomans’ choice of one type of precedent over the others.<br />This paper aims to study the Ottoman system of taxation by integrating economic and historical approaches. Borrowing insights from recent developments in New Institutional Economics and using information from the published tax registers of the Ottoman Empire, I examine the overall structure and efficiency of the system and the way it was shaped by regional conditions and institutional history. Three objectives thus guide the inquiry. The first is to identify the general structure of the tax system. Although historians have proposed various ways of classifying Ottoman taxes, they have typically chosen ad hoc categories of classification, failing to determine the general structure of taxes or a mechanism to distinguish between them systematically. I construct an economic classification of taxes that depend on systematic differences in the tax base.<br />The second objective of the paper is to examine the efficiency of the tax system. Identifying the general structure of taxes makes it possible to ask why this, rather than some other, structure was chosen. Adopting an economic approach and focusing on the efficiency properties of the system, I argue that the choice of how to levy taxes on an item or activity was determined primarily by the cost of measuring the tax base.<br />The third objective is to explain the regional diversity of Ottoman taxes. Despite sharing a common structure, taxes varied significantly among the regions of the Ottoman Empire in names, bases, and rates. Some of these variations can be viewed simply as efficient adaptations of the system to local conditions. But a satisfactory explanation of the system as a whole requires that we integrate economic and historical approaches by studying not just how the<br />2<br />Ottomans were able to transform some taxes for efficiency but also how institutional rigidities prevented them from transforming others.<br />THE EFFICIENCY AND PATH-DEPENDENCE OF INSTITUTIONS<br />Methodological differences between the narrow variants of the economic and historical approaches originate primarily from the contrast between their views of institutions. In a narrow, ahistorical economic approach, an institution is simply the efficient solution to an economic problem. In this view, a process of competition would weed out inferior institutions, ensuring the survival of only those that best solve the problem. Institutions are thus endogenous responses to the environment, outcomes of some sort of a selection process that generates efficient results. It follows that changes in the environment (e.g., prices, technology) would create incentives to alter existing institutions and to construct new ones better suited to the new environment. The economic historian’s task then becomes to simply identify the economic problem and the competitive forces responsible for the existence of an institution.<br />According to an equally narrow historical view, competitive forces do not affect institutions. History is what matters. From an atheoretical and unsystematic historical approach to institutions, their existence is not directly associated with a particular property like equity or efficiency. An institution may survive not because it was a static efficient response to an economic problem but because it was the product of a dynamic and irreversible historical process in which past institutions determine the nature and evolution of those that exist today and in the future. To explain the prevalence and divergent paths of institutions, we need to examine their history.<br />3<br />Whereas some of the early works in economic history may have been from narrow variants of economic or historical perspectives, recent contributions have increasingly recognized the deficiencies of a one-sided narrow approach and aimed to bridge the gap between them. Economic historians would now generally agree that both competitive and historical forces matter in shaping institutions. The challenging task is to determine how exactly to integrate the two types of approaches for a complete explanation. The influence of history is sometimes described in economic history by the term “path dependence,” referring to the way outcomes are generated by allocative processes that are unable to break free from their own history. We need to know not only which institutions best served particular needs but also how societies often had distinct institutional trajectories that did not yield to competitive forces and why some societies could not easily transplant more successful institutions of other societies. Approaching from the other side of the explanatory scheme, we need to know how and why some institutions managed to break free from their historical path.<br />The importance of integrating multiple perspectives may be most evident in New Institutional Economics, where leading proponents have shifted positions from adopting an efficiency view of institutions to recognizing the importance of path-dependence. Douglass North, a Nobel Laureate pioneer of the New Institutional approach in economic history, has explicitly “abandoned the efficiency view of institutions” and proposed a more comprehensive analysis of institutions, institutional change, and economic performance.2 In addition to providing historical richness, New Institutional Economists have developed the tools and concepts of modern institutional political economy and used them to explain how and why history mattered. In other words, they have brought systematic theory to the task of explaining institutions. Some of the recent influential studies of the Middle Eastern institutions have also<br />4<br />come from this perspective as can be seen in the works of Timur Kuran and Avner Greif.3 It is now time to apply insights from these developments to examine the Ottoman tax system.<br />THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE OTTOMAN SYSTEM OF TAXATION<br />Studies of the Ottoman system of taxation typically use the detailed information recorded in imperial registers (defter-i hākanī) for source. Upon conquering new lands, the Ottomans typically surveyed all taxable resources and activities and recorded the information in tax registers commonly known as the tahrir defterleri. As circumstances changed over time, they conducted subsequent periodic surveys in order to update the information on the empire’s current sources of revenue. The registers were used for a variety of purposes, including serving as official records to establish legal claims to land, assessing the empire’s expected tax revenues, and appropriating some of the revenues to the military and administrative officials as remuneration for their services. Fortunately, many of these registers have survived to the present, available to researchers in various archives in Turkey and other countries that were previously under Ottoman domination, making it possible to study the Ottoman system of taxation in great detail.4<br />At the beginning of each district’s register was its tax code, a document called kānūnnāme. 5 Tax codes show that the Ottomans did not use complicated tax instruments like the income tax or the value added tax for public finance, because they faced various constraints in their capacity to gather the information required to administer taxes. Instead, they relied on simpler and more feasible taxes like lumpsum taxes on shops, personal taxes with standard rates within a district or province, and production taxes that were collected as simple proportions of output or based simply on the amounts of land or another input. Because taxes were levied on<br />5<br />numerous groups of persons and activities, however, the resulting system was still inevitably complex. The types and rates of taxes could vary significantly between regions, making the system more complicated. It must have been complicated enough, even perhaps for the government’s own agents, that the government felt obligated to carefully lay out the basic tax regulations of each district in a formal code and to specify the rates at which each tax was to be collected in different circumstances.<br />To reduce the complexity of taxes, we need to classify them by using a coherent standard. Previous classifications of taxes, however, have not been satisfactorily coherent or enlightening. Whereas some historians have examined each tax in isolation and thus avoided the problem of classification, others have classified them based on ad hoc or purely legal, rather than economic, categories. As an example of the former, Neşet Çağatay described taxes in an encyclopedic style by taking them in an alphabetical order, making no attempt to group them into categories.6 Although this work, as one of the earliest studies in the field, undoubtedly contributed to our understanding of the Ottoman system of taxation, such an approach is ultimately incomplete and unsatisfactory because it fails to provide the framework around which each of these taxes were collected. As an example of the latter, İnalcık grouped tax revenues recorded in the tax registers into four groups: personal taxes, tithes, various fees and fines, and extraordinary levies.7 Lacking a clear theoretical basis, however, this ad hoc classification is also unsatisfactory and confusing. It is not clear, for example, why fees on some agricultural products and fines on criminal misdemeanors belong to the same category, and how tithes are to be distinguished from other taxes on agricultural products. Although the distinction between categories may have been based on the method of collection (cash vs. in-kind), this does not explain why personal taxes, collected in cash, were put in a separate category than fees and fines.<br />6<br />Ottoman taxes have also been studied within a legal framework by distinguishing between Islamic and customary taxes.8 For example, whereas the tithes had a well-established basis in Islamic taxation, some of the personal taxes used by the Ottomans had no clear basis in the Islamic law. Although the distinction between the Islamic and customary taxes may have been useful in identifying the legal precedent for taxes, it does not help to understand the basic structure of the system as a whole. It does not help to distinguish between the taxes found within each category or to similarly identify commonalities between the taxes found in the two categories. For example, distinguishing between the Islamic and customary origins of taxes does not help to understand the differences between various Islamic ways of taxing agricultural products, such as the difference between the tithes used in taxing wheat and the fees used in taxing fruits and vegetables. It similarly does not help to understand the commonalities between taxes with Islamic and customary origins. The tithes observed in the European provinces that the Ottomans simply preserved from the tax systems of predecessor Christian states, for example, are essentially identical to those observed in the Arab lands, though their legal basis may have been different. Although previous ad hoc or legal classifications of Ottoman taxes may have served well for some purposes, they do not provide a coherent framework for classification and a consistent procedure for differentiation.9<br />Despite the enormous complexity of the Ottoman system of taxation on the surface, it had a simple basic structure. To understand the fundamental elements of this structure, let us use simple insights and concepts from the economic theory of taxation and follow the usual analytical procedure of classifying taxes according to their base. A tax base is simply the item on which the tax is levied. Ottoman tax bases can be grouped into three major categories: personal taxes levied on the persons or households, trade taxes on the goods and services brought<br />7<br />to market for sale, and production taxes on various farming and manufacturing activities. The Ottoman budgets included other sources of revenue, such as the tributes from vassal states, profits from government owned enterprises, and revenues from various fees and fines like the marriage fees and criminal fines.10 Because of our focus on tax revenues, other sources of revenue are excluded from this classification.<br />Legally, personal taxes resulted from the dependent status of the subjects. 11 Although the names and rates of personal taxes could vary among regions, they were commonly levied on the persons or households. The tax rates could vary among taxpayers, depending on their observable characteristics like land ownership and marital status, which served as an index of their ability to generate income and pay taxes. For example, under the conventional system of taxing subjects, a married subject who held farm land workable by a pair (çift) of oxen paid the çift tax, which was higher than the amount paid by bachelors (resm-i mücerred) and those possessing less than a çift or no land (resm-i bennāk). Those unable to work, such as the elderly and the disabled, were exempted from personal taxes.12<br />Table 1 shows examples of personal taxes in the Ottoman Empire during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Representing the differences in rates and the geographical diversity of the Empire during this period, the Table includes information from such diverse districts as Jerusalem in eastern Mediterranean, Budapest in Europe, Bursa in western Asia Minor, Erbil in northern Iraq, and Antep and Malatya in eastern Asia Minor.13 Personal taxes were typically levied in cash. The rates for the çift tax, for example, were specified in terms of the Ottoman currency of akçe and varied from being 33 akçes in Bursa in 1487 to 50 akçes in Erbil in 1542 and Malatya in 1560.<br />8<br />The second general category of Ottoman taxes was the trade taxes that applied to market exchange of goods and services. Trade taxes included customs dues and the general market tax, exacted on items brought for exchange into towns and villages that hosted the periodic markets. The tax base was the item brought in for trade. The tax codes, especially of districts with large markets, specified the rates at which various goods, spices, animals, slaves, and agricultural products were to be taxed. In some places trade taxes took the form of gate dues that applied to items in-transit or brought in for local consumption. Items could also be taxed at ports or river crossings. Although most trade taxes were levied in cash, the tax rates for some items were specified in-kind. In the Jerusalem district, for example, whereas fruits brought to market were taxed at the rate of one-thirtieth, linens were taxed at twenty akçes per camel-load.<br />In the third category were the production taxes that applied to various productive activities in agriculture and manufacturing. These taxes can be further divided into three subcategories depending on the tax base: output taxes that were levied on the total output of an activity, input taxes on one of the inputs used in production, and enterprise taxes on the activity as a whole.<br />Output taxes consisted of the tithes (öşür), applying primarily to grains, legumes, and fibers. Taxes on these products were to be collected in kind, as a share of the total output. The usual rate was one tenth, typically with an additional one fortieth, called salāriye, collected as fodder for the horses of the fief-holder. As Table 1 shows, the rates could vary significantly between regions, sometimes even between villages within a region. Despite such variations, however, output taxes throughout the Empire had the common property of being based on the harvested product and collected at rates specified as a percentage share of the total output. The<br />9<br />usual rate of one-tenth, for example, meant for the tax collector to claim his share immediately after the harvest as ten percent of the output of wheat, barley, lentils, and so on.<br />Input taxes applied primarily in the taxation of fruits, vegetables, and animal products. Taxes for these items were levied on the land, trees, or other inputs used in their production, rather than on total output. For example, taxes on the production of fruits, nuts, and dates depended on the number (sometimes also the age, height, and type) of trees. Similarly, taxes on vineyards typically depended on the number of vines, taxes on vegetables depended on the amount of land allocated to them, and taxes on animal products depended on the numbers of animals or other inputs like beehives.<br />Enterprise taxes were levied not on the total output or one of the inputs used in production but on the activity as a whole. In towns, they applied to retail stores and manufacturing enterprises like dye-houses, tanneries, juice-makers, slaughter-houses, and soap-makers.14 This method was also used in the taxation of agricultural production in uninhabited lands called mezra’as and in some small or remote villages. The tax rate for enterprise taxes was specified as a lump-sum payment, presumably determined by some estimate of the profitability of the enterprise. Because enterprise taxes were customized to activities, the tax codes typically did not codify standardized rates for these activities (except for some rare occasions, such as when they specified the tax rates for retail stores as “per store”). Because the lump sum rates thus showed great variability in the tax registers, they are not reported in Table 1.<br />To show the relative importance of different tax categories for Ottoman finances, Table 2 reports the proportional share of each category in representative regions of the Empire, calculated from the tax registers of these regions.15 The proportions of tax categories show significant variations among these regions and over time, probably based on such factors as<br />10<br />differences in tax rates and climatic and soil conditions. Despite these variations, one can see a clear pattern: a majority of the tax revenue in most regions came from output taxes, and trade taxes typically constituted the smallest proportion.<br />THE EFFICIENCY OF THE OTTOMAN TAX SYSTEM<br />Because the ultimate objective of a tax system is to maximize revenues, it is reasonable to expect the system to be designed to raise revenues as efficiently as possible. To examine the efficiency of the Ottoman system of taxation, let us leave aside for a moment the effect of history and focus instead on the system’s ability to solve economic problems. The issue is to explain the logic and structure of the tax system, why the tax on some items or activities were levied on one type of base and others on another type. For example, why were the taxes on grains typically levied on the output, while those on fruits and vegetables levied on one of the inputs? Similarly, why were trade taxes levied on items brought to the market for trade, rather than on the revenue or profits from the trade or as a personal lump sum payment on the tradesman himself? Within each broad category a number of subcategories could be observed, depending on, for example, whether to base the input tax on land, livestock, trees, or other capital inputs; on which products to levy output taxes, and how to determine the relevant characteristics of taxpayers for personal taxes. Moreover, because new types of taxes could be created by mixing these categories in many different ways, possibilities were numerous.16<br />To explain various organizational forms observed in history, economic historians have viewed them as institutional responses to the problems posed by risk and transaction costs. In a hypothetical world without risks or transaction costs, the organization of production and exchange activities would not affect the use of resources. But in reality both risk and transaction<br />11<br />costs exist and pose problems. The presence of risks may pose problems because if we do not know which outcomes may realize tomorrow we would have to change the allocation of resources and the design of institutions today in order insure against the undesirable outcomes of tomorrow. The presence of transaction costs may also affect outcomes because if the information required for an activity or exchange is costly and imperfect, institutions would have to be designed to solve the information problem as cheaply as possible. Economic historians have used risk or transaction-cost based approaches to explain various interesting organizations and institutional arrangements observed in history.<br />CAN AGRICULTURAL RISKS EXPLAIN THE TAX SYSTEM?<br />To determine whether a risk based explanation of the structure of the Ottoman tax system would be satisfactory, one would have to start by observing how differently risks would have been allocated under different types of taxes. Focusing on production taxes, it is easy to see how output taxes would have had different implications than input or enterprise taxes for how disasters would have affected the after-tax incomes of the taxpayers. Suppose an activity was subject to the output tax. This method would have made it possible for the taxpayer to shift part of the production risk onto the state, because if there was a crop failure, taxes would have also fallen proportional to the reduction in output. But if the same activity was subject to the input tax, the crop failure would have only affected the taxpayer’s income because the amount of taxes would have remained unchanged. The same was true for enterprise taxes. Under both methods, the producer would have assumed all the risk. Output taxes would have thus provided better opportunities for the state and the taxpayers to share risks.<br />12<br />How the difference between taxes in facilitating risk sharing would have affected the choice of taxes would depend on the risk attitudes of the state and the taxpayers. If the state or the taxpayers were indifferent between risky and safe incomes, for example, there would have been no reason to expect the presence of risks to affect the tax system because it would not have mattered which type of tax was used to generate revenue, all else being the same. But it is more reasonable to suppose that the taxpayers were risk averse and that the state was better able to deal with risks than taxpayers (because it was able to diversify the risk among taxpayers and regions). In that case, a state concerned with the welfare of its taxpayers would have been expected to accommodate their risk aversion and improve aggregate welfare by choosing output taxes over other types in taxing an activity.<br />There is some frequently cited evidence from the pre-Ottoman times, dating back to the eighth century, which seems to support the importance of risk considerations in determining the choice between tax types in this region. Based on a petition by the peasants of Iraq during the 770s, the Caliph is said to have agreed to (re)introduce output taxes (the muqāsamah method) in order to facilitate the sharing of risks between the government and the peasants.17 Assuming that the risks were still high during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and that the means for insuring against them were still limited, one could extend the argument to the period of the Ottoman rule and argue that it was because of risk considerations that the Ottomans used output taxes for grains.<br />A complete explanation of Ottoman taxation, however, must account for not just why output taxes existed but also why they coexisted with input, enterprise, and other types of taxes within the same system. The coexistence of taxes can be explained only by factors that varied among activities. For example, if the distribution of production risks was the primary<br />13<br />consideration, then one would have expected output taxes to consist of the highest risk products. The typical mixture of input and output taxes observed in Ottoman taxation, however, does not seem to support this expectation. Some of the products that were subject to input taxes were actually more prone to product failure due to pests, disease, and severe weather than some of the other products that were subject to output taxes. For example, whereas all fruits and vegetables, regardless of their delicateness and perishability, were typically subject to input taxes, some of the hardier grains were subject to output taxes.18 Moreover, if the distribution of production risks was the primary consideration, then there would have been no reason for input and enterprise taxes to coexist as subcategories of production taxes. Under both types of taxes, the tax amount would have been independent of the actual level of output and the taxpayer would have thus assumed all the risks.19<br />MEASUREMENT COSTS AND THE TAX SYSTEM<br />For a more satisfactory explanation of Ottoman taxation, let us turn to transaction cost economics. In market exchange the transaction costs include the time, effort, and other resources used in locating parties to trade with, negotiating the terms of the trade, and drawing up and enforcing contracts. In the transaction cost approach to the analysis of organizations and institutions, their presence and form are treated as the results of choice, subject to the constraints of transaction costs. If these costs were zero, it would not matter which institutional or organizational form is chosen for production or exchange activities. But when transaction costs are positive, the efficiency principle requires that the form that best economizes on these costs should be adopted. Various organizational arrangements can thus be explained in terms of how the costs of transactions vary among alternatives. By focusing on transaction costs, economic<br />14<br />historians have been able to explain a variety of institutional arrangements, including the firm, sharecropping, and manorial contracts.<br />Although the transaction cost approach has been used primarily in the analysis of private organizations and institutions, it can easily be extended to the analysis of the public sector and tax systems. If the transaction costs were zero, it would make no difference which base the government uses to tax an economic activity. In taxing production, for example, the government can raise the same amount of revenue by any combination of input, output, or enterprise taxes, ranging from levying the amount on only one of them to an equal or varying amounts of each. But in a world complicated by transaction costs, the cost may vary significantly among taxable activities and bases, making it costlier for the government to collect taxes by some methods than others. In that case, the difference in transaction costs may explain why some activities are taxed by one type of a base rather than another.<br />The transaction cost that is most relevant in studying taxes is the cost of measuring the tax base.20 These are simply the time and resources required to determine the value of the tax base, such as those that would be needed in classifying different types of items constituting the base (possibly varying in shape, size, ripeness, and so on), quantifying the total amount in each category, and estimating the monetary value. By focusing on measurement, we are able to explain both the choice of taxable economic activities and the choice of a base for their taxation. Efficiency in tax collection typically restricts states to tax only observable activities, and the Ottoman state was no exception. Consumption, for example, was generally not taxed because it was difficult to observe. Non-market exchange and productive activities that took place at home, such as cleaning and cooking, were similarly not taxed. Instead, easily observable activities like market exchange and agricultural and manufacturing production were taxed. Once the state<br />15<br />decided to tax an activity, it was also important to choose a tax base that could be easily measured. It would not have been sufficient for the cost of measurement to be low to the taxpayer himself, because he had an incentive to hide revenue whenever possible. The state or its agents who received the taxes had to be able to measure the tax base independently at low cost. Moreover, hiring a tax collector introduced a principal-agent problem to tax collection, accompanied by agency costs. For example, the tax collector could make side-agreements with the tax payer to collect reduced taxes in return for a transfer payment to himself (a bribe).<br />Examining differences in the cost of measurement in light of the Ottoman economy of this period helps to understand the structure of the tax system as a whole. Trade taxes, for example, were based on observable items like the goods brought for exchange, rather than the costlier to observe exchange itself, which is consistent with our knowledge of the institutions and technology surrounding exchange at this time. Similarly, because the state could not directly observe the marginal product of labor or the income generating capacity of individuals, personal taxes were based on the household as a whole or on observable characteristics like marital status and land ownership.<br />To illustrate the importance of the cost of measurement in detail, let us focus on production taxes and explain the choice between the output, input, or enterprise as the base in taxing a productive activity. Comparing the cost of measurement helps to understand the observed subcategories of production taxes, with taxes on grains levied on the output, those on fruits and vegetables on one of the inputs, and taxes on manufacturing activities on the enterprise itself. Once again, if the output of activities could have been measured at no cost, they could all be taxed under the category of, say, output taxes and there would have been no need for input or enterprise taxes. The total output would have been the tax base, and the tax amount would have<br />16<br />been determined either as a proportion of output or as its cash equivalent. In reality, however, the cost of measurement varied significantly among activities. Whereas both the producer and the tax collector could easily measure the output of some activities, for other activities the tax collector had to incur significant cost in determining the quality and/or the quantity of the output.21<br />The cost to the tax collector was probably the lowest for products like cereal grains, whose characteristics and harvest technologies made it easy to determine both the quality and the quantity of output at low cost. Because the harvested crop was fairly homogenous for these items, the tax collector did not have to incur high cost by inspecting the whole output closely in determining its quality. The quantity of cereal grains could also be determined at low cost. The technology for harvesting these products and the brevity of their harvest period made it easy for the tax collector to observe the output, and difficult for the taxpayer to underreport it.22 The division of the grain output could be a fairly simple matter of, for example, first threshing all the cut grain together and then dividing it between the parties, or similarly loading every nth wagon (with 1/n being the tax ratio) of the harvested grain as the share of the tax recipient.<br />The cost of measuring the output could be considerably high for other products like fruits and vegetables, because the total output could include products with significant variations in size, taste, shape, and ripeness. Even when the tax collector could have observed the quantity, the taxpayer could still increase his share of the output simply by keeping the best ones to himself. Given the taxpayer’s incentive to underreport the quality by such means, the tax collectors had to incur cost by physically being present (or hiring an agent) for close inspection of the quality of output. Not just the quality but also the quantity of total output could be difficult to determine for some products, in particular those with harvests lasting for a long time.<br />17<br />Because continual harvests created opportunities for such concerns as overnight theft, the tax collector would have had to incur cost in trying to prevent any crop from being withdrawn from division, which would have resulted in a high cost of determining the quantity independently.<br />Whenever the cost of measuring the output of an activity was prohibitively high, the next-best alternative for the state could be to choose one of the inputs as the tax base. For the input tax method to be an efficient alternative, however, the quality and quantity of the base had to be easily observable. Land and trees, for example, were better candidates than seed, water, fertilizers, and labor. The taxpayer could not evade taxes by underreporting the amounts of trees and land used in production, because their amounts remained fixed during the production period and the tax collector could easily observe them. The production tax on fruits was thus typically levied on the number of trees, and the tax on vegetables was levied on the amount of land allocated to them. Whenever it was expensive to measure the output of an activity but cheap to measure one of the inputs, the activity was taxed by the input tax method.<br />When neither the output nor any of the inputs were easily observable, the last resort for the state was to tax the activity as a whole. This was typically the case for manufacturing enterprises like juice-makers and soap-makers in towns and agricultural production in remote villages or uninhabited fields. 23 Because the cost of measuring the output or one of the inputs of these activities would have been very high, the state determined the tax amount as a lumpsum payment that was levied on the enterprise itself.<br />EXPLAINING REGIONAL DIVERSITY<br />The structure of the Ottoman system of taxation shared many elements with those of preceding and contemporary states, suggesting the presence of a selection process that caused<br />18<br />these structures to converge toward an efficient ideal. Output and input taxes, for example, were similar in principle to the basic categories of Islamic taxation of production known as the muqāsama and misāa methods.24 Enterprise taxes were also similar to the maqū’ method of assessment (sometimes also called dīmūs, a word of Greek origin from the pre-Islamic period). These categories typically formed the basic structure of the production taxes observed in various Islamic states that the Arab, Persian, Turkish, and other rulers had established in the Middle East before the Ottomans. Ottoman personal taxes also resembled those of predecessor states, in particular the Byzantine Empire.25 The çift tax, for example, was similar in principle to the Byzantine tax called zeugaratikion. These commonalities clearly support the view that the observed structure of Ottoman taxes had efficiency properties that made it more desirable than its alternatives.<br />Identifying the efficiency properties of the structure of taxes, however, is not the same as claiming that the system was efficient as a whole or that it was the same efficient system that ruled taxation in all regions of the Empire. The vast Empire that the Ottomans had built by mid sixteenth century had inherited not only common elements but also various idiosyncrasies from the customs and administrative practices of preceding states, and the tax system that they developed also reflected these idiosyncrasies. There were significant variations between the taxes observed in different regions of the Empire, some of which can be seen in Table 1.<br />The taxes in different regions varied in names and rate structures. Personal taxes, for example, varied significantly. Under the conventional system observed in Asia Minor, personal taxes were based on adult males, and the tax rate varied by marital status and land ownership. The subjects in Hungary, on the other hand, paid personal taxes in terms of the gate (kapı) tax,<br />19<br />for which the unit of taxation was the household, rather than adult males, and the tax amount did not change by marital status or land ownership. Moreover, personal taxes were not even fully implemented in all areas (though non-Muslim subjects throughout the empire paid a poll tax called cizye). In Jerusalem and surrounding districts, for example, the Ottomans did not introduce the çift tax or any other form of personal tax systematically levied on individuals or households.<br />Production taxes also varied among regions. Although the usual output-tax rate was one-tenth, a higher rate of one-fifth was applied in some of the provinces annexed after the mid-sixteenth century.26 The rates could sometimes vary even among the villages within a region. In the Palestine, southern Syria, and Transjordan region, for example, the rates varied between one-seventh to two-fifths in 1596. 27<br />Activities taxed under one category in one region could be taxed in another category in another region. Whereas beehive taxes were levied on the output of honey as output tax (under some circumstances) in Hungary, they were based on the hive itself as input tax in other regions. Similarly, there could even be differences within the same type of an activity within a region, as was the case for the taxation of olive products in the Arab lands. A clear distinction was made between the products of Rumānī trees (generally interpreted as referring to aged trees), taxed based on output, and İslāmī trees (younger trees), taxed based on the number of trees.<br />It may be possible to explain some of these differences from an efficiency view of the tax system. Taxes may have varied between regions as efficient adaptations to local conditions. For example, if the harvesting technology or the local stock of knowledge about the expected output varied significantly between two regions, then measuring the tax base of a productive activity may have been cheaper in some regions than in others, and the tax codes may have reflected<br />20<br />these differences by taxing the activity based on output in one region and based on input in the other. This may have been the reason for why beehive taxes were based on the output of honey in some regions and on the number of hives in others. Differences in production technology could also have caused the tax systems to vary. Research has shown, for example, that differences in irrigation technology was one of the reasons for the system of variable tax rates observed in the Fertile Crescent, where the output tax rates were higher in villages with easier access to irrigation water than in others.28<br />Some of the changes the Ottomans introduced into the tax systems of some regions after conquest also seem to support the efficiency view of the tax system. A well-known example of such a change is how the Ottomans abolished some of the feudal labor services. Whereas under the pre-Ottoman tax system the subjects owed labor services to their feudal lords, such as to build a barn, gather firewood, or work on his land, the Ottomans converted these service obligations to cash payments. Historians have often interpreted the Ottomans’ tendency to commute labor services as an example of their benevolence toward new subjects. But the phenomenon can also be viewed from an economic perspective as efficient adaptation of previous forms of personal taxes to the Ottoman system of government and taxation. Labor service would have been an inefficient method of payment for personal taxes. It would have caused efficiency distortions because the tax collectors would have had to incur cost monitoring the taxpayers, who had no incentives to work diligently for the tax collector, in order to ensure that the tax payment is made at the required amounts. Despite the inefficiency labor services could have survived under previous regimes because of path dependence. But a regime change provided the Ottomans an opportunity to discontinue excessive inefficiencies and highly undesirable elements. Although converting labor services to cash payments was by no means<br />21<br />peculiar to the Ottomans, as a centralized regime they had additional reasons for this conversion. Tax revenues were allocated not just to military personnel but also to the central and provincial governments.29 Because these governments did not directly engage in production, they had no need for labor services. Even the cavalrymen who resided in the countryside were likely to be away from the land during the production season, fighting in the battlefield for long periods, with limited time and ability to engage in production and maintain a large farm with heavy demand for labor services. These factors together meant that labor service was not a viable method of payment for personal taxes in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans thus significantly altered the historical precedent by converting preconquest labor services to cash payments, providing an example of the way economic principles shaped the selection from available methods of taxation.<br />It is difficult, however, to explain all components of the Ottoman tax system with economic principles only. If efficiency was the sole driving force in tax design, then the truly efficient system would have replaced all others, and regional differences would have been mere adaptations of this system to local conditions. But there are numerous other regional differences that are difficult to explain with economic principles or with an efficiency view of institutions. Consider some of the differences in tax bases and rate structures observed in the Empire. Among personal taxes, for example, numerous differences existed between regions in not just the local names of personal taxes but also in their bases and rate structures, raising the question of why the more efficient ones did not replace others. If it was more efficient to vary the rates of personal taxes based on the characteristics of adult males (because of, for example, varying abilities to pay), as was the case under the çift tax system, then one would have expected personal taxes observed in the Balkans (where the payment was based on the household as a whole, rather than individuals) to be replaced by the çift tax system. Similarly, if a uniform rate<br />22<br />for output taxes was more desirable, one would have expected it to replace the rate structure observed in parts of the Fertile Crescent with rates that varied between villages. But in both cases the Ottomans simply adopted the prevailing taxes and rate structures, making no systematic attempt to change things one way or another. They did not extend the çift tax system to the Balkans or the Fertile Crescent. Neither did they change the output tax rates that varied between villages in the Fertile Crescent to a uniform-rate system that prevailed in the rest of the Empire. It is difficult to explain such continuities of sharply different rate structures merely as efficient adaptations of the tax system to local conditions.<br />These examples indicate that certain institutions were more flexible than others and history was less of a constraint in some areas than in others. Although the Ottoman government’s ultimate objective in designing the tax system may have been to maximize tax revenues, they could not seek efficiency and minimize transaction costs as they wished. They needed to work within the parameters of various institutional constraints. But they were not completely bound by these constraints either. The challenge is to sort out these cases, and this paper contributes to this task.<br />One of the institutional constraints that could have affected the Ottomans’ choice of taxes was the legal system. Kuran has shown various ways in which Islamic law affected the institutional endowment of the Middle East.30 For example, the Islamic inheritance rules and contract law restricted the organizational forms available for business enterprises, and the rigidities of law governing pious foundations inhibited their autonomy and the provision of public services. It does not seem, however, that the legal system introduced significant rigidities into the tax system. There were two mechanisms for the Ottomans to avoid legal obstacles in tax design. The first was to take advantage of the controversial but legally recognized catch-all<br />23<br />category of customary taxes. Turkish states traditionally adopted a dual legal system particularly in public administration and taxation.31 The taxes that did not fit clearly into Islamic law could thus still be considered legal as belonging to the category of customary taxes. This was particularly useful in designing the tax code of a newly conquered area, where the Ottomans could adopt existing taxes under this category, rather than be forced to overhaul the tax system according to the principles of Islamic taxation. Various forms of personal taxes, for example, were incorporated into the Ottoman tax system as customary taxes. The Ottomans preserved even some taxes that were in conflict with general Islamic principles. Taxes on producing wine and raising swine, for example, were preserved in the Balkans, even though the consumption of alcohol and pork was banned under Islam. Although there were occasional debates within Ottoman hierarchy about the legitimacy of some of these taxes or the customary category as a whole, the presence of the category for the most part prevented the legal system from being a significant obstacle in tax design.<br />The other mechanism to avoid legal obstacles was to take liberties in interpreting the Islamic law itself. There were times when the shifting balance of power within the Ottoman government limited the independence of customary taxes from the Islamic law. Those designing the taxes were under pressure to justify the legitimacy of taxes under Islamic law. Given the importance of taxes for state revenues and the flexibility of Islamic law on taxation, however, the pressure was not necessarily a significant constraint. If they so wished, legal scholars could take liberties in interpretation that were in line with the interests of the government, for example by trying to fit customary taxes inherited from non-Islamic predecessors into the categories of Islamic law. This was the case when Ebu’s-Suud Efendi, the famous minister for religious matters (şeyhülislam) of mid-sixteenth century, offered an interpretation of the çift tax as<br />24<br />belonging to a category of Islamic taxes called misāa, even though it was clearly developed after the feudal practices of previous non-Islamic states and thus had a different origin.<br />Although the legal system may have been an insignificant constraint on the choice of taxes, political obstacles were significant. There were at least two sources of rigidity in Ottoman politics with significant influences on the tax system. The first was from various pressure groups with vested interests in the prevailing system of taxation. This was most evident during conquests, which naturally aimed to alter previous forms of tax and property relationships while establishing the Ottoman rule. But in regions of power strongholds the process often required the Ottomans to take a gradual approach in changing the tax system, if at all. 32 In eastern Asia Minor, for example, they preserved the rights of some landholders to collect taxes (under a system called mālikāne dīvānī). They similarly preserved the preconquest taxes and tax-collection rights in other regions and made concessions to some tribes or recognized their semi-autonomous status with respect to taxation. The objective in these compromises and concessions was not to minimize transaction costs or to maximize the tax revenue, but to establish the Ottoman rule within the institutional constraints of conquest politics. Any attempt to understand the postconquest tax systems of these regions would thus have to examine the rigidities created by the relative powers and interests of established political groups.<br />The second source of rigidity was the general population of taxpayers. Opposition to taxes has been one of the most common reasons for popular uprisings in history.33 Taxpayers naturally resist higher taxes, and they prefer stable, secure incomes. This type of resistance may also have been most evident during conquests. Unless changing taxes would have clearly eliminated excessively oppressive elements of the previous tax system (as may have been the case for labor services), the general population would have been likely to prefer status quo over<br />25<br />change, for fear that change might mean higher taxes and worse conditions. And they could have even fled the land or revolted against the new regime if the changes were perceived to be too burdensome. Even if an existing tax system was known to be inefficient, therefore, the Ottomans had to carefully weigh their desire to change the system against the possibility of political instability. An inefficient tax system could have thus survived if political rigidities prevented a ruler from changing it.<br />Given the political realities surrounding conquest, assimilation, and stability, the Ottomans were not free to change the tax codes as they wished. Even if they could have increased the tax revenues in Hungary by changing personal taxes from being based on the household as a whole to a differential rate structure based on the characteristics of its individual members, they would have met stiff resistance from those who would have paid higher taxes. Because of this resistance, they could not have implemented the change easily. They similarly could not have easily changed the rate structure of output taxes in the Fertile Crescent from discriminatory rates to a uniform rate, because this would have meant higher rates for some villages. Political obstacles existed not just in newly conquered lands but in well assimilated regions as well. Once the tax code of a region was adopted, changing it would have been difficult because the general population accustomed to paying taxes under a familiar system and powerful groups with vested interests in this system would have continued to resist the change.<br />There were various other forms of institutional rigidities against changing taxes. Units of measurement varied significantly between regions, making it difficult to standardize the bases and rates of taxes across the Empire. Social and demographic institutions may also have contributed to regional diversity. The size and structure of families and households, for example, may have varied between regions or between ethnic and religious groups, making it difficult to<br />26<br />implement one region’s personal tax system in another region, even though one may have been more efficient or equitable than the other. Even the lingual diversity may have been an obstacle to change. There were numerous types of scripts and languages within the Empire, setting barriers to transplanting components of a region’s tax system onto another. Even if the tax systems of some regions may have contained inefficient or inequitable elements, institutional rigidities may have guarded their survival.<br />CONCLUSION<br />New Institutional Economics provides rich tools and concepts that allow us to go beyond the previously narrow frameworks of economic and historical approaches to the study of Ottoman taxation. Whereas economic historians have conventionally studied Ottoman taxes from a narrow historical perspective by simply identifying elements of continuity with the precedent, this paper has also identified the properties of these elements that explain why their continuity was desirable. Integrating economic and historical perspectives for a more complete approach, it has examined the structure, efficiency, and regional diversity of Ottoman taxes.<br />The general structure of taxes made it possible for the Ottomans to economize on the cost of measuring the tax base. Personal taxes were based not on unobservable income or productivity but on observable characteristics like marital status and land ownership. The choice of a base for production taxes similarly depended on how the cost of measurement varied among bases. Taxes on some products like grains were levied on the output because the tax collectors could easily measure the harvested output. Taxes on other products like fruits and vegetables, on the other hand, were levied not on the output but on one of the inputs used in production because it was cheaper to measure the amount of this input than the total output. The system of applying<br />27<br />different types of bases to productive activities allowed the Ottomans to minimize the transaction cost of taxation. The same was true for trade taxes.<br />Although identifying desirable properties may be sufficient to explain some of the regional differences in taxes within the Empire, it fails to explain others. Some of the regional variations in the methods and rates of taxation can be viewed as efficient adaptations of the system to the local conditions of production technology or the changing needs of public expenditures. Other variations, however, were outcomes of not adaptation but institutional rigidity. They reflected the way previous practices were molded into the Ottoman system of taxation within various political, social, and other types of institutional constraints. In drafting the tax code of a newly conquered region the Ottomans had to carefully consider the prevailing local practices and rates of taxation, maintaining a delicate balance between efficient taxation and political assimilation. Competitive forces toward efficient taxation must have continually clashed with institutional obstacles against change throughout the Empire, requiring that we integrate economic analysis of the efficiency of Ottoman taxes and historical studies of their continuity.<br />28<br />TABLE 1<br />EXAMPLES OF TAX RATES IN OTTOMAN DISTRICTS<br />PERSONAL TAXES<br />TRADE TAXES<br />PRODUCTION TAXES<br />Input taxes<br />Output taxes<br />District (Year)<br />Resm-i Çift (Yoke Tax)<br />Resm-i Mücerred (Bachelor Tax)<br />Resm-i Kapı (Gate Tax)<br />Goods Brought to Market<br />Beehives<br />Animals<br />Vineyards<br />Tax Rate<br />Antep (1574)<br />40<br />6<br />1 per camel-load of miscellaneous goods<br />2 per beehive<br />0.5 per animal<br />0.02 per vine<br />1 / 8<br />Budapest (1562)<br />50<br />4 per wagon-load of pots and cups<br />0.5 per animal<br />4 per dönüm<br />1 / 10<br />Erbil (1542)<br />50<br />6<br />10 per load of butter and honey<br />2 per beehive<br />0.5 per animal<br />Bursa (1487)<br />33<br />9 or 12<br />1 or 2 per beehive<br />0.5 per animal<br />3, 5, or 10 per dönüm<br />1 / 10<br />Jerusalem (1562)<br />20 per camel-load of linen<br />1 per beehive<br />0.5 per animal<br />0.1 per vine<br />variable between 1/7 and 2/5<br />Malatya (1560)<br />50<br />6<br />1 per beehive<br />0.5 per animal<br />0.03 per vine<br />1 / 5<br />Notes: All monetary values are in the Ottoman currency of Akçe. Dönüm is a measure of land. See the text for the definitions of personal tax items. Some figures are missing either because the tax code did not specify the rate for those items or because the description was too detailed and<br />29<br />complex to be summarized in a single entry. Because of the customized nature of lumpsum taxes, their rates are not reported.<br />Sources: Akgündüz, Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri and Barkan, Kanunlar.<br />30<br />TABLE 2<br />THE PERCENTAGE SHARES OF OTTOMAN TAX CATEGORIES<br />PRODUCTION TAXES<br />DISTRICT<br />YEAR<br />PERSONAL TAXES<br />TRADE TAXES<br />Output<br />Input<br />Enterprise<br />Antep<br />1536<br />12<br />10<br />26<br />47<br />6<br />Antep<br />1543<br />9<br />4<br />54<br />31<br />3<br />Antep<br />1574<br />10<br />3<br />47<br />33<br />6<br />Budapest<br />1546<br />23<br />30<br />35<br />4<br />7<br />Budapest<br />1562<br />23<br />18<br />42<br />9<br />9<br />Erbil<br />1542<br />7<br />2<br />70<br />10<br />11<br />Malatya<br />1560<br />17<br />5<br />53<br />17<br />7<br />Mardin<br />1564<br />21<br />8<br />51<br />6<br />14<br />Jerusalem<br />1596<br />0<br />2<br />69<br />23<br />6<br />Sources: Ottoman Tapu Tahrir Defterleri (numbered 161, 186, 345, 373, 388, 406, 410, and 449 in the Prime Ministry Archives in Istanbul and 69, 72, 97, 100, 112, 117, 142, 181, 185, and 192 in the Cadastral Office in Ankara); contents published by Hüseyin Özdeğer, Onaltıncı Asırda Ayıntab Livası. (Istanbul, 1988); Gyula Káldy-Nagy, Kanuni Devri Budin Tahrir Defteri (1546-1562). (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları, 1971); Mehdi İlhan,. “Erbil Vilayeti Mufassal ve Mücmel Tahrir Defteri (H. 949/M. 1542).” Belgeler 31<br />26(1994-95); Rafet Yinanç and Mesut Elibüyük, Kanuni Devri Malatya Tahrir Defteri (1560). (Ankara, 1983); Nejat Göyünç and Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth, Land an der Grenze. (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1997); and Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth and Kamal Abdalfattah, Historical Geography of Palestine, Transjordan and Southern Syria in the Late 16th Century. Erlanger Geographische Arbeiten, Vol. 5. (Erlangen, 1977).<br />32<br />NOTES<br />Author’s note: I gratefully acknowledge financial support of the National Science Foundation (under Grant No. SES - 0433358) and the University of Connecticut Research Foundation. I also wish to thank Dhammika Dharmapala, Thomas Miceli, reviewers for this Journal, and the participants at the 2002 Annual Cliometrics Conference in La Crosse, WI and the 2003 Iowa Alumni Workshop in Iowa City, IA for helpful comments and suggestions. Ali Özdemir, Sadık Yıldırım, and Hüseyin Yılmaz provided valuable research assistance.<br />1 Halil İnalcık [with Donald Quataert], An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914. 2 vols. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1: 105. For the relationship between the Byzantine, Balkan, Islamic, and Ottoman taxation, see Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Türkiye’de Toprak Meselesinin Tarihi Esasları,” Ülkü Halkevleri Dergisi 60 (1938): 51-63, 63: 233-40, 64: 339-46 ; Michael Boyd, "The Evolution of Agrarian Institutions: The Case of Medieval and Ottoman Serbia," Explorations in Economic History 28(1991): 36-53; Halil İnalcık, “The Problem of the Relationship between Byzantine and Ottoman Taxation,” Akten des XI. Internationalen Byzantinisten-Kongresses 1958 (Munich, 1960), 237-42; İnalcık, An Economic and Social History. 70, 149-53; Bernard Lewis, “Ottoman Land Tenure and Taxation in Syria,” Studia Islamica 50(1979): 109-24.<br />2 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 7. For other examples and discussion, see Alexander J. Field, “The Problem with Neoclassical Institutional Economics: A Critique with Special Reference to the North/Thomas Model of Pre-1500 Europe,” Explorations in Economic History 33<br />18(1981): 174-98; Kaushik Basu, Eric Jones, and Ekkehart Schlicht, “The Growth and Decay of Custom: The Role of New Institutional Economics in History," Explorations in Economic History 24(1987): 1-21.<br />3 See, for example, Timur Kuran, “Why the Middle East is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18(2004): 71-90; Avner Greif, "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," The Journal of Political Economy 102(1994): 912-50.<br />4 Halil İnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest,” Studia Islamica 2(1954): 103-130; İnalcık, An Economic and Social History. Chapter 5; Douglas A. Howard, “The Historical Development of the Ottoman Imperial Registry (Defter-i Hakanî): Mid-fifteenth to Mid-seventeenth Centuries,” Archivum Ottomanicum 11(1986): 213-30; Metin M. Coşgel, “Ottoman Tax Registers (Tahrir Defterleri),” Historical Methods 37(2004): 87-100.<br />5 For the history and types of Ottoman tax codes, see Halil İnalcık, “Kânūnnâme,” Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition, 1960; Douglas A. Howard, “Historical Scholarship and the Classical Ottoman Kanunnames,” Archivum Ottomanicum 14(1995/96): 79-107. For collections of tax codes, see Barkan, XV ve XVI. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Zirai Ekonominin Hukuki ve Mali Esasları. Cilt 1: Kanunlar. (Istanbul: Burhaneddin Matbaası, 1943); Ahmed Akgündüz, Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri ve Hukukî Tahlilleri. (Istanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1990).<br />34<br />6 Neşet Çağatay, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Reayadan Alınan Vergi ve Resimler,” AÜDTCFD 5(1947): 483-511.<br />7 İnalcık, An Economic and Social History, 55-75.<br />8 For example, starting with this distinction, Ziya Kazıcı examines Ottoman taxes belonging in the Islamic category. See, Kazıcı, Osmanlılarda Vergi Sistemi. (Istanbul: Şamil Yayınevi, 1977). For examples of problems related to the distinction, see İnalcık, An Economic and Social History, 72-74; Lewis, “Ottoman Land Tenure and Taxation,” 119-20. For a study of Ottoman finance procedures, Linda Darling finds it more useful to classify taxes according to the recipient of the tax revenue. See, Linda Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660. (NY: E.J. Brill, 1996). Because of our focus on the generation or tax revenue, issues related to their distribution are omitted here. For a study of how transaction costs affected the distribution of Ottoman tax revenues, see Metin M. Coşgel and Thomas J. Miceli, “Risk, Transaction Costs, and Tax Assignment: Government Finance in the Ottoman Empire,” Journal of Economic History. forthcoming. For an economic analysis of Ottoman taxes in the nineteenth century, see Süleyman Sūdī, Osmanlı Vergi Düzeni [Defter-i Muktesid] (Isparta, 1996).<br />9 İnalcık’s seminal study of Ottoman personal taxes, on the other hand, was successful precisely because it considered the personal tax system as a whole and provided the broad categories of its framework. See, İnalcık, “Osmanlılarda Raiyyet Rüsumu,“ Belleten 23(1959): 575-610.<br />35<br />10 Extraordinary levies to the state called avarız-ı divaniyye are also omitted because of their irregular nature during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. For Ottoman state revenues, see İnalcık, An Economic and Social History, 55-76. For revenues as fees and fines from marriages and misdemeanors, see Amy Singer, “Marriages and Misdemeanors: A Record of resm-i ‘arūs ve bād-i havā,” Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies 4(1996): 113-52.<br />11 For a detailed account and the historical origins of personal taxes, see İnalcık, “Osmanlılarda Raiyyet Rüsumu”.<br />12 Because the amount of land also affected these taxes, İnalcık insists that “[t]his was actually a system assessing peasants’ labor and land in combination.” See, İnalcık, An Economic and Social History, 149. That the tax rates also depended on one’s age and marital status, however, suggests that the taxpayer himself was the broader tax base. Although those who owned land paid at a higher rate, even landless subjects were responsible for paying the personal tax.<br />13 For the complete tax codes of these and other districts, see Akgündüz, Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri and Barkan, Kanunlar.<br />14 For urban taxes and activities in Anatolia, see Suraiya Faroqhi, “Taxation and Urban Activities in Sixteenth-Century Anatolia,” International Journal of Turkish Studies 1(1979-80): 19-53.<br />15 These figures have been calculated from the tax information on towns and villages. The information recorded for other potential sources of revenue, such as ruined mills or uninhabited lands, are omitted in order to keep figures comparable across districts.<br />36<br />16 The issue for taxes is analogous to the problem of choosing among the rich variety of contractual forms observed in history. For the contractual mix in agriculture in the American south since the Civil War, for example, see Lee J. Alston and Robert Higgs, “Contractual Mix in Southern Agriculture since the Civil War: Facts, Hypotheses, and Tests,” Journal of Economic History 42(1982): 327-53. For medieval contracts, see Coşgel, “Risk Sharing in Medieval Agriculture,” Journal of European Economic History 21(1992): 99-110. For reviews of the relevant literature, see Douglas W. Allen, “Cropshare Contracts,” in Peter Newman, ed. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. (New York: Stockton Press, 1998); and Keijiro Otsuka , Hiroyuki Chuma, and Yujiro Hayami, “Land and Labor Contracts in Agrarian Economies: Theories and Facts,” Journal of Economic Literature 30(1992): 1965-2018.<br />17 Eliyahu Ashtor, A Social and Economic History af the Near East in The Middle Ages. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 40. In fact, long before economists justified cropsharing contracts and output taxes on risk-sharing grounds, the Muslim scholar Abū Yūsuf had argued in favor of output taxes because input taxes (the misāa method) posed greater price risks. For a discussion, see Frede Løkkegaard, Islamic Taxation in the Classic Period, with Special Reference to Circumstances in Iraq. (Copenhagen: Branner and Korch, 1950), 114.<br />18 For the different species of food plants, see Robert W. Schery, Plants for Man. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972). See also, for examples of crop production and field-crop ecosystems in this region, Itzhak Arnon, Agriculture in Dry Lands: Principles and Practice. (NY: Elsevier, 1992); C. J. Pearson, ed. Field Crop Systems. Ecosystems of the World. Vol 18. (New York: Elsevier, 1992), chapter 14.<br />37<br />19 One may also propose an incentive based explanation of production taxes, based on the taxpayer’s incentives to utilize resources efficiently under different categories of taxes and the possibility of misaligned incentives between the state and the taxpayers. But the incentive based argument does not fit the evidence well either. Although the state legally owned the land and retained the eminent domain, the possession and usufruct rights belonged to farmers. The taxpayers’ interests in using the land (or trees, animals, and other natural resources) were thus aligned with those of the state.<br />20 For the importance of measurement costs in determining cropsharing contracts in modern agriculture, see Douglas W. Allen and Dean Lueck, “Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent versus Cropshare,” Journal of Law and Economics 35(1992): 397-426. For the general importance of measurement cost for the organization of markets, see Yoram Barzel, “Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets,” The Journal of Law and Economics 25(1982): 27-48.<br />21 Court records show frequent disputes arising from the division of harvest, which support the importance of measurement costs for division. For harvest related disputes in the Jerusalem court records, see Amy Singer, Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials: Rural Administration around Sixteenth-Century Jerusalem. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 90-99.<br />22 For the relationship between the harvest and tax collection schedules in the Aleppo region, see Margaret L. Venzke, The Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Sanjaq of Aleppo: A Study of Provincial Taxation. Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1981, 135-39.<br />23 For evidence of increasing cost of measurement in distant villages, see Metin Kunt, The Sultan’s Servants. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 19.<br />38<br />24 For Islamic taxation, see Løkkegaard, Islamic Taxation; A.K.S. Lambton, “Kharādj,” Encyclopaedia of Islam. Second Edition. Leiden, 1962. See also, for Islamic law on land taxes, . Baber Johansen, The Islamic Law on Land Tax and Rent. (New York: Croom Helm, 1988).<br />25 For the commonalities between the Byzantine and Ottoman taxes, see İnalcık, “The Problem of the Relationship”; İnalcık, An Economic and Social History, 149-53; and Anthony Bryer and Heath Lowry, eds., Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society. Papers Given at a Symposium at Dumbarton Oaks in May 1982. (Washington, D.C.:Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1986). For the tax systems of other contemporary Islamic states, the Safavid and Mughal Empires, see also Shireen Moosvi, The Economy of the Mughal Empire c. 1595, A Statistical Study. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987); Willem Floor, A Fiscal Study of Iran in the Safavid and Qajar Periods, 1500-1925. (New York: Bibliotheca Persica Press, 1998).<br />26 İnalcık, An Economic and Social History, 112-14.<br />27 For a quantitative analysis of the efficiency and redistributive properties of the variable tax rates in this region, see Coşgel, “Taxes, Efficiency, and Redistribution: Discriminatory Taxation of Villages in Ottoman Palestine, Southern Syria, and Transjordan in the Sixteenth Century,” Explorations in Economic History. forthcoming.<br />28 Ibid.<br />29 For analyses of the principles for the distribution of tax revenues in the Ottoman Empire, see Kunt, Sultan’s Servants; and Coşgel and Miceli, “Risk, Transaction Costs, and Tax Assignment”.<br />39<br />30 Kuran, “Why the Middle East is Economically Underdeveloped”.<br />31 Halil İnalcık, “Suleiman the Lawgiver and Ottoman Law,” Archivum Ottomanicum 1(1969): 108-11)<br />32 For Ottoman methods of conquest and assimilation, see İnalcık, “Ottoman Methods”.<br />33 David F Burg, A World History of Tax Rebellions: An Encyclopedia of Tax Rebels, Revolts, and Riots from Antiquity to the Present. (New York: Routledge, 2003).<br />40land ownership in islamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05414932490344169940noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2263133053636924346.post-82431064460455076312008-12-11T17:50:00.000-08:002008-12-11T17:57:41.377-08:00Taxes, Efficiency, and RedistributionDepartment of Economics Working Paper Series<br />Taxes, Efficiency, and Redistribution: Discriminatory Taxation<br />of Villages in Ottoman Palestine, Southern Syria and Transjordan<br />in the Sixteenth Century<br />Metin Cosgel<br />University of Connecticut<br />Working Paper 2002-22<br />October 2002<br />341 Mansfield Road, Unit 1063<br />Storrs, CT 06269–1063<br />Phone: (860) 486–3022<br />Fax: (860) 486–4463<br />http://www.econ.uconn.edu/<br />Abstract<br />Governments can tax productive activities with either uniform or discriminatory<br />rates among taxpayers. Although discriminatory rates can cause productive<br />inefficiency and require high cost of administration, they can be preferred because<br />of their advantage in distributional flexibility. This paper studies the discriminatory<br />taxation of production in the Fertile Crescent. Using information from the<br />Ottoman tax registers, it examines the basis, distortionary effects, and distributional<br />consequences of discriminatory rates quantitatively. The results challenge<br />widely held beliefs about the basis for discriminatory rates in this region and the<br />Ottoman government’s motivation in adapting systems of taxation in newly conquered<br />lands.<br />I wish to thank the participants at the Economic History and Development<br />Workshop at UMass, Amherst; the 2002 Annual Cliometrics Conference in La<br />Crosse, WI; the 2002 Economic History Association Meetings in St. Louis, MO,<br />and the 2003 Iowa Alumni Workshop in Iowa City, IA for helpful comments and<br />suggestions. Ali Ozdemir, Hesna Taskimir, and Sadik Yildirim provided valuable<br />research assistance.<br />1<br />Taxes, Efficiency, and Redistribution:<br />Discriminatory Taxation of Villages in Ottoman Palestine, Southern<br />Syria, and Transjordan in the Sixteenth Century<br />ABSTRACT: Governments can tax productive activities with either uniform or discriminatory<br />rates among taxpayers. Although discriminatory rates can cause productive inefficiency and<br />require high cost of administration, they can be preferred because of their advantage in<br />distributional flexibility. This paper studies the discriminatory taxation of production in the<br />Fertile Crescent. Using information from the Ottoman tax registers, it examines the basis,<br />distortionary effects, and distributional consequences of discriminatory rates quantitatively. The<br />results challenge widely held beliefs about the basis for discriminatory rates in this region and<br />the Ottoman government’s motivation in adapting systems of taxation in newly conquered lands.<br />A fundamental question governments face in taxing productive activities is whether the<br />rates should be uniform or discriminatory among taxpayers. Whereas under a uniform rate<br />structure the same rate would apply to all taxpayers, discriminatory rates would vary among<br />taxpayers based on their abilities, socio-economic status, what they do, or how much they earn.<br />Although uniform rates are simpler and cheaper to administer, discriminatory rates may also be<br />observed in a variety of contexts, primarily because of their advantage in distributional<br />flexibility. By varying rates among taxpayers, governments are able to redistribute income<br />between the sectors and regions of the economy or between political, demographic, or income<br />groups. Discriminatory rates induce inefficiencies, however, because they cause the after-tax<br />cost of production or input provision to be greater for some taxpayers than others. In deciding<br />2<br />whether the rates should be uniform or discriminatory, governments have to balance the loss in<br />efficiency against the social value of redistributing income through the system of taxation.<br />The cost of administering a system with discriminatory rates can be very high when the<br />characteristics of taxpayers do not differ systematically or when these differences cannot be<br />easily observed. It is generally easier to identify differences between the sectors of the economy<br />than within each sector, making it harder to implement discriminatory rates within a sector.<br />Although rates have historically varied between the agricultural and manufacturing or between<br />the market and non-market sectors, they have been more uniform among producers within each<br />of these sectors. In most medieval and early modern systems of taxation, for example, although<br />manufacturing and trade activities may have been taxed at different rates than agricultural<br />activities, all agricultural producers typically paid taxes at the same rate, usually as tithes.<br />The system of discriminatory taxation that prevailed in parts of the Fertile Crescent until<br />the nineteenth century stands out as a novel phenomenon in the history of taxation. Although the<br />origins of the system are unknown, it was widely practiced at the time of the Ottoman conquest,<br />possibly much earlier in history. When the Ottomans conquered this region in the early sixteenth<br />century, they inherited a system of agricultural taxation with discriminatory rates among villages.<br />Whereas in other parts of the Empire taxes on grains were levied at uniform rates (usually onetenth)<br />among villages, the rates in the newly conquered lands varied between one-seventh to<br />two-fifths of output. Despite the contrast between the two systems, the Ottomans preserved the<br />prevailing system of taxation in these lands and simply reassigned the tax revenues to<br />themselves.<br />This paper seeks to understand the nature and consequences of discriminatory taxation in<br />this region, examining it quantitatively within the relevant theoretical and historical context.<br />3<br />Three objectives guide the inquiry. The first is to examine the basis for discriminatory rates.<br />Although historians have generally argued that the rates depended on local factors like the<br />fertility of the soil and the availability of irrigation facilities, no satisfactory quantitative<br />evidence has been found for support. I use the Ottoman tax registers as primary sources of data,<br />which include information about over 1,300 villages in seven Ottoman districts corresponding to<br />Palestine, southern Syria, and Transjordan in 1595-96 (H"tteroth and Abdulfattah, 1977). I also<br />use maps of the region to construct measures of some of the physical characteristics, such as the<br />availability of irrigation water, of each village. Although a regression analyses shows various<br />variables that affected the tax rates significantly, the effects of some of the variables were not in<br />expected directions. Framing previous arguments into a coherent whole, I discuss their relative<br />merits.<br />The second objective is to determine the distortionary effects of discriminatory taxation.<br />Whereas the tax rates varied among villages for some products like grains, they were uniform for<br />other products like fruits and vegetables. By determining the relationship between the tax rates<br />and the outputs of these two types of products, we can determine the distortion caused by<br />discriminatory taxation. Economic theory of taxation has shown how taxes raise the after-tax<br />cost of a product and cause producers to inefficiently shift resources toward other products. All<br />else being the same, the magnitude of this distortion would rise with the rate of taxation. The<br />implication for a discriminatory rate structure is that, assuming substitutability between products<br />to be the same among villages, a village with a higher rate of taxation than another would be<br />expected to substitute a greater amount of the discriminatorily taxed product for other products.<br />Taxation theory would thus lead us to expect a negative relationship between the tax rates and<br />4<br />the output of a discriminatorily taxed product and a positive relationship with the outputs of<br />other products. Using data from the tax registers, I find that the results confirm the expectation.<br />The final objective is to examine the effect of discriminatory rates on income distribution.<br />To compare income distribution under discriminatory and uniform rates, I first determine the<br />existing distribution of income among villages at different points of the distribution and calculate<br />the income shares of the villages in each group. I then use the regression results of the<br />relationship between the tax rates and output to simulate what the incomes would have been<br />under a uniform rate structure. Comparing the distribution of income under the two rate<br />structures, I examine whether discriminatory rates improved or worsened income distribution.<br />The results challenge widely held beliefs about the Ottoman government’s motivation in<br />adapting systems of taxation in newly conquered lands.<br />DISCRIMINATORY RATES IN THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT<br />The basic elements of a tax system are the tax base and the rate structure. Governments<br />have various choices in levying taxes on a productive activity, such as to impose a lump-sum<br />payment on the firm or to make taxes based on the revenue or profits earned from the activity or<br />on the returns to one or more of the inputs used in production. Corresponding to each tax base,<br />there is also the choice of whether the rates should be uniform or discriminatory among<br />taxpayers. The rates in discriminatory taxation may vary according to various criteria, including<br />geographic location (rural versus urban, developed versus backward), product category (farming<br />versus industrial, consumer versus capital goods), or personal characteristics (age, marital<br />status). Because tax collection is coercive, the choice of tax base and rate structure can have<br />important implications for various political and economic outcomes in a society, including the<br />allocation of resources and the distribution of income.<br />5<br />Uniform and discriminatory rates have significant implications for equity and efficiency<br />in taxation.1 By altering the relative costs of economic activities, all (non-lump-sum) taxes affect<br />behavior and cause inefficiencies as taxpayers naturally adjust to taxes by substituting other<br />activities for taxed ones. Although both uniform and discriminatory rates thus cause distortions,<br />economic inefficiencies are likely to be greater with discriminatory rates than with uniform rates.<br />Some inefficiencies are distinct outcomes of discriminatory taxation. For example,<br />discriminatory rates create opportunities for rent-seeking (as each group seeks to reduce its own<br />rate) and raise the cost of administration and compliance (given the asymmetric information<br />about taxpayers and their incentives to avoid taxation).2<br />Moreover, discriminatory rates among taxpayers cause not only allocative but also<br />productive inefficiencies.3 One of the requirements of production efficiency is for the marginal<br />rate of transformation between any two outputs to be the same in all producers, which can be<br />achieved when all producers face the same prices for outputs. Although a tax on an output that is<br />uniform across producers would not affect this condition, discriminatory rates would cause<br />producers to face different prices and cause the economy to be productively inefficient.<br />To compare the distortionary effects of uniform and discriminatory taxation in a simple<br />example, consider an economy with two groups of producers producing two goods, A and B.<br />Suppose that this economy is initially producing efficient quantities of A and B and that the<br />government decides to raise revenue by taxing A. Taxing this product at a uniform rate between<br />1 For the classical article on the efficiency of differential commodity taxes, see Ramsey (1927).<br />Despite some parallels, however, the problem is quite different with rates that differ among<br />commodities than with those that differ among taxpayers. For general reviews of efficiency and<br />equity in taxation, see Slemrod (1990) and Stiglitz (1999).<br />2 For a general analysis of public choice issues in taxation, see Holcombe (1998).<br />3 Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) analyze conditions for production efficiency in taxation in a<br />general framework.<br />6<br />the two groups would result in a deadweight loss by raising the price of A and causing an<br />inefficiently large production of B. Despite the loss in welfare, however, the economy can still<br />be productively efficient (on the production possibilities frontier) because all producers would<br />face the same prices. Raising the same tax revenue with discriminatory rates, on the other hand,<br />would result in not only a deadweight loss but also a loss in production efficiency. For the tax<br />revenue to be the same under the two rate regimes, the discriminatory rate has to be higher than<br />the uniform rate for one of the groups and lower than the uniform rate for the other group.<br />Because the tax rates are now different between the two groups, they face different costs and<br />produce the two goods at different marginal rates of transformation. The economy is no longer<br />productively efficient. Assuming supply elasticities to be the same between the two groups, the<br />high rate group would be producing too little A and the low rate group too little B, compared to<br />productively efficient levels. Aggregate output can be increased by diverting resources from B<br />to A in one group and from A to B in the other until the marginal rates of transformation are<br />equalized.<br />Are the inefficiencies of discriminatory taxation justified? Governments engage in<br />discriminatory taxation primarily for income redistribution.4 A variety of factors can affect the<br />choice of a rate structure, including the magnitude of inefficiencies, the nature of pre-tax<br />inequalities, and the balance of power between various social and political groups. These, in<br />turn, would be determined by such things as production technology, natural resources and their<br />4 If taxpayers’ supply elasticities differ systematically among producers, discriminatory taxation<br />can also help to maximize tax revenue by assigning higher rates to producers with lower<br />elasticity. See Ramsey (1927) for a parallel argument in differential taxation of commodities.<br />Because of my focus on income redistribution and the difficulty of determining supply<br />elasticities, I ignore the way discriminatory rates may also have affected state’s tax revenue.<br />7<br />allocation in the population, the availability of skilled staff to administer taxes, and a society’s<br />history of taxation.<br />Although discriminatory taxation was observed in the fiscal history of the Fertile<br />Crescent, the details of the system before the Ottoman period are not known. A basic component<br />of the tax systems observed in the region was the proportional taxation of some products, known<br />in Islamic taxation theory as the muq#sama (sharing) method.5 Although the muq#sama method<br />was not practiced uniformly throughout the region or continually over time, historical records<br />show that it extended far back into Islamic history, possibly even to the pre-Islamic period.<br />Discriminatory rates were an integral part of the method in some regions. Based on their<br />interpretation of the Islamic Law, Muslim jurists generally agreed that the rates of taxation could<br />vary among villages, and secondary sources indicate that some rulers collected taxes on grains<br />like wheat and barley at rates that varied among villages between one-twentieth to one-half of<br />total output. The lack of detailed and reliable data, however, makes it impossible to determine<br />with certainty how widespread was the system of discriminatory taxation during the time of the<br />early Islamic empires, what exactly were the rates in each village, and how the system changed<br />over time until the Ottoman rule.<br />Thanks to the rich information recorded and preserved by the Ottomans, it is possible to<br />analyze the details of discriminatory taxation in this region during their reign. Upon conquering<br />new lands, the Ottomans typically conducted a cadastral survey and recorded information about<br />tax-paying subjects and taxable resources in tax registers, updated periodically as circumstances<br />5 That the Abbasid caliph al-Mahdi (CE 775-85) reintroduced the method upon request by the<br />peasantry indicates that it existed before his reign, possibly much earlier in history. For Islamic<br />taxation methods, see L$kkegaard (1950). See also Johansen (1988) for Islamic law on land<br />taxes. For the historical background to agricultural taxation in the region, see also Lambton<br />8<br />changed over time, in order to have current information on the empire’s sources of revenue.6 At<br />the beginning of each tax register was the tax code of a region, which laid down the basic tax<br />regulations and specified the rates corresponding to different circumstances.7<br />The tax codes of some of the districts in the Fertile Crescent make it clear that the<br />Ottomans inherited a discriminatory rate structure from previous rulers and that this differed<br />from the system of taxation in other regions. The tax code of the district of Quds (Jerusalem),<br />for example, begins: “In this district, because the tax rate of each village is different, the rate is<br />recorded separately.”8 The tax registers of this and several neighboring districts indeed recorded<br />the tax rate for each village separately, in addition to the detailed information about the taxpayers<br />and the expected revenues from a variety of productive activities in each village. The wealth of<br />information that these registers provide make it possible to study the nature, causes, and<br />consequences of discriminatory rates in this region in great detail.<br />By studying the tax codes of various Ottoman districts, we can determine the general<br />structure of their fiscal system. There were three general categories of Ottoman taxes: personal<br />taxes that were based on a taxpayer’s characteristics like land ownership and marital status, trade<br />taxes based on the market exchange of goods and services, and production taxes that applied to<br />(1962), Lewis (1979: 112-14), and Poliak (1977: 65-66). Venzke (1997) studies tax rates and<br />agricultural productivity in Aleppo.<br />6 These registers were called defter-i h#kan% [imperial register], commonly known as the tahrir<br />defterleri (s. defter). For details, see Co!gel (2003), &nalc'k (1954), and &nalc'k (1994: Chapter<br />5). For the registers of the Arab lands, see Lewis (1951) and H"tteroth and Abdulfattah (1977:<br />1-11). See also Kark (1997) for a history of cadastral surveys of Palestine and Singer (1990a;<br />1990b) for research possibilities based on the Ottoman registers of this region.<br />7 The tax code of each province or district was called k#n(nn#me. See &nalc'k (1960) for the<br />history and types of k#n(nn#mes. For collections of Ottoman k#n(nn#mes, see Barkan (1943)<br />and Akg"nd"z (1990). For similarities and differences between the tax systems of the Ottomans<br />and other contemporary Islamic states, see Floor (1998) and Moosvi (1987).<br />8 See Singer (1994: 48-49) for an English translation of the Quds tax code.<br />9<br />various farming and manufacturing activities.9 Production taxes consisted of three subcategories<br />depending on the tax base: output taxes that were based on the total output of an activity, input<br />taxes that were based on one of the inputs used in production, and enterprise taxes based on the<br />activity as a whole. Output taxes applied primarily to grains, legumes, and fibers, and they were<br />assessed as a share of the total output. Input taxes typically depended on the quantities of the<br />land, trees, animals, or other inputs used in production, rather than on total output. For example,<br />taxes on fruits, nuts, and dates depended on the number (sometimes also the age, height, and<br />type) of trees. Taxes on vineyards similarly depended on the number of vines, taxes on<br />vegetables depended on the amount of land allocated to them, and taxes on animal products<br />depended on the numbers of beehives or animals. Enterprise taxes depended not on the amounts<br />of the total output or one of the inputs used in production but on the activity as a whole.<br />Table 1 shows examples of tax instruments and rates in representative districts of the<br />Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth century.10 Differences among districts in tax rates and<br />bases reflect regional economic conditions and also the way pre-Ottoman customs were adapted<br />into the Ottomans system of taxation. Because personal taxes often had origins in wellestablished<br />feudal obligations that prevailed in areas conquered by the Ottomans, the names and<br />9 Although the Ottoman budgets included other sources of revenue, such as the tributes from<br />vassal states, profits from government owned enterprises, and revenues from various fees and<br />fines like the marriage fees and criminal fines, these revenues are excluded from discussion<br />because of our focus on the discriminatory taxation of productive activities. Extraordinary levies<br />to the state called avar'z-' divaniyye are also omitted because of their irregular nature during the<br />sixteenth century. For Ottoman state revenues, see &nalc'k (1994: Vol. 1, pp. 55-76).<br />10 These districts represent the geographical diversity of the Ottoman Empire. Quds is in eastern<br />Mediterranean, Budin is in eastern Europe, and Antep and Malatya are in eastern Anatolia.<br />Items of taxation were similarly chosen to represent regional similarities and differences in rates.<br />See Akg"nd"z (1990) and Barkan (1943) for the complete tax codes of these and other districts.<br />10<br />rates of these taxes could vary among regions.11 Whereas a married peasant in Anatolia who<br />held farm land workable by a pair ()ift) of oxen paid the )ift tax and a bachelor male paid the<br />lower bachelor tax, similar taxes in the European districts, such as the “gate-tax” observed in<br />Budin, were typically levied on the household as a whole. Personal taxes (other than the poll<br />taxes imposed on non-Muslims) did not even exist in the Quds district (and surrounding districts<br />as well). Trade and input taxes, on the other hand, were remarkably similar across districts,<br />reflecting the way the Ottomans were able to standardize the system as much as possible.<br />A comparison of the output tax rates across districts shows the distinct nature of<br />discriminatory taxation in Quds and surrounding regions. In other parts of the Ottoman Empire<br />the output tax rates were uniform across villages in a district. Although the uniform rate itself<br />could vary from one district to another, such as between the rate of 1/10 in Antep and 1/5 in<br />Malatya, it was the same rate that nevertheless applied uniformly to all villages within a district.<br />The rates in Quds and neighboring districts, however, varied significantly among villages.12<br />The absence of personal taxes in Quds provides a partial explanation for why output tax<br />rates were generally higher in this district than in others. It may seem to be an unfair burden for<br />villages to be taxed here at rates as high as forty percent while in other regions the rates were<br />only ten percent. The higher rates did not necessarily mean, however, that the total tax burden in<br />Quds was significantly higher, because there were other types of taxes to consider. Table 2<br />reports the relative shares of different tax categories in representative districts. Although the<br />higher output tax rates in Quds might have caused the proportion of output taxes to be higher<br />there than in other districts, the absence of personal taxes (other than the poll taxes imposed on<br />11 For a detailed account and historical origins of personal taxes, see &nalc'k (1959).<br />12 Despite the spatial variation, the rates remained remarkably stable over time. See Makovsky<br />(1984: 104) for the infrequent cases of changing tax rates in the Quds district.<br />11<br />non-Muslims) could have compensated for this. The sum of output and personal taxes in Budin,<br />for example, constitute about the same proportion of total taxes. Moreover, the level and<br />composition of both taxes and incomes from productive activities were influenced by a variety of<br />other regional production and market conditions, rendering comparisons of tax burden based<br />solely on output tax rates misleading.<br />Rate differences between and within districts continued until the nineteenth century,<br />when the Ottomans finally fixed these rates uniformly at one-tenth throughout the Empire. The<br />standardization of the rate was part of the European-inspired reform movement known as the<br />Tanz%m#t. 13 The reforms included the centralization and universalization of the tax system in the<br />same way that contemporary European states had recently sought to accomplish. Not everyone<br />has agreed, however, with the reformers’ contention that discriminatory rates were dysfunctional<br />and needed to be changed. *mer L"tfi Barkan, one of the leading economic historians of the<br />Empire in the twentieth century, criticized Tanz%m#t reformers for failing to understand the<br />redistributive benefits of discriminatory taxation (Barkan, 1964). Barkan and reformers could<br />both be right, of course, if discriminatory rates once had good basis that ceased to exist by the<br />nineteenth century. In any case, the question remains whether Barkan and others were right in<br />asserting that discriminatory rates served useful functions during the sixteenth century.<br />13 For attempts at making the rates uniform, see Lambton (1962: 1037). See also Barkan (1964)<br />for the history of muq#sama taxes (*!"r) in the Ottoman Empire and the variation of these rates<br />among districts.<br />12<br />THE BASIS FOR DISCRIMINATORY TAX RATES<br />Unfortunately, the tax registers did not specify the basis for the tax rates of villages, and<br />other contemporary sources did not provide direct testimony for what exactly caused the rates to<br />vary among villages. Writers in the secondary literature have typically presumed the rates to be<br />determined by factors that could cause the cost or revenue of productive activities to differ<br />systematically. Combined with information about farming conditions in the Fertile Crescent, this<br />presumption has led them to argue that the rates depended primarily on differences in<br />productivity and irrigation possibilities. Lewis (1979: 119), for example, argues that rates were<br />“determined by the quality and situation of the land, the availability of irrigation, and of course<br />the existing usage.” L$kkegaard (1950: 109-10) similarly states that in determining the rates,<br />“due regard [was] being paid to the facilities for irrigation and the cultivation of the soil.”14<br />It is well-known that the availability of irrigation water has had great importance for<br />agricultural production in this region because of its Mediterranean-type semi-arid climate, with a<br />regular pattern of some winter rains and an absolute summer drought.15 Differences in irrigation<br />possibilities could clearly affect the cost of farming, as villages with poorer access to irrigation<br />water were likely to spend more effort and incur higher cost than other villages in producing the<br />same amount of output. Similarly, differences in the productivity of land could affect the<br />revenue from farming, allowing farmers on more productive lands to generate higher incomes.<br />A redistributive system of taxation could in turn be based on these differences by assigning<br />higher rates to villages with more productive resources and/or easier access to irrigation water.<br />14 For similar arguments about the relationship between tax rates and productivity, see Ashtor<br />(1976: 40), Bakhit (1982: 148), Barkan (1964), and S(d% (1996: 40). For a detailed discussion of<br />the effect of irrigation possibilities on tax rates, see L$kkegaard (1950: 120-22.).<br />15 For the climate and water resources of the region, see Beaumont, Blake, and Wagstaff (1976:<br />Chapter 2) and FAO (1997). See also Arnon (1992) for agriculture in dry lands.<br />13<br />Although historians have generally shared the view of discriminatory rates as an<br />instrument of redistribution, they have not been able to confirm any of the presumed<br />relationships by quantitative analysis. For example, finding the argument about the relationship<br />between tax rates and productivity reasonable, H"tteroth and Abdulfattah (1977: 64-65) checked<br />it “very carefully in hundreds of cases,” but they found the results disappointing: “there is no<br />definite correlation between the [tax rate] and the agricultural productivity of the respective<br />village lands.” Similarly, based on a quantitative analyses of tax rates in Quds, Makovsky (1984:<br />102) argues: “Despite the likely general accuracy of the … hypotheses concerning the<br />progressive nature of [discriminatory] taxation, there seems to be no absolute standard by which<br />we can predict the taxation rate of a given village.”<br />These studies may have failed to find the determinants of tax rates not because of a<br />nonexistent relationship between tax rates and other variables but because of insufficient data or<br />inadequate methods of investigation. Although they do not state it explicitly, H"tteroth and<br />Abdulfattah (1977) seem to have reached their conclusion from a merely visual inspection of<br />hundreds of cases rather than systematic quantitative analyses. Because a variety of factors, in<br />addition to the productivity of land, were likely to influence tax rates at the same time, it is<br />impossible to control for all these factors and isolate the effect of productivity by mere visual<br />inspection. Despite being more detailed and quantitatively more sophisticated, Makovsky’s<br />(1984) analysis of the relationship between tax rates and population is also likely to fail for the<br />same reason. Because the effect of population, if any, on the tax rates is likely to be mixed with<br />many other factors, tabulating the population and tax rates of villages is unlikely to show their<br />relationship in isolation.<br />14<br />For a quantitative analysis of the determinants of tax rates, this paper uses data from the<br />tax registers of the Ottoman districts of Quds, N#bl(s, !azza, Lajj(n, +Ajl(n, "afad, and Hawran<br />for the year 1595-96 (1005 H.).16 To construct a complete and reliable data set for the study of<br />the determinants of tax rates, I omitted fiscal units that made a single lump-sum payment for<br />taxes (rather than itemized taxes) and those with missing information on inhabitants or taxes.17<br />Of the 1559 fiscal units (excluding uninhabited fields called mazra’as) reported by H"tteroth and<br />Abdulfattah (1977), 211 observations were thus dropped, and the remaining 1348 villages<br />constitute the observations in the data set.<br />Table 3 shows the distribution of the inhabitants of these villages and their taxes by tax<br />rates. About half of all villages in the area were taxed at the rate of one-fourth, the majority of<br />the rest being taxed at one-third of total output. Only 5 villages were taxed at rates below 20<br />percent. Taxed at the rate of one-seventh was the village of Sukr%r in !azza. Those taxed at the<br />rate of one-sixth were the villages of Dayr Shayh and Bayt S#h(r an-Na,#r# in Quds and the<br />villages of Majdal #rkam#s and Tall Kis#n in the subdistrict (n#-iya) of Akk# in the district of<br />"afad. Nuwayr%, a writer of the Mamluk period, emphasized security concerns, such as being<br />16 The registers are numbered TK 72, 100, 112, 181, 185, and 192 in the Cadastral Office<br />archives in Ankara. In addition to reporting the results of their pioneering study of the historical<br />geography of this region, H"tteroth and Abdulfattah’s (1977) transcribed, categorized, and made<br />available the data contained in these registers for other researchers. Social, economic, and<br />demographic studies of the region in the sixteenth century have relied heavily on these registers<br />as the primary sources of information. See, for example, Makovsky (1984), Rhode (1979), and<br />Singer (1994). For the registers of the Arab lands, see Lewis (1951) and H"tteroth and<br />Abdulfattah (1977: 1-11). See also Kark (1997) for a history of cadastral surveys of Palestine.<br />Bakhit and Hmoud (1989) also published a series of registers of the region corresponding to<br />today’s Jordan.<br />15<br />located on the seacoast or near the enemy border, as the primary reason for why the Mamluks<br />assigned such low rates of taxation.18 Although one of these villages, Sukr%r, was located near<br />the coast in the northwestern part of !azza, the other four villages did not have similar locations,<br />and there were many other villages along the coast with higher rates of taxation.19 There must<br />have been something distinct about these five villages, such as being in charge of the protection<br />of (or catering to) the pilgrims during the annual pilgrimage to Mecca or the maintenance of an<br />important road or bridge, which caused their tax rates to be exceptionally low.<br />For a regression analysis of the determinants of tax rates, I generated various independent<br />variables from the tax data. I also used available maps of this region to construct other variables<br />that represent physical characteristics of a village. The variables of primary interest are those<br />that have been identified in the literature as the most significant influences on the cost and<br />revenue of farming operations: irrigation possibilities and agricultural incomes. It is impossible<br />to find a direct measure of the availability of irrigation facilities in each village in the late<br />sixteenth century, simply because we have no localized information on irrigation methods (e.g.,<br />canals or underground water sources) from that period. Rather than a direct measure of irrigation<br />possibilities, proxy variables have to be used to represent the availability of irrigation water in a<br />17 In a few number of cases, I filled in the tax rates of surrounding villages for the missing rate of<br />a village to be able to retain available information on other variables.<br />18 Makovsky (1984: 102) also discusses the case of Q(fin in the Quds district as being taxed at<br />the rate of one-tenth. H"tteroth and Abdulfattah (1977) list the same village as being taxed at<br />one-third in their register. An error may have been made in deciphering, recording, or printing<br />this record.<br />19 Nuwayr% (1923-42) also mentioned the possibility of low rates for those villagers leasing<br />deserted lands. Although their status as being no longer inhabited in the late mandatory period<br />appears to suggest harsh climatic conditions for three of these villages, the same was true for<br />over 200 other villages whose past locations were also identified (about 750 villages were still<br />16<br />village. One possibility is to use recent maps of the region to approximate a village’s access to<br />surface sources of water (rivers, streams, lakes), assuming them to be unlikely to have changed<br />significantly.20 I thus identified each village’s location relative to surface sources of water and<br />generated a dummy variable for whether a village was within close proximity of water.21 There<br />are some obvious potential problems of using such a measure, such as omitting other sources of<br />water that were available to villages in the sixteenth century and including sources that were not<br />available. Given the current state of our knowledge of irrigation facilities in each of these<br />villages in the sixteenth century, however, this is the best that we can do.<br />On the revenue side, the relationship between the tax rates and agricultural incomes could<br />exist at two different levels: total for the whole village or average per household. Even though<br />the registers listed the heads of households separately and the tax system made them responsible<br />for taxes individually, the taxes were recorded as a single sum for the whole village, rather than<br />broken down or averaged out by households. Although the government could presumably use<br />this information to calculate simple averages, there is no evidence that this was done. One might<br />argue that, because the government did not have information about average incomes of<br />households, tax rates were determined by the total revenue of the whole village, all else being the<br />same. Discriminatory tax rates applied only to output taxes, so I included as an independent<br />inhabited in the late mandatory period, and no definite determination could be made for the<br />status of the remaining 500 or so villages recorded in the tax registers).<br />20 The assumption is consistent with the evidence on climatic changes and the evolution of land<br />use in the region. See Butzer(1961) and Whyte (1961) for details.<br />21 For the location of villages, I relied on the maps produced by H"tteroth and Abdulfattah<br />(1977). I also relied on their estimation of where a village could be located in cases when the<br />location could not be identified with certainty in current maps. In locating available sources of<br />water, I did not include underground sources because no reliable and detailed maps exist for their<br />location and depth. Similarly, I omitted artificial canals because most canals that are currently<br />used for irrigation in this region have been built recently.<br />17<br />variable the sum of the incomes from products subject to output taxes by multiplying the taxes<br />listed in the registers for these products by the taxation factor (inverse of the tax rate).<br />The relationship between income and tax rates could also exist at the level of average<br />incomes per household. That the government did not calculate taxes or incomes per household<br />may not necessarily imply that income differences among villages were not well-known or that<br />these differences did not influence the determination of tax rates. There may have been wellknown<br />differences in soil productivity among villages, which may have caused incomes per<br />household to differ systematically. The tax system could have used these differences as the basis<br />for discriminatory rates, for example by assigning higher rates to villages with higher incomes<br />per household. To consider this possibility, I calculated each village’s average income per<br />household from products subject to the output tax.<br />I included various other variables into the regression analysis to be able to control for<br />their effects on the tax rates. The religious composition of a village’s inhabitants could be a<br />factor if, for example, the relative power of the tax recipients over the villagers in influencing the<br />tax rates depended on the proportion of Muslims in the village. Although the religious minorities<br />(Jews and Christians) paid a poll tax called jizya in addition to regular agricultural taxes, they<br />could be paying even higher taxes through higher rates of taxation on their grain production as<br />well. To consider this possibility, I calculated the proportion of Muslims in a village’s<br />population (adult males) as another variable.<br />A village’s distance to the nearest market town could affect its tax rate. This could be the<br />case if being farther from market towns meant for a village to have a lower tax rate because of<br />fewer opportunities for alternative employment, higher cost of marketing products, or costlier<br />access to other urban benefits. To approximate these considerations, I measured the direct<br />18<br />distance between a village and the nearest market town as a variable. Although the relevant<br />distance could vary considerably from this measure because of such factors as the terrain or the<br />presence and conditions of the roads and waterways, we do not have information about these<br />factors in the sixteenth century.<br />The recipient(s) of a village’s tax revenue could also affect its rate of taxation. The<br />distribution of tax revenue could affect the rates if, for example, the recipients differed<br />systematically in their incentives to maximize the revenue. 22 To consider this possibility, I<br />grouped the recipients into three categories based on the way they collected and spent taxes. 23<br />The first is the central government, which collected taxes through its agents. Because the money<br />entered the treasury before being spent and thus those who collected the money were different<br />from those who spent it, the incentives to maximize the tax revenue were different. The<br />government’s tax collectors, who had the expertise and local knowledge, did not have full<br />incentives to try to maximize the tax revenue. The second category consists of all members of<br />22 The causality between the rates and recipients of taxes could also have gone in the other<br />direction, such as if recipients were determined based on the tax rates, which would be a case of<br />an endogenous relationship. Despite being an interesting possibility, this interdependence is<br />beyond the scope of this paper and is not investigated in detail.<br />23 Under the Classical Ottoman system of government finance, tax revenues were either retained<br />by the central treasury, awarded to various military, judicial, and administrative personnel as<br />remuneration for their services, or distributed to other groups or organizations as their rights<br />recognized by the system of land tenure. The revenue recipients recorded in the tax registers of<br />this region were the p#d%!#h (the ruler, central government), m%r liw# (provincial governor and<br />commander of troops), holders of t%m#r and za’#ma (small and large fiefs), waqfs (pious,<br />charitable foundations), and the holders of such rights as m"lk (private) land and haq ’arab<br />(share of the Bedouins). In Qa$# .awr/n, some of the revenues were also awarded to the m%r<br />m%r#n (governor of the wil#yat) of Sh#m (Damascus). The tax revenues of some villages were<br />divided between two or more recipients, in which case the registers recorded the respective<br />portions (as a fraction of 24) of all recipients. In such cases, I calculated the amount of tax<br />revenue to add to each recipient’s grand total by simply multiplying these portions by the tax<br />revenue of the village. See Co!gel and Miceli (2003) for how risk and transaction costs affected<br />the allocation of tax revenue among these recipients.<br />19<br />the governing and military class in the provinces. There are some obvious differences among the<br />members of this group, for example between the cavalrymen who typically lived on the same<br />land as he collected taxes and other members of the governing and military class who lived<br />farther and thus used agents to collect taxes. More relevant, however, was that all recipients in<br />this group had the same type of high incentives to maximize the tax revenue, both to increase<br />their personal living standards and to improve their professional positions.24 In the third<br />category are the pious foundations (and various other negligible recipients whose combined<br />revenue was less than two percent of total taxes). Although there were pious foundations of<br />various types and sizes, as a whole they had the same type of incentives to maximize tax<br />revenues, which was also distinct from the incentives of those in the two previous categories. As<br />was the case with the central government, they needed agents to collect tax revenues, and<br />different people thus collected the taxes and spent the revenue. But because pious foundations<br />often had a clear focus and local operations and management, they were less likely to suffer from<br />the same problem of incentives facing the central government.25 By being local and thus clear<br />and present, the beneficiaries of a foundation were likely to apply strong pressure to increase the<br />tax revenues. Similarly, although the manager(s) of a foundation did not receive all tax revenues<br />directly as remunerations for service, they nevertheless had high incentives to maximize tax<br />revenues in order to fulfill professional obligations and improve service, if not to increase<br />personal standards of living.<br />24 There is also a more practical reason for grouping them in the same category. Although these<br />recipients were clearly identified and separated in other regions, they were not distinguished in<br />the registers of the qa$# of Hawran.<br />25 Although some foundations received tax revenues from distant villages, the argument about<br />differential incentives still applies.<br />20<br />To consider the effect of the distribution of tax revenue, I generated three dummy<br />variables corresponding to the three categories of recipients.26 In the regression equation, I<br />omitted the dummy variable for the central government to avoid multicollinearity, so the<br />coefficients of the remaining two dummy variables show the different effect of having a pious<br />foundation or one of the members of the provincial governing and military class, rather than the<br />central government, as the primary recipient of the tax revenue.<br />The distribution of tax revenue could affect the rates differently if there were multiple<br />recipients of the revenue. For example, one might expect the upward pressure on the tax rate to<br />be greater in villages where two or more recipients share the tax revenue than in villages with a<br />single recipient. To account for this possibility, I generated a dummy variable based on whether<br />a village’s tax revenue was divided (1 if divided between two or more revenue holders).<br />Finally, I included a set of dummy variables to determine and control for the influences<br />of possible but unobservable differences among the seven districts comprising the data set. A<br />variety of unobservable regional factors, such as systematic differences among districts in<br />climate, topography, and political factors, could have influenced the tax rates. I thus generated<br />dummy variables corresponding to each of the districts (1 if village is in the stated district). The<br />dummy variable for Quds is dropped, so the remaining six dummy variables show the way<br />unobservable factors caused the tax rates of other districts to differ systematically from the tax<br />rates in Quds.<br />26 In cases of divided revenue, I coded the holder of the highest share as the primary recipient of<br />tax revenues.<br />21<br />Table 4 shows the results of the regression estimation of influences on the tax rate.27 The<br />effects of control variables are interesting in their own right. The results show that religious<br />composition of a village and its distance to the nearest market town did not affect its tax rate<br />significantly. The distribution of tax revenue and local factors, on the other hand, affected tax<br />rates significantly and generally in expected directions. The rates were likely to be higher in<br />villages where multiple parties shared tax revenues. Villages paying taxes to pious foundations<br />and provincial officials were also likely to pay at higher rates than those paying to the central<br />government, confirming the expectation about the effect of differential incentives to maximize<br />the tax revenue. The coefficients of regional dummies are also significant, showing that villages<br />in other districts except N#bl(s were likely to have lower rates of taxation than those in Quds.<br />The magnitudes of these influences are also interesting. Because the dependent variable<br />is in logarithmic form, the coefficients of explanatory variables have a percentage interpretation.<br />The coefficients of some of the district dummies are considerably high, explaining as much as 32<br />percent of the difference in tax rates between districts (as can be seen from the difference<br />between the coefficients of "afad and N#bl(s). For example, given that the dummy variable for<br />Quds was dropped, the coefficient for "afad indicates that the grain output of a village was likely<br />to be taxed at a rate about 26 percent lower in "afad than in Quds, holding all other variables<br />constant. The variables representing the distribution of the tax revenue, on the other hand, had<br />smaller influences, varying around 3 percent, on the tax rate.<br />27 The (mean, standard variable) of the non-dummy variables included in the regression<br />equations are as follows: natural logarithm of tax rate (3.4, 0.19), natural logarithm of the<br />revenue from output-taxed products (9.4, 0.9), natural logarithm of per-household income from<br />output-taxed products (6.3, 0.86), percentage of Muslims (0.98, 0.097), distance to nearest<br />market town (3.0, 2.2).<br />22<br />Controlling for other factors makes it possible to identify the individual effects of<br />incomes and irrigation possibilities. To the extent that a village’s current proximity to sources of<br />fresh surface water represents the possibilities for irrigation in the sixteenth century, the positive<br />coefficient of this variable indicates that access to irrigation water did indeed affect the tax rate,<br />confirming the expectation that the tax rates were likely to be higher in villages with better<br />access to water than in others.<br />The coefficients of “Village Income (from Output-taxed Products)” and “Income per<br />Household” are both significant but with different signs, providing two alternative hypotheses<br />about the relationship between incomes and tax rates.28 Whereas the significance of the<br />coefficient of village income supports the view that the whole village’s income served as the tax<br />base in determining the rates, the significance of the coefficient of income per household<br />suggests that the tax base was the average income per household. Whereas the positive<br />coefficient of the former variable indicates a progressive rate-base relationship, the negative<br />coefficient of the latter indicates that the rate structure was regressive. Unfortunately, we do not<br />have sufficient information to determine whether it was the total or average incomes that actually<br />served as the tax base when the rates were first assigned. Further research based on other<br />sources is required to decide which of these possibilities was the more likely scenario.<br />Despite being small in magnitude (a one percent increase in average income lowered the<br />tax rate by about 0.04 percent), the latter result contradicts the argument commonly made in the<br />literature about the relationship between tax rates and productivity (assuming that higher<br />28 The simple correlation coefficient between the total income and income per household is 0.44,<br />suggesting the possibility of a multicollinearity problem between them. The sign and<br />significance of their coefficients, however, do not change when one of these variables is<br />dropped. Both variables are thus kept in the reported regression to provide more complete<br />information about their effects.<br />23<br />incomes were generated by higher productivity). One possible explanation for this surprising<br />result is that the negative relationship between tax rates and average incomes could simply be an<br />unintended consequence. If, for example, people overcrowded villages with easy access to<br />irrigation water and the tax rates were based primarily on irrigation possibilities, then (Ricardian)<br />diminishing returns in agriculture would have caused marginal product and average incomes in<br />these villages to fall, resulting in a negative relationship between tax rates and average incomes.<br />If villagers and Ottoman officials were unable to systematically compare average incomes and<br />tax rates across villages, this unintended outcome may have gone unnoticed. As another<br />possibility, the rates may have been intentionally assigned to achieve a negative relationship<br />between tax rates and average incomes. If, for example, the fiscal authorities were concerned<br />solely with minimizing the distortionary effects of taxation (rather than redistribution) and perhousehold<br />incomes and supply elasticities of output-taxed products were positively correlated,<br />then (similar to Ramsey taxes in commodity taxation) optimal taxation would require to assign<br />high rates to villages with low incomes (inelastic supply). Once again, lack of sufficient<br />evidence forces us to leave it to further researchers to determine which of these possibilities was<br />the more likely explanation.<br />DISCRIMINATORY RATES AND OUTPUT DISTORTION<br />Taxes are mandatory, but taxpayers are free to adjust their behavior in order to avoid<br />being taxed as much as possible. The Ottoman taxpayers too had opportunities to shelter some<br />of their income from taxation by allocating their resources among activities. The difference<br />between the rate structures of output and input taxes provided such an opportunity. Because the<br />rates differed among producers for output-taxed activities but were uniform for input-taxed ones,<br />taxpayers could adjust to their own rates by changing the composition of output between these<br />24<br />two types of activities. For example, a village could have adjusted to a high output tax rate by<br />shifting resources from items subject to the output tax to either non-taxed activities or to those<br />that are subject to the input tax, such as by converting a grain field to vegetable garden.<br />Although regulations may have prevented producers from altering their product mix significantly<br />in any one year, they could have nevertheless achieved desired changes in the long run as<br />cumulative outcomes of small yearly adjustments. We would thus expect taxpayers with higher<br />output tax rates than others to produce less of the output-taxed products, all else being the same.<br />As a corollary, the amounts of input-taxed products (as substitutes for output-taxed products)<br />would be expected to be higher for high-rate producers than others.<br />These expectations about the distortionary effects of discriminatory taxation can be tested<br />by a regression analysis of how tax rates affected output-taxed and input-taxed products in two<br />separate equations. The dependent variable of the first equation is the revenue from output-taxed<br />products, which we can easily calculate (as we have already done for the previous regression<br />analysis) by simply multiplying the taxes listed in the registers for these products by the taxation<br />factor (inverse of the tax rate). It is much harder to calculate the dependent variable of the<br />second equation: the revenue from input-taxed products. Although the tax codes stated the tax<br />rates for inputs clearly, we have no direct information on how to relate these rates to the output<br />or revenue of these products.29 We can nevertheless estimate input-output rates indirectly by<br />combining the tax data with more recent information about the productivities and production<br />processes of some of the items listed in the registers. Information about olives and grapes is<br />29 Faced with the same problem, H"tteroth and Abdulfattah (1977: 79-85) assumed that the taxes<br />collected from these products were proportional to their output according to the local taxation<br />factor, so they calculated the revenue from the production of fruits, vegetables, animal products<br />and various other products by multiplying the tax amount by the taxation factor of the respective<br />villages.<br />25<br />particularly useful because they could be taxed either as raw products or as finished products like<br />olive oil and grape syrup, and the registers listed these taxes either individually or as combined<br />with other taxes, and as based on either inputs or outputs. The registers thus provide information<br />about the quantities of inputs and the prices of outputs, which we can combine with external<br />sources on current yields of olive trees and grape vines, the oil or juice contents of olives and<br />grapes, and the conversion rates of weights and measures between the two time periods to<br />estimate revenue from taxes. Based on the assumption that yields did not change significantly<br />since the late sixteenth century, I calculated the ratio of revenue to taxes to be remarkable similar<br />between these products: 8.1 for grapes and 8.2 for olives.30 Assuming yields to be similar within<br />the region and tax arbitrage to be possible among input-taxed products, I used the rate of oneeights<br />for all input-taxed products to convert taxes to revenue in all villages.<br />I used the same set of independent variables in both equations because the same set of<br />factors could have potentially, if differently, affected output-taxed and input-taxed products. The<br />independent variable of primary interest is the tax rate. Among the other variables that could<br />have also affected production, perhaps the most important were the inputs used in production.<br />Although the tax registers did not directly record the quantities of inputs, they did record the<br />numbers of adult males in each village, which we can use to generate a general proxy for all<br />inputs. Assuming the number of adult males to be proportional to the agricultural labor force<br />and input proportions to be similar among villages, this measure would represent the units of the<br />input bundle used in production.<br />30 For estimates of current average yields, I relied on the Isaac, et al’s (1994) team study of<br />dryland farming in parts of this region. For conversion rates, see Makovsky (1984: 109-110). To<br />determine whether the results are sensitive to these calculations, I ran the same regressions with<br />different rates, as low as one-third (proportion of tax to revenue). The results did not change<br />significantly.<br />26<br />Among the variables created earlier for examining influences on the tax rate, the<br />availability of irrigation water in a village, its distance to the nearest town, and the recipients of<br />its tax revenue could have also affected production. So I included these variables in this<br />regression analysis. I used the information from tax registers to create three new dummy<br />variables that represent other economic activities in a village. To consider the effects of<br />commercial activities, I created a dummy variable based on whether the village hosted the<br />periodic regional market or pursued any urban activities (1 if the village paid b#j b#z#r or other<br />urban taxes). I created two other dummy variables to consider the effects of making investments<br />in manufacturing activities. One is whether the village had a water mill (1 if village paid taxes<br />for 0#-(1), whose presence would indicate a lower cost of converting grain to final products and<br />could thus have had a complementary, positive effect on grain production. The other dummy<br />variable is whether the village had a press for grape syrup or olive oil (1 if village paid taxes on<br />ma’sara), which would similarly indicate a lower cost in the processing of fruits and olives into<br />final products.31<br />Just as unobservable differences among districts were found to affect the tax rates<br />significantly, more localized differences among subdistricts could have affected the productions<br />of output-taxed and input-taxed products. To control for unobservable differences among<br />subdistricts in, for example, rainfall, climate, prices, and soil quality, I generated dummy<br />variables, similar to the district dummies of the first equation, for the forty-two subdistricts<br />represented in the data set.<br />31 Some types of olive trees called zayt(n R(m#n% were subject to the output tax, but the registers<br />did not always record the distinction carefully. Sometimes, taxes from olive trees were lumped<br />together with other items, such as fruit trees, that were subject to the input tax.<br />27<br />Table 5 reports the OLS estimates of influences on the revenues of output-taxed and<br />input-taxed products separately. One might argue that a method of simultaneous estimation<br />should have been used to estimate these equations. Recall that the revenue from output-taxed<br />products was one of the independent variables in the regression analysis of the determinants of<br />tax rates reported in Table 4. That the tax rate is now an independent variable in Table 5 thus<br />indicates an interdependent relationship between the tax rate and output-taxed products. Testing<br />for the endogeneity of the value of output in the equation in Table 4 and of the tax rate in the first<br />equation in Table 5 weakly confirms that these two variables were indeed jointly determined.32 I<br />therefore used the two stage least squares (2SLS) method to estimate the two equations<br />simultaneously. The signs and significance of the coefficients, however, were generally<br />consistent between the OLS and 2SLS estimates. The coefficients were also surprisingly close.33<br />Table 5 thus reports only the OLS results in order to avoid redundancy and to maintain<br />consistency between the two equations.<br />The results show interesting relationships between the control variables and the revenues<br />from output-taxed and input-taxed products. The number of adult males affected the quantities<br />of the two types of products positively, as one would expect. Being close to irrigation water had<br />an insignificant effect on these products, probably because it affected more the cost of<br />production than its revenue. Villages with a water mill produced more of both types of products<br />than other villages. Although the positive effect of mills on output-taxed products confirms<br />expectations about their complementarity, it is difficult to explain why the same type of positive<br />32 See Wooldridge (2000: 483) for a description of the test performed.<br />33 The only coefficient that changed significantly was that of the tax rate, possibly because the<br />rates in the original data were discrete values that ranged between 1/7 and 2/5 whereas the values<br />in the instrumental variable used in the 2SLS estimation could be continuous beyond this range.<br />The results of the 2SLS estimation are available upon request.<br />28<br />relationship existed between mills and input-taxed products. Consistent with grape syrup and<br />olive oil being output-taxed products, having a press for grape syrup or olive oil affected the<br />production of output-taxed products (but not input-taxed products) positively. The presence of<br />urban and commercial activities in a village, on the other hand, affected the input-taxed products<br />(but not output-taxed products) positively, indicating a complementary relationship between<br />them. Although the distribution of tax revenue also affected production in interesting ways, it is<br />beyond the scope of this paper to examine them in detail.34<br />The coefficients of the tax rate in the two equations show how taxes distorted output.<br />The negative coefficient of the tax rate in the first equation confirms the expectation that, all else<br />being the same, taxpayers adjusted to higher rates by producing less of the output-taxed products<br />(and substituting by others). The positive coefficient of the tax rate in the second equation shows<br />the other side of the substitution effect: taxpayers substituted output-taxed products with inputtaxed<br />ones as those with higher rates produced more of the latter. The magnitudes of these<br />effects are also interesting. Because both variables are in logs, the coefficients of the tax rate<br />reflect tax elasticities of the two types of products. Tax elasticity of supply is low in both cases,<br />possibly caused by the immobility of resources and restrictions on changing the composition of<br />products.<br />DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES<br />One of the features of the Ottoman government frequently emphasized in the literature is<br />their concern about fairness in taxation. The rulers appear to have taken various measures to<br />34 Because of space limitations, the results of the dummy variables that control for the<br />differences among the forty-two subdistricts are not reported in the Table. A majority of these<br />variables affected output significantly, confirming the importance of local factors in production<br />decisions.<br />29<br />prevent inequitable practices in collecting taxes. They announced great pride in changing some<br />of the taxes in the newly conquered lands, such as by commuting labor services in the European<br />provinces, in attempts to introduce fair and just taxation. They similarly established clear<br />regulations about how and when taxes should be collected and how tax collectors should not<br />abuse their power. When one type of tax was replaced by another, for example, the tax codes<br />often explicitly prohibited tax collectors from taking advantage of the situation by collecting<br />both types of taxes. Observing these measures against unjust taxation, leading historians of the<br />Empire have typically portrayed the Ottoman legal and financial system as fundamentally fair.<br />&nalc'k (1973: 73-4), for example, writes that the Ottoman laws “introduced a system of taxation<br />which was in general simpler and less liable to abuse than the earlier systems of feudal services.<br />[Various] regulations aimed to prevent the military class oppressing the peasantry and, therefore,<br />assessment according to means and collection according to law were the governing principles of<br />the tax system.”<br />The question then becomes whether preserving discriminatory rates in the Fertile<br />Crescent was consistent with the Ottoman concern for fairness. One of the standards of fairness<br />is vertical equity, which suggests that individuals who are in a position to pay higher taxes than<br />others should do so. If there were significant, systematic differences among villages in their<br />ability to generate income, vertical equity thus requires a discriminatory rate structure to assign<br />higher rates to those who are in a position to pay more than others.<br />Although the negative relationship between the tax rates and the per-household revenue<br />from output-taxed products (Table 4) suggests a regressive system of taxation, this does not by<br />itself mean that the tax system worsened the distribution of incomes as a whole. As the results in<br />Table 5 show, the taxpayers were able to adjust their total net incomes by responding to higher<br />30<br />rates by decreasing the production of output-taxed products and increasing input-taxed products.<br />To determine how tax rates affected incomes, we thus need to consider not just the revenue from<br />output-taxed products but the net incomes from all activities.<br />I used the tax data and previous regression results to calculate and compare the total<br />after-tax incomes under discriminatory and uniform rate structures. I used the same procedure<br />outlined above to estimate a village’s income from output-taxed and input-taxed products with<br />discriminatory rates. Subtracting the amount of total taxes paid by the village and dividing the<br />result by the number of households gives the net per-household incomes in a village. To<br />simulate what the incomes would have been under a uniform rate structure, I used the regression<br />results reported in Table 5. Simple calculations show that the uniform tax rate that would be<br />required to generate the same amount of tax revenue (as with discriminatory rates) is 29.25<br />percent. Substituting this for the tax rate in the data and using the regression equations to<br />calculate the predicted value of the dependent variable for each village gives the simulated<br />revenue from output-taxed and input-taxed products corresponding to this tax rate, all else being<br />the same. Similarly recalculating the taxes corresponding to this rate and subtracting them from<br />revenues, I estimated the net incomes under a uniform rate structure.<br />Table 6 shows the distribution of income under the two types of rate structures at<br />different points of the distribution. The distribution is shown separately for villages that were<br />near and distant from sources of irrigation water to determine whether any redistribution took<br />place between them. Contrary to expectations raised by the literature, the distribution is less<br />equitable under discriminatory rates than under uniform rates. Discriminatory rates decrease the<br />shares of total income received by the poorest 80 percent of the households, while increasing the<br />share of the richest 20 percent. It is also interesting that redistribution was more pronounced<br />31<br />among villages distant from sources of irrigation. Even though the magnitude of redistribution<br />was small, the direction of redistribution nevertheless shows that the discriminatory rate structure<br />was regressive.<br />This does not mean, of course, that the system of discriminatory taxation was originally<br />intended to be regressive or that the Ottomans intended to use the tax system to redistribute<br />income from high-income to low-income villages. Such interpretations of the results have to<br />wait until more direct evidence can be found about the origins of the system or about the<br />Ottoman’s intentions in preserving it.<br />The results nevertheless suggest an alternative to the standard reason offered in the<br />literature for why the Ottomans preserved some types of taxes after conquest and changed others.<br />It may have been simple pragmatism and concern with political stability, rather than an<br />overriding concern for justice and equity, that determined Ottoman policy. They may have thus<br />chosen to preserve the discriminatory rate structure in the Fertile Crescent not because they knew<br />about and agreed with its redistributive consequences but because they found it politically more<br />feasible to preserve than abolish a system that had been in existence for centuries. Unlike the<br />commutation of labor services in the European provinces that was typically welcomed by all<br />peasants, the switch from discriminatory to uniform rates would have faced significant resistance<br />because the Ottomans would have had to lower the rates for some villages but raise them for<br />others in order to preserve the same tax revenue.<br />CONCLUSION<br />Combining information from the tax registers of the Ottoman Empire with other<br />information about the physical characteristics of villages, this paper has examined the<br />determinants and consequences of discriminatory taxation in the Palestine, southern Syria, and<br />32<br />Transjordan region in the late sixteenth century. The results support the widespread belief that<br />the availability of irrigation water was one of the determinants of discriminatory rates in this<br />region. The widespread belief about the positive relationship between the tax rates and<br />productivity, however, receives no support.<br />As an adverse consequence, discriminatory rates caused distortion in output. Consistent<br />with behavior expected from rational decision-makers, the producers in this region responded to<br />taxes by reallocating their output between discriminatorily taxed and other products. All else<br />being the same, villages with higher tax rates produced less of the discriminatorily taxed<br />products and more of other products, and vice versa. By altering the cost of production among<br />producers and causing them to alter the product mix, discriminatory rates thus caused<br />inefficiencies in production.<br />Whereas inefficiencies in taxation can sometimes be justified by more equitable<br />distribution of income, discriminatory taxation in this region actually made the distribution even<br />less equitable. 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South-<br />Western College Publishing.<br />36<br />TABLE 1<br />EXAMPLES OF TAX RATES IN OTTOMAN DISTRICTS<br />DISTRICT<br />(YEAR)<br />PERSONAL TAXES TRADE<br />TAXES<br />PRODUCTION TAXES<br />Input taxes<br />Output<br />taxes<br />4ift-tax<br />Bachelo<br />r Tax<br />Gate<br />Tax<br />Examples of<br />Goods Brought<br />to Market Beehives<br />Animal<br />Products Vineyards Tax Rate<br />Antep (1574) 40 6 1 / camel-load<br />of<br />miscellaneous<br />goods<br />2 / beehive 0.5 /<br />animal<br />0.02 /<br />vine<br />Uniform<br />1 / 10<br />Budin (1562) 50 4 / wagon-load<br />of pots and cups<br />1/10 or<br />2 / beehive<br />0.5 /<br />animal<br />4 / d5n"m Uniform<br />1 / 10<br />Quds<br />(Jerusalem)<br />(1562)<br />20 / camel-load<br />of linen<br />1 / beehive 0.5 /<br />animal<br />0.1 / vine Discrimi<br />natory<br />between<br />1/7 and<br />2/5<br />Malatya (1560) 50 6 [none specified] 1 / beehive 0.5 /<br />animal<br />0.03 /<br />vine<br />uniform<br />1 / 5<br />Notes: All monetary values are in the Ottoman currency of Ak)e. D5n"m is a measure of land.<br />Because of their customized nature, the rates for enterprise taxes are not reported.<br />Sources: Ottoman provincial k#n(nn#mes. Akg"nd"z (1990), Barkan (1943).<br />37land ownership in islamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05414932490344169940noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2263133053636924346.post-84676372052630192292008-12-11T17:30:00.001-08:002008-12-11T17:50:10.859-08:00Islamic Law, Land and MethodologiesPaper 3: Islamic Law, Land and Methodologies<br /><br />M. Siraj Sait<br />Dr. Hilary Lim<br />School of Law <br />University of East London <br />Duncan House <br />High Street <br />Stratford <br />London E15 2JB <br />UNITED KINGDOM <br /><br /><br />Islamic Law is the epitome of the Islamic spirit, the most typical manifestation of the Islamic way of life, the kernel of Islam itself. For the majority of Muslims, the law has always been and still is of much greater practical importance than the dogma. Even today the law remains a decisive element in the struggle which is being fought in Islam between traditionalism and modernism under the impact of Western ideas. It is impossible to understand the present legal development in the Islamic countries of the Middle East without a correct appreciation of the past history of legal theory, of positive law, and of legal practice in Islam. <br />(Khadduri and Lienbesny 1955:28) <br /><br /><br />OVERVIEW<br /><br />A striking feature of Islamic societies is the high degree of reliance on legal cultures, arising in part because of the sophistication and breathtaking scope of Islamic law (Shari'a). Islamic law is an important factor influencing land rights and tenure systems in Muslim societies. Rather than assume that Islamic law (Shari’a) is a monolithic, static or immutable corpus of medieval laws, it can be seen as an evolving, responsive and assimilating sphere of competing ideologies and interests, though it is a site of struggle between conservatives and liberals. The primary sources of the Shari’a may be divine (the Qur’an) but it is the human (bashari) endeavour or interpretation as well as State preferences that determine how contemporary society actualises the Shari’a. An appreciation of the distinctive features and sources of Islamic law, its diversity in application, its dispute resolution mechanisms would contribute towards strategies aimed at enhancing security of tenure. <br /><br />Scope of this Position Paper: This position paper introduces the significance of Islamic law in Muslim consciousness in Section 1. Section 2 outlines the sources of Islamic law relating to land and property right. Section 3 explores the pluralism inherent in the articulation of Islamic legal theories and their practice. Section 4 examines the role of various legal institutions in implementing Islamic law. Section 5 offers five strategies for empowerment through Islamic law<br /><br />* Recognize the importance of Islamic legal discourses<br />* Engage with Islamic sources and legal methodologies <br />* Appreciate the dynamics of Islamic legal pluralism<br />* Support capacity building of legal institutions in Muslim countries <br />* Facilitate alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in the Muslim World. <br /><br />3.1 CENTRALITY OF ISLAMIC LAW IN THE MUSLIM WORLD <br />3.1.1 Role of Law in Land Policy <br /><br />Law generally constitutes a significant medium in the development, articulation and implementation of land policies. It defines property rights, informs land tenure systems and regulates land administration. Throughout the world there are variations in how property rights are established, the types of property rights recognized, the regulation of different types of use and users and in the enforcement mechanisms. This position paper outlines how notions of law, in the Islamic legal contexts, are distinctive in their normative outlines, structure and methodology. <br />3.1.2 The relevance of Islamic Law <br /><br />Whatever the extent and form of Islamic law ‘officially’ sanctioned in Muslim scocities, in the consciousness of much of the Muslim world land tenure regimes and concepts are generally constructed or realised, to a noticeable degree, through reference to the Islamic law (Shari’a). Therefore there is no field of ‘Islamic land law’ but rather a set of overlapping themes or domains which practitioners will recognize as such. Land rights in Islam therefore do not exist in isolation but rather are best understood with reference to other parts of Islamic law. Islamic law is the epitome of Islamic thought, the most typical manifestation of the Islamic way of life, the core and kernel of Islam itself. <br />3.1.3 Reasoning in Islamic Law<br /><br />Much of Islamic law relating to land, property and housing would fall within the domain of ‘social transactions’ (muamalat) and therefore be open to a greater degree of interpretation than matters of religious observances. Islamic law does not make sense without the ethical dimension of the divine revelation. There are certain basic Islamic concepts or ‘golden threads’ that embody the spirit of the Islamic law (Shari’a) such as rights (haqq), justice (adl) and equity (qist) which are reiterated in the Qur’an. Islamic law has to be appreciated from a socio-historical context and debates even though it may have outgrown classical formulations. <br />3.1.4 Methodology in Islamic Law (Usul al fiqh)<br /><br />Usul al-fiqh is a science which deals with the methods of reasoning and the rules of interpretation which are derived from the Qur’an and Sunna (practice of the Prophet’s generation). It is the methodology (usul) which determines the substantive rules of, or practical jurisprudence (fiqh). The foundational principles of Islamic law (Maqasid al- Sharia) recognise property rights as a priority so no law can violate this essential (daruriyyat) and also that State policy through public interest or welfare (masala) must operate to promote it. Thus, property and land rights lie at the very heart of Islamic law but must be approached within the Islamic methodological framework. <br /><br /><br />3.2 SOURCES OF ISLAMIC LAW RELATING TO LAND<br />3.2.1 Evolution of Islamic Laws relating to Land and Property <br /><br />There exists no amalgamated or systematic field of Islamic land law or property law, even though it is an important Islamic legal branch of learning. During formative classical period of seventh to the ninth centuries, institutions and doctrines relating to Islamic property law emerged, and were adapted to their specific socio-economic and political contexts. The classical law relating to property and land rights underwent several periods of influence –Ottoman, colonial and post-colonial/modern periods. In 1858 the Ottoman government consolidated various existing laws into a Land Code and it is from this that most States in the modern Muslim world derive their land tenure categories. Study of contemporary Islamic Property law today in the Western world its structure adopts much of the Western legal structure. <br />3.2.2 The Qur'an and Sunna in relation to Land and Property Law<br /><br />In Islamic law, there is a formal hierarchy of sources of law. The two foundational and primary sources of Islamic Law (Shari'a), are the Qur’an and the Sunna. The Qur’anic stipulations on general aspects of property and land rights are significant for example on the nature of property and women’s rights. Where an Islamic property regime, such as the compulsory inheritance rules, are dealt with explicitly by the Qur’an, most Muslims would consider the matter not subject to independent reasoning (ijtihad) but that it has to be interpreted as a whole. A further important source of law lies in the records of the words and deeds of the Prophet (Sunna), peace be on him, in the form of a diverse collection of narratives (hadith) Here the challenge is to weed out spurious gender deprecating customary norms projected as Islamic truisms with reference to the gender empowering Qur’anic stipulations. Modern day land, property and housing rights within the Islamic framework are still heavily reliant on the Qur’an and the Sunna. <br />3.2.3 Deduction by analogy (Qiyas) & consensus (Ijma)<br /><br />Reasoning by analogy (qiyas) and consensus (ijma) are two secondary sources of Islamic understanding or law (Shari’a), first. Consensus (ijma) is commonly taken to mean the unanimous agreement amongst those who are learned in the religion at a particular time on a specific issue, though this is a matter of debate. It is ijma which allowed guardianship over the property of minors; this allowance has been extended by qiyas to apply to the guardianship of minors in marriage. Reasoning by analogy is form of deduction in comparable cases which links the reasoning back to the original sources of the Qur'an and the tradition of the Prophet (Sunna). Through Ijma and Qiyas, there are further possibilities for developing land and property rights. <br />3.2.4 Supplemental Sources<br /><br />There are also other supplemental law-generating mediums such as juristic preference (istishan) which enhance the flexibility and responsiveness of Islamic law (Shari'a) and which demonstrate the plurality of method in Islamic law since some of these tools are only closely associated with particular Sunni schools. The concept of juristic preference (istishan) where discretion (not contrary to Qur’an and Sunna) can be exercised in cases of miscarriage of justice. Similarly, general principle found in some Islamic schools of law is that of “necessity and need,” or Darura. A second supplementary principle of law is based on public interest and human welfare (maslaha). It is a method associated with the Maliki school and permits the jurist to find a solution using discretion that is based on determining and promoting man's best interest in a case (Istislah), provided again that it is not a matter covered by any Shari'a textual source. <br />3.2.5 Personal Reasoning (Ijtihad)<br /><br />Independent personal reasoning (ijtihad) is an established wing of Islamic jurisprudence. It is strictly not a source but an interpretative methodology which is not confined to jurists but is the sacred duty (fard kifaya) of every competent individual. The idea that the ‘gates of ijtihad’ were shut in the year 1258 by a juristic consensus has been discredited. It is the post-facto validation of ijtihad through ijma (consensus of opinion) that converts the fruits of personal reasoning into a discovery or finding for the benefit of society. This is the internal Islamic authentic process through which Islamic land tenure and property rights can be more systematically clarified. <br /><br />3.3 ISLAMIC LAW IN A PLURALIST WORLD <br />3.3.1 Schools of Islamic Jurisprudence (Maddhahib) <br /><br />There is a plurality inherent in Islam and Islamic law, which is reflected in and shaped by the two major sects of Islam, Sunni and Shi'a. The Shi’a minority within the Islamic communities (umma) accepts the Qur’an, but consider the only acceptable interpretation as emanating from their spiritual leader (Imam). Among the Sunnis, who constitute the majority of Muslims in the world, there are four main jurisprudential schools (maddahib, singular maddhab) Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali and Shafi. These schools (maddahib) were named after their leading jurists and each is the dominant authority in different parts of the world. Recognition of the prevailing Islamic school of jurisprudence is necessary to engage with the Islamic legal discourses in a particular context. For example Hanafism, the more widespread of the four school considered the most flexible open to innovative interpretations of its core doctrines. <br />3.3.2 Diversity of Islamic Legal Systems<br /><br />Legal systems throughout the Muslim world exhibit considerable variety owing to their specific historical and colonial contexts, the State ideology and the extent to which Islamic law is able to trump secular or customary laws. The legal systems of many Muslim countries have undergone extensive secularization to varying degrees, notwithstanding the principled irrevocability of its religious origins, owing to Western influences. Despite divergent histories and forms of government, there is surprising resemblance among the various judicial systems of the Arab world. <br />3.3.3 Islamic Legal Pluralism<br /><br />The practice of Islamic law in Muslim world, thus, suggests complex and contentious relationship between particular brands of Islamic law and others forms of law – state or customary law. The normative systems are sometimes referred to as quasi-legal or informal, but legality and illegality are not so clearly delineated. Morocco, Indonesia and Egypt show how paying attention to 'legal pluralism', or legal dualities/contradictions, may enhance our legal understanding of both Islamic law and the complex, overlapping and competing norms to be found in Muslim societies. <br />3.3.4 Role of Custom (urf) <br /><br />Islamic law, as it emerged from the Prophet’s time, was built over pre-Islamic customary practices and as the faith spread it brought in various levels of symbiosis and amalgamation between Islamic legal theory and customary norms of the newer Islamic communities. Classical Islamic jurists actively engaged with the validity of a custom (urf) in the Islamic context, and generally accepted the same unless it was in direct contradiction with Islamic principles. In most Muslim societies, Islamic and customary norms have almost been fused together requiring a conscious effort to distinguish the two as with land practices. Where there are injurious customary practices, positive Islamic principles can be used to weed out traditions that are unjust and unacceptable. <br />3.4 ISLAMIC LAW IN ACTION <br />3.4.1 Islamic Legal Structures<br /><br />Despite the general application of Islamic law in Muslim societies, there has always existed – since the Islamic Ummayad and Abbasid empires- the dichotomy between Islamic law and secular law. It was during the Ottoman period that while Islamic law was codified and promoted, a series of secular codes referred to as qanun (secular laws) were also promulgated. Even within Islamic legal systems then, there exist numerous institutions or personnel that implement the range of laws and interests. These include not merely the judge within an Islamic jurisdiction (Qadi), judges dealing with secular matters, administrative offices such the Muhtasib (ombudsman) and informal legal authorities such as the mufti (one issues fatwa or responsa, advisory opinions) and the mujtahids (those exercising ijtihad or personal reasoning). <br />3.4.2 Role of the Judge (Qadi) <br /><br />Muslim judges were generally conscious of moral contexts and social visions and the need to garner legitimacy across multiple schools of legal thought. The Judge within the Islamic legal system (Qadi) balances the ‘rights’ or duties owed to God with the rights of individuals through elaborate procedural guarantees. Classical jurists devoted much attention on the Qadi and his qualifications, court procedures including evidence. Adab al-qadi is a genre of legal literature that expresses the model behaviour of the judge and the courtroom. Judicial independence is an importance feature of Islamic legal systems with procedural guarantees. <br />3.4.3 Alternate Dispute Resolution & Access to Justice<br /><br />The Islamic legal system did not generally require any lawyers since the litigants themselves generally pleaded their own case. Disagreements and disputes were settled within the organic society through the community as well as formal processes. Concepts of mediation or conciliation are found in the Qur’an, as well as in the practice of the Prophet’s generation. These include conciliation (Solh), mediation (wasta) and arbitration (takhim). In assessing the applicability of Western-based conflict resolution models in non-Western contexts such as the Arab-Islamic culture area, theoreticians and practitioners alike have begun to recognize the importance of indigenous ways of thinking and feeling, as well as local rituals for managing, reducing, and resolving conflicts. <br />3.4.4 Ombudsman (Muhtasib) <br /><br />Among the duties of the Muslim State, as well as members of the society is to promote good (ma`ruf) and prevent wrongdoing (munkar). These public duties contained in the institution of hisba are relevant in the wider context of a just society and an efficient market economy. Since earliest Islamic history, this hisba agency was headed by a learned jurist (muhtasib) who functioned like a market inspector, chief public health officer, receiver of complaints and land use enforcer. This Islamic institution can be put to good use in the modern context.<br />3.4.5 Islamic law in relation to land<br /><br />Land and property rights being part of the Islamic legal sphere relating to social relations (muamalat) is inherently more susceptible to flexibility and innovation though egalitarian Islamic principles apply. Islamic history, particularly Ottoman experience, demonstrates that these matters were considered amenable to secular and efficiency approaches though cast in Islamic language. Despite the fertile Islamic rights literature supporting pro-poor, innovative and inclusive land and property regime, Islamic legal theory appears to be detained by transactional details rather than express its lofty ideals and objectives. More juristic work needs to be done to systematically develop equivalent doctrines of access to land, security of tenure and protection from forcible eviction though Islamic legal raw materials and concepts exist. <br /><br />3.5 STRATEGIES FOR EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ISLAMIC LAW <br />3.5.1 Recognise the importance of Islamic Legal Discourses<br />Islamic law is a central feature of the lived experiences and consciousness of Muslims across the world, whether or not their States ‘officially’ implement the law. As such, Islamic legal conceptions inform and influence the lives of a majority of Muslims as well as their attitudes towards land and property rights. However, much of the Western perspectives regarding tends to be limited, partial or hostile creating a gulf of cross-cultural misunderstanding. It also allows myths about Islamic law to develop and the field is left clear for extremist and obscurantist constructs of Islamic law. Recognising the potency of Islamic legal thought processes paves the way for active and constructive engagement with the internal discourses. <br />While secular approaches towards property and land rights are evident in interventions from both within and outside, delving into the ‘authentic’ forms of argumentation has its advantages, at the least it is an additional form of securing those rights. Islamic laws relating to property and land rights have to be assessed within the broader Islamic legal systems since there is considerable overlap and cross-application of different Islamic legal doctrines. Decoding the sources, structure and normative frameworks of Islamic law enables those working within Muslim societies to explore innovative, proactive and inclusive land tools potentially available within Islamic law. This is particularly relevant for strategies towards developing access to land and security of tenure. <br />3.5.2 Engage with Islamic Legal Methodologies<br />Contrary to general assumptions, Islamic law is not a ‘religious’ law but rather a man made code whose primary source is the holy scripture Qur’an which is subject to human interpretation of divine intent. While there are dominant conservative legal opinions alongside egalitarian foundational principles, there exist significant opportunities for interpretation strategies within Islamic law that can promote access to land and security of tenure for all. However, general interpretation techniques based on logic and reasoning are not persuasive Islamic legal interpretation as they are merely considered ‘opinions’ (ra’y). In order to be legitimized within an Islamic jurisprudential praxis, interpretation must comply with certain authenticated methodology. How one goes about interpreting Islamic legal principles in compliance with certain protocols is therefore vital to success of the venture. <br />Islamic law has a well developed field of usul-al-fiqh (methodology in Islamic jurisprudence) which deals with the processes of reasoning and interpretation. The primary source is the Qur’an which has a limited number of ‘law verses’ some of them being explicit, others general. These are interpreted in their context alongside the practice of the Prophet’s generation (Sunna), some of which has to be verified for their accuracy, credibility and compatibility with the Qur’an. The two other sources, interpretation by analogy (qiyas) and through consensus (ijma) need to be appreciated. A major avenue for exploring the true spirit of Islam is personal reasoning within the Islamic framework (ijtihad) which is a well recognized Islamic jurisprudential tool. There are other supplemental law-generating mediums such as juristic preference (istishan) which enhance the flexibility and responsiveness of Islamic law (Shari'a), the principle of ‘necessity and need’ (darura), actions to promote public interest (maslaha) and human welfare (istislah). The deployment of these mechanisms and tools could well enable the emergence of inclusive, innovative and empowering land management tools.<br />3.5.3 Appreciate Islamic Legal Pluralism<br /><br />Islamic law is not a monolithic, static or autonomous field. There is a gap between the theory of Islamic law and its practice in the Muslim world. There is considerable divergence among Muslim countries with regard to form and extent of Islamic law in their legal and political systems. This may have to do whether the Muslim community in question follows the Sunni and Shi'a creed of Islam. Among the Sunnis, who constitute the majority of Muslims in the world, there are four main jurisprudential schools (maddahib, singular maddhab) Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali and Shafi which are named after their founders and each is the dominant authority in different parts of the world. Legal systems throughout the Muslim world also exhibit considerable variety owing to their specific historical and colonial contexts, the State ideology and the extent to which Islamic law is able to trump secular or customary laws. To consider a particular brand of Islamic law as generally applicable to all parts of the Muslim world would miss the specific national or local contexts which they operate. <br />In most Muslim societies, complex and contentious relationships exist between particular conceptions of Islamic law and others forms of law – state or customary law. There may be visible or understated but these legal, quasi-legal or informal systems are equally important for Muslims and represent choices which Muslims clearly make between competing choices. Islamic law, in fact, recognizes custom (urf) unless it is in direct contravention of Islamic principles. In some case, it may be necessary to differentiate Islamic and customary practices in order to weed out discriminatory practices. Paying attention to 'legal pluralism', or legal dualities/contradictions, may enhance our legal understanding of both Islamic law and the complex, overlapping and competing norms to be found in Muslim societies. <br />3.5.4 Support legal institutions in Muslim countries<br /><br />Discussion on Islamic law in the Muslim world often focus on the law as it is written less than the law as it is applied. Also, there is a need to enhance our understanding of how Courts and other legal institutions deal with property rights. Since Islamic land and property rights, though based on the conception of ultimate ownership of God, lie in the sphere of social transactions (muamulat) rather than religious worship, they could be dealt with either through Islamic legal systems or secularized legal institutions (for example the qanun law and courts in the Ottoman period). Even within Islamic legal systems then, there exist numerous institutions or personnel that implement the range of laws and interests. These include not merely the judge within an Islamic jurisdiction (Qadi), judges dealing with secular matters, administrative offices such the Muhtasib (ombudsman) and informal legal authorities such as the mufti (one issues fatwa or responsa, advisory opinions) and the mujtahids (those exercising ijtihad or personal reasoning). <br /><br />Whether it is the judge in the Islamic court (Qadi) or a judge dealing with secular jurisdiction dealing with property or land issues, use of Islamic foundational principles such as justice (adl) or rights (haqq) could promote inclusive, pro-poor and innovative legal solutions. Judicial independence and procedural guarantees are well established in Islamic thought but in general courts suffer from lack of organization, resources, training and a human rights perspective. In all parts of the Muslim world, efforts are underway to modernize and streamline the judicial system. Supporting the capacity building and more efficient mode of justice delivery is needed while recognizing the particular context and needs of courts in the Muslim world. <br />3.5.5 Facilitate alternative dispute resolution mechanisms<br /><br />The Muslim world demonstrates not merely distinctive formal legal systems but also a wide array of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms. Modernisation of Muslim legal systems has been facilitated in part by colonial encounters usually involving the importation of Western legal structures. However, even where an existing system of property rights is judged inadequate, one must be careful in replacing it, particularly where it is culturally embedded. Attempts at reform of customary systems that do not succeed in changing behavior can create confusion and conflict between claims based on custom and others based in national law. Thus, while State adopts legislation and policy to ‘create’ new frameworks or norms, it may not have the legitimacy or ownership from the general masses. <br /><br />In assessing the applicability of Western-based conflict resolution models in non-Western contexts such as the Arab-Islamic culture area, theoreticians and practitioners alike have begun to recognize the importance of indigenous ways of thinking and feeling, as well as local rituals for managing, reducing, and resolving conflicts. Concepts of mediation or conciliation are found in the Qur’an, as well as in the practice of the Prophet’s generation. These include conciliation (solh), mediation (wasta) and arbitration (takhim) which are widely practiced in the Muslim world. Among the duties of the Muslim State, as well as members of the society is to promote good (ma`ruf) and prevent wrongdoing (munkar). 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Knopf)<br /><br />Schacht, Joseph (1964) An introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford : Clarendon Press) <br /><br />Scott-Hunt, Susan and Lim, Hilary (2001), Feminist Perspectives on Equity and Trusts, (London: Cavendish)<br /><br />Siddiqui, Muhammad Zubayr (1993) Hadith Literature: its origin, development and special features (London: Islamic Texts Society) <br /><br />Starr, June (1992) Law as Metaphor: From Islamic Courts to the Palace of Justice (Albany: State University of New York Press).<br /><br />Vogel, Frank (2000) Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Leiden: Brill). <br /><br />Weiss, Bernard (1978) 'Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad', 38 American Journal of Comparative Law 203<br /><br />Yanagihashi, Hiroyuki (2004), A History of the Early Islamic Law of Property, Reconstructing the Legal Development, 7th-9th Centuries (Leiden: Brill). <br /><br />Ziadeh, Farhat (1960): 'Urf and law in Islam’ in: J. Kritzeck and R.B. Winder (ed.) The World of Islam (London MacMillan) pp 60-67.<br /><br />Ziadeh, Farhat (1993) ‘Property Rights in the Middle East’ 8:1 Arab Law Quarterly 3-12land ownership in islamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05414932490344169940noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2263133053636924346.post-82900646297082326282008-12-11T17:28:00.000-08:002008-12-11T17:30:21.764-08:00The Political Economy of Urban LandThe Political Economy of Urban Land<br />Reforms in a Post-Colonial State<br />AMBE J. NJOH<br />Introduction<br />The proclivity towards regulating and controlling the use of urban land is a universal<br />feature of governments. In less developed countries (LDCs), policies in this connection<br />are masqueraded in terms of measures designed to achieve the laudable objectives of<br />social justice and equity, greater political stability, economic growth, environmental<br />preservation and productivity in the use of land for national development (cf. Handelman,<br />1996). However, it would appear that the imperative to regulate and control urban land<br />use constitutes a fundamental part of efforts by the state in LDCs to usurp other forms of<br />societal authority (Williams, 1992).<br />From this vantage point, the constellation of land reform policies that have been<br />adopted throughout sub-Saharan Africa (see, e.g., UN DESA, 1973), especially since the<br />1960s, can be seen as a manifestation of the continuing struggle over legitimacy and<br />control between the state and society. While this struggle has been widely discussed<br />(see, e.g., Ergas, 1987; Rotchild and Chazan, 1988), much remains to be done in the way<br />of promoting understanding of the development implications of the usurpation by the<br />state of other forms of societal authority in Africa. The utility of extant works in this<br />regard is substantially weakened by the absence of empirical data (Williams, 1992) as<br />well as country-by-country assessments of state-society relationships in specific policy<br />arenas.<br />As an attempt to redress this shortcoming in the literature, we herein explore the<br />nature of ‘reglementation’ — that is, the progressive expansion of rule-bearing authority<br />by the state or agents acting on its behalf (cf. Williams, 1992) — in the urban land policy<br />arena and its implications for different members of society in Cameroon. We begin by<br />retracing the roots of modern urban land use policy in Cameroon (hereafter, the country).<br />Then, we examine contemporary efforts on the part of the Cameroonian state to regulate<br />and control urban land use in the face of unprecedented rates of urban population growth<br />as well as a dwindling resource base. Following this, we uncover real and potential<br />impacts of the policy on different groups and/or members of the Cameroonian society.<br />Finally, and prior to concluding the discussion, we recommend a number of actions<br />necessary for eradicating the extant, as well as averting the potential, problems.<br />The evolution of modern urban land use policy in Cameroon<br />Urban land use regulatory and control measures in most developing countries are a legacy<br />of their colonial past. It is therefore not surprising that the flurry of urban land laws<br />ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998. Published by Blackwell Publishers,<br />108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.<br />promulgated by indigenous leaders in Cameroon following independence in 1960 are<br />richly laced with the values and planning ideologies of the country’s erstwhile colonial<br />masters, namely, Germany (1884–1919), Britain (one-fifth of the territory, 1919–60) and<br />France (four-fifths of the territory, 1919–60). Perhaps nowhere else are these alien<br />planning values and ideologies more conspicuous than in legislation affecting interest in<br />urban residential land.<br />Legislation affecting interest in urban residential land<br />The pre-colonial era Official legislation affecting interest in land was unheard of prior<br />to the advent of colonialism in Cameroon. During the pre-colonial era, interest in land<br />was governed by indigenous customary laws within a purely African traditional system.<br />Within the framework of this system, the extended family was considered the basic<br />functional unit endowed with the authority to own land (Njoh, 1994). The powers to<br />alienate land were, however, vested in the community at large. Based on the rules and<br />values sanctioned by this wider community, the outright sale of land was forbidden.1<br />Thus, the relationship of an individual to land under the traditional African system was, as<br />Mabogunje (1981) notes, no more than that of trustee with rights of beneficial use or<br />‘usufruct’.<br />The German era Soon after their arrival and subsequent to signing the protectorate<br />agreement with local Cameroonian authorities on 12 July 1884, the Germans embarked<br />vigorously on efforts designed to replace the indigenous land tenure system with a<br />European one. The first major, and arguably the best known piece of legislation in this<br />connection is the Act of 15 July 1896 creating German Crown Lands and twenty-six land<br />commissions corresponding with the territory’s twenty-six administrative districts. The<br />act ostensibly converted into the property of the German Imperial Government, so-called<br />‘unoccupied lands’, which included all parcels of land that were neither being cultivated<br />nor resided upon at the time. The only parcels excluded from this fold were those under<br />the occupation of chiefs and their communities as part of the German overseas dominions.<br />The 1896 act was only a minuscule component of a larger and more elaborate scheme<br />designed to place every piece of Cameroonian land under the exclusive tutelage of the<br />German colonial state. In fact, prior to the enactment of this act, as Fisiy (1992: 28) notes,<br />‘the Germans had already contemplated herding indigenous dwellers . . . into reserves’. In<br />fact, the major functions of the land commissions included demarcating so-called crown<br />lands and recommending in their respective administrative districts areas deemed suitable<br />for ‘native reserves’ (Njoh, 1994). Furthermore, Von Puttkamer, then governor of the<br />colonial state, decided that ‘natives’ be granted use of no more than 1.5 hectares for<br />residential development purposes. Furthermore, the governor crafted rather detailed plans<br />to convert dispersed ‘native’ settlements into large consolidated villages with numbered<br />and surveyed building and agricultural plots.<br />Ossification of the land conversion schemes was rendered possible by the<br />introduction of a land register, the Grundbuch, wherein all interests in land were<br />systematically recorded. Pieces of information deemed important and hence entered in<br />this document include the specific location, the dimensions, and name and address of the<br />party or parties with rights to the parcel of land in question.<br />1 Although the outright sale of land was forbidden within the African traditional land tenure system, there is<br />albeit limited evidence suggesting that the sale of land pre-dated the advent of colonialism in some parts of<br />Africa. This is especially true of the coastal areas of West Africa such as Ghana and Nigeria, where as Feder<br />and Noronha (1987) note, the production of commercial crops such as oil palm had led to the sale of land<br />before the emergence of colonialism. It must however, be noted that this claim is highly contentious. In fact,<br />as Feder and Noronha (1987: 154) note, the West African Land Committee (c. 1912) characterized the<br />evidence presented in support of the foregoing claims as ‘insufficient and inconclusive’.<br />ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998<br />The political economy of urban land reforms in a post-colonial state 409<br />German colonial rule and control over land in Cameroon unofficially ended in 1916.<br />A year or two previously the territory had already come under British and French control.<br />Both colonial powers continued from where the Germans left off as far as efforts to<br />dismantle the traditional land tenure system went. However, it is worth noting that the<br />powers of these two latter colonial powers were significantly restricted by a provision of<br />the United Nations trust agreement, which itself resulted from a concern with the possible<br />development of permanent white settlements on mandate territories. The provision<br />stipulated that:<br />In framing laws relating to the holding or transfer of land and natural resources, the<br />administering authority shall take into consideration native laws and customs, and shall respect<br />the rights and safeguard the interests, both present and future, of the native population. No<br />native land or natural resource may be transferred, except between natives, save with previous<br />consent of the competent authority (quoted in Fisiy, 1992: 30).<br />The British era In Southern Cameroons — that is, the one-fifth segment of the<br />Cameroonian territory that was under British control — efforts on the part of colonial<br />authorities to comply with the above quoted provision took several forms. Most notable in<br />this regard, was the decision in 1927 to adopt colonial land tenure laws in force in<br />Northern Nigeria as opposed to those prevalent in Eastern Nigeria, of which Southern<br />Cameroons was administratively a part. The decision was predicated on the belief that the<br />laws of Northern Nigeria responded more to the spirit of the UN mandate Agreement than<br />did those of Eastern Nigeria.<br />Under the 1927 decision, or what was officially known as the Land and Native Rights<br />Ordinance, all lands in the British-controlled area of the country — whether occupied or<br />unoccupied — were declared native lands (Section 3).2 Although this ordinance had the<br />deceptive appearance of complying with the UN mandate and on the surface seemed to<br />recognize traditional land tenure systems, it in fact did neither. To be sure, architects of<br />the ordinance were unconvinced that the ‘natives’ were capable of handling the labyrinths<br />involved in the development, management and/or transfer of rights in land. Hence, the<br />paternalistic tone of the ordinance. For instance, Section 4 of the ordinance states as<br />follows:<br />All native lands, and all rights over the same are hereby declared to be under the control and<br />subject to the disposition of the (Governor) Prime Minister, and shall be held and administered<br />for the use and common benefit of the natives; and no title to the occupation and use of any such<br />lands shall be valid without the consent of the Prime Minister (quoted in Fisiy, 1992: 31).<br />Its paternalistic tone aside, it takes very little imagination to appreciate the fact that this<br />Ordinance was in contravention of the UN trust agreement, which stated without<br />equivocation that administering authorities must respect indigenous laws and customs in<br />promulgating legislation affecting land tenure. As stated earlier, pre-colonial laws vested<br />the right to own, control and transfer rights to land (never through sales) in the extended<br />family in particular and the community at large. However, under the 1927 Ordinance,<br />these rights and powers were effectively transferred to the colonial state with the<br />Governor or Prime Minister directly in charge.<br />The French era Two parallel systems of law were instituted in the portion of Cameroon<br />under French imperial control. One system applied to the ‘natives’ or what the French<br />labelled, les indigenes while the other, tailored along the Napoleonic Code of 1810, was<br />applicable to local French or western educated elites (les assimile´s). However, as far as<br />interests in land were concerned, this distinction was non-existent as the French, like the<br />2 A few, albeit insignificant areas were excluded. In this regard, as many as 84 estates registered under the<br />German system and subsequently accepted as freehold property by the English in 1922 were exempted.<br />ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998<br />410 Ambe J. Njoh<br />Germans and British, were eager to take complete control and administration of all land.<br />In this regard, the French moved speedily to experiment with a number of land tenure<br />systems. The purpose of this experimentation was to determine the system most likely to<br />guarantee the colonial state firm control over land without alienating the local population<br />(Fisiy, 1992). Prominent amongst the steps taken along these lines, was the passage of a<br />law, la legislation d’attente, on 24 July 1921. This law was simply an extension of the law<br />of 23 July 1855 introducing the transcription system in France.<br />In 1932, the French colonial authorities introduced a system of land registration under<br />which unoccupied lands were classified as terres vacantes et sans maıˆtres. This system<br />was exactly the same as the one earlier adopted by the Germans under the 1896 Decree<br />converting ‘unoccupied’ lands into Crown property. However, as the appellation<br />suggests, the French went a step further by classifying so-called unoccupied lands as<br />ownerless.3 This classification was, to say the least, absurd in the context of indigenous<br />land tenure systems. These systems, as stated earlier, view all land as belonging to the<br />community at large.<br />Overt and covert aims of the colonial land tenure system<br />We have already suggested that colonial land policies were designed to reinforce the<br />colonial state’s grip on its colonial holdings. However, there was more behind efforts by<br />colonial authorities to replace traditional African with European land tenure systems than<br />meets the eye. For one thing, the Europeans saw Africa as a continent at an inchoate stage<br />in an inevitable evolutionary process. Within this framework, land tenure was expected to<br />evolve from the primitive form of tribal and communal ownership to individual<br />ownership (Sorenson, 1967). Thus, according to the colonial authorities, Africans<br />occupied a very low rung on the evolutionary ladder, the topmost rung of which was<br />occupied by Europeans.<br />For another thing, Europeans were interested, or at least claimed they were, in the<br />economic development of the colonies. In this connection, individual ownership of land<br />as attested to by formal ownership certificates and titles as opposed to traditional land<br />ownership as attested to by informal or customary instruments, was considered an<br />important propellant of economic growth. The economic justification for promoting<br />individual and formalized land ownership entitlement systems on the part of colonial<br />officials is highly questionable. Possible support to this assertion is provided by Feder and<br />Noronha (1987: 149) when they state that ‘in India individual titles had allegedly led<br />owners to mortgage and sell their lands to moneylenders, resulting in widespread<br />indebtedness and landlessness’. To put this in perspective, it must be recalled that the<br />British colonization of India preceded their colonial adventures in Africa.<br />Contemporary land legislation<br />Although securing the support of traditional authorities was a fundamental factor in the<br />political calculus of indigenous leaders of post-colonial Cameroon, the trend on the part<br />of the state towards usurping all other forms of societal authority and control over land<br />persisted through the immediate post-independence era and beyond. In fact, as Njoh<br />(1992b: 25) notes, post-colonial land laws in Cameroon are ironically ‘bolder and less<br />tolerant of customary entitlements and rights to land’. Thus, contemporary land laws like<br />those that prevailed during the colonial era seek not only to place as much land as<br />possible under the direct ownership and control of the state, but also to replace the<br />3 To avoid the possibility of political unrest, the French were clever enough not to employ words such as<br />‘Crown lands’, as did the Germans, in reference to so-called ‘ownerless land’. Rather, they claimed such<br />land belonged to the entire territory or au territoire.<br />ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998<br />The political economy of urban land reforms in a post-colonial state 411<br />traditional land tenure system with one rooted in a western value system. Support to this<br />assertion is easily discernible from the constellation of ordinances and amendments<br />enacted as part of the country’s 1974 land reforms. To all intents and purposes these<br />reforms were designed to place the state in control of a fundamental factor of production,<br />namely land. This claim is buttressed by Section 1, Part I of Ordinance No. 74–1 of July<br />1974, which stated that: ‘The state shall be the guardian of all lands. It may in this<br />capacity intervene to ensure rational use of land or in the imperative interest of defence or<br />the economic policies of the nation’.<br />Therefore, as a direct challenge to alternative sources of societal authority, the<br />reforms effectively transferred all land and/or land transactions to the state and other<br />entities acting on its behalf. In this respect, the singular legal testimony for transactions in<br />land is the land certificate.<br />The land ownership certification process<br />The conditions for obtaining a certificate of land ownership in Cameroon were<br />established by Decree No. 76–165 of 27 April 1976 (Fisiy, 1992; Njoh, 1992b). The<br />decree allows individuals with either temporary and/or miscellaneous rights over state<br />and other lands the option to convert such rights into land certificates as long as they can<br />show that their rights pre-date 5 August 1974. Otherwise, a land certificate is granted to<br />individuals who have purchased land through formally established channels. The process<br />for converting miscellaneous deeds into land certificates, which has been described as<br />cumbersome, tedious, and deliberately slanted in favour of the economically powerful<br />such as functionaries, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs (DeLancey, 1989; Fisiy, 1992; Njoh,<br />1992a; 1992b; 1998), comprises four major steps as follows:<br />· Having the parcel of land demarcated by a sworn surveyor<br />· Completing an application for land certificate form, which requires inter alia,<br />information on the applicant, the piece of land in question including property<br />boundaries, liabilities, valuation report, and so on<br />· Obtaining an attestation from the Department of Lands testifying that all rents and<br />dues on the parcel of land in question have been defrayed<br />· Submitting the completed application dossier to the local Provincial Chief of Service<br />for Lands, for onward transmission to the Central Lands Office in the national capital,<br />Yaounde.<br />The responsibility for issuing the land certificate resides in the hands of the Central Lands<br />Office, which can only issue the certificate upon verification that the stated rights to the<br />parcel of land in question are not being challenged or contested.<br />The steps for converting occupancy or exploitation rights over state land into a land<br />certificate is also cumbersome and tedious. In this case, the applicant is required to<br />compile four copies of an application file identical to that described above. These files<br />must then be submitted to the office of the local Divisional Officer (DO) or sous prefet.<br />The latter is responsible for verifying the validity of the applicant’s stated rights to the<br />parcel of land in question. Once the validity of the claim has been established, the sous<br />prefet is required to publish a summary of the application details at the Divisional Office<br />and the local town or village halls of the area where the parcel of land is located.<br />Additionally, the DO is required to schedule a meeting of the Land Consultative Board<br />(LCB), which must demarcate the parcel of land in question and prepare a report on it.<br />The DO is further required to transmit a copy of the complete application file, including<br />the LCB’s report on the property, to the local Divisional Chief of Service for Lands after<br />30 days. The Divisional Chief of Service for Lands is required to assign the application a<br />serial number, check its contents, countersign and forward it to the local Provincial Chief<br />of Service for Lands for endorsement and onward transmission to the Central Lands<br />Office in Yaounde, which, as stated earlier, is ultimately responsible for decisions<br />ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998<br />412 Ambe J. Njoh<br />regarding land certification matters throughout the country. Such final decisions are<br />entered in the official land Gazette. Some have observed that this tedious and complex<br />process takes at least five to seven years to complete (see, e.g., Mabogunje, 1992: 25;<br />Njoh, 1992a: 27). In fact, as of 1986, that is a decade after the decree was enacted on 27<br />April 1976, certificates had been issued to only 6% (100,000 out of 1,600,000) of the<br />active applicants throughout the nation (Fisiy, 1992: 45).<br />The foregoing numbers raise two obvious questions. The first has to do with the<br />efficiency and effectiveness of the country’s so-called modern land tenure system, which<br />calls for the demarcation and registration of freehold title. The second and more important<br />question within the context of the present discussion has to do with the extent to which<br />each of the one million six hundred thousand (1,600,000) applicants for land certificates<br />in the country had an equal chance of being granted a land certificate or being included<br />amongst the one hundred thousand (or 6% of 1,600,000) who had actually been issued<br />land certificates as of 1986. We contend that an applicant’s chance of securing formal<br />title to land in Cameroon is directly proportional to his/her socio-economic and political<br />power. Thus, only the socio-economically and politically powerful members of the<br />Cameroonian society are able to take advantage of the enormous benefits associated with<br />possessing formal claims to land and/or landed property. We pursue this line of argument<br />in more detail a little later. For the moment, it is necessary to briefly examine the benefits<br />associated with formal claims to land as attested to by modern instruments such as land<br />ownership certificates as opposed to traditional claims under communal or other<br />indigenous African land tenure systems.<br />Benefits of modern tenure systems: theory and evidence4<br />Modern land tenure systems have been defended on several grounds. Proponents,<br />including the World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID)<br />and policy-makers, amongst others, who have forcefully promoted modernization of the<br />land tenure systems in developing countries, contend that such systems, particularly when<br />they involve the consolidation and registration by adjudication of land, can accomplish<br />the following objectives (Baron, 1978; Tomosugi, 1980; Feeny, 1982; Feder and<br />Noronha, 1987; Barrows and Roth, 1990):<br />· Reduce the costs of urban land<br />· Increase security of tenure<br />· Facilitate the transferability of land ownership rights<br />· Enable the use of land as collateral for bank and other loans.<br />Cost of urban land<br />Arguably, the high cost of urban land in LDCs is partially a function of fragmented land<br />ownership patterns resulting from the inheritance clause. The latter is a potent element in<br />most traditional land tenure systems. In fact, some leading experts in the field (e.g.<br />Doebele, 1987) contend that a leading problem of urban land markets in less developed<br />countries has to do with putting to better use the substantial underutilized parcels of land<br />tied up in different family hands throughout urban areas in these countries. The cost<br />implication of underutilizing a scarce commodity such as land is obvious. As long as<br />inherited land, for financial or other reasons, remains undeveloped, the amount of land<br />available for housing and other urban uses is reduced. In effect, the cost of urban land is<br />driven upward.<br />From this vantage point government intervention, either through the introduction of<br />land use controls and/or the replacement of individual ownership by state ownership of<br />4 This segment draws largely from Feder and Noronha (1987).<br />ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998<br />The political economy of urban land reforms in a post-colonial state 413<br />land, is defended as a strategy for reducing the cost of land and increasing the supply. The<br />reality, however, is that land use controls have seldom been effective. This is primarily<br />because they seek to conform to pseudo-western planning standards, which emphasize<br />order and the clear delimitation or compartmentalization of land uses. Furthermore, the<br />claim that land supply is a function of ownership type is not substantiated by empirical<br />evidence. In fact it would appear that the two variables, supply and ownership style, are<br />statistically independent. To be sure, land supply problems are as severe in cities such as<br />Karachi and Delhi, where much of the land is in public hands, as in cities such as<br />Bangkok, Manila and Seoul where the private ownership of land is commonplace<br />(Brennan, 1993).<br />Security of tenure<br />The formalization of land holding systems through instruments such as land certificates<br />and land ownership titles has also been promoted as a means of securing land ownership<br />rights. The lack of security of tenure, it is argued, acts as a disincentive to any potential<br />land development efforts. Land owners are unlikely to undertake any significant<br />improvements on land if they are unsure of what may happen to the land in the future.<br />Therefore, it is arguable that insecurity in land ownership is capable of reducing<br />productivity (Feder and Noronha, 1987).<br />The foregoing line of reasoning suggests that traditional tenure systems do not<br />guarantee security of ownership. Although this is indeed the case, it is worthwhile noting<br />that the inability of traditional land tenure systems to guarantee security of land<br />ownership is a function of the fact that the state in developing countries refuses to<br />recognize traditional claims to land. Essentially, therefore, only claims to land backed by<br />formal documents such as land ownership certificates issued by the state or agents acting<br />on its behalf are recognized. In effect, land owners with such documents tend to harbour a<br />sense of increased security in their property. For instance, a survey of land owners in<br />Kisii, Kenya revealed that 75% actually believed that registration of their property had<br />increased security of their tenure (Barrows and Roth, 1990). Given the state’s inherent<br />positive predisposition towards formal testimonials to land rights, the claims of holders of<br />land certificates or cognate documents are less likely to be challenged. In fact, in<br />Machakos, Kenya, 98.4% of the farmers with land certificates reported having<br />experienced no problems such as land disputes since formally registering their land<br />(Barrows and Roth, 1990). The implication is that prior to obtaining land certificates, land<br />disputes were commonplace. Theoretically, the likelihood for land disputes intensifies as<br />the potential return on investments in land increases (Baron, 1978; Tomosugi, 1980;<br />Feeny, 1982; Feder and Noronha, 1987). Thus, there is a better chance of land disputes<br />occurring in urban than in rural areas. It follows, therefore, that the need to register land is<br />greater in urban than rural areas.<br />Transferability of land ownership rights<br />As mentioned earlier, within the context of most indigenous African traditional land<br />tenure systems, rights to land are obtained either through inheritance and membership of a<br />kinship group, or through allocation by a community leader such as a chief or<br />elderperson. Critiques, especially those of the colonial and post-colonial states, contend<br />that such arrangements act as serious constraints to the land market. This criticism of<br />traditional land tenure constitutes the basis for policies designed to promote<br />individualized as opposed to communal land tenure. An intended consequence of<br />individualized systems of land holding is the commodification of land. In neoclassical<br />economic terms, an individualized land tenure system invariably leads to the emergence<br />of a land market. This is because, under an individualized land tenure system, ‘. . . land<br />will be transferred to those who are able to extract a higher value of product from the land<br />ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998<br />414 Ambe J. Njoh<br />as more productive users bid land away from less productive users’ (Barrows and Roth,<br />1990: 269).<br />Thus, land becomes a ‘good’ like any other economic good that can be freely bought<br />and sold or exchanged on the open market. Such exchange of land or transfer of<br />ownership right over land would be difficult at best and impossible at worst without a<br />formalized land ownership entitlement system. Proponents of the ‘individualized property<br />rights’ paradigm, therefore, consider African traditional land tenure systems problematic<br />on several counts. In particular, the traditional systems are seen as inefficient in allocating<br />resources given especially that property rights are nondescript, costs and rewards are not<br />internalized, and the legality and enforceability of contracts are not guaranteed (Barrows<br />and Roth, 1990).<br />Land as collateral for bank and other loans<br />Secure and documented claims to land assure access to bank and other loans (Feder and<br />Noronha, 1987). Additionally, such documentation can also serve as collateral for cheaper<br />and longer-term loans. For instance, in India, while farmers with formal land certificates<br />pay interest rates of 8–16% on secured loans, lenders charged those without such<br />documentation of land ownership 18–37% (Feder and Noronha, 1987: 144). Formalized<br />land entitlement instruments such as land certificates and land ownership titles increase<br />the demand for capital, especially credit. For instance, in Costa Rica it was revealed that<br />prior to the introduction of a land titling programme, only 18% of the farmers surveyed<br />had applied for and received credit from the bank; following the programme’s inception,<br />as many as 31.7% did so (Seligson, 1982). In a similar fashion, as many as 50% of titled<br />land holders in Jamaica opted to significantly increase their borrowing (Inter-American<br />Development Bank, 1986). In fact, commercial banks in LDCs can only extend credit to<br />individuals without formal employment — in other words, the majority of the population<br />— when title deeds are used as security or collateral.<br />Implications for different societal groups<br />An appreciation of the nature of the state, used here synonymously with the term<br />government, and the rationale for its actions in the public sphere will go a good way<br />towards facilitating understanding of the real and potential implications of land reform<br />programmes for different groups in an erstwhile colonial state such as Cameroon. The<br />state in such a setting, or any setting for that matter, is a lot more than simply a<br />descriptive entity. In fact, the state in African countries in general has been characterized<br />as ‘an actor with interests, capacities, achievements and, of course, frailties’ (Chazan et<br />al., 1988: 19). The rationale for government actions such as the institution of land reforms<br />is, to say the least, controversial. To the uncritical eye, such actions are designed to<br />benefit all members of society or at least, maximize the good of the greater majority<br />without hurting the minority. However, a more scrupulous examination of the nature, and<br />the real and potential impact of these actions reveals otherwise. To be sure, it is rather<br />naive to exalt the role of government as one of an objective, fair-minded arbiter interested<br />in nothing but the ‘good of all’. Government actions, despite their deceptive appearance,<br />are by design skewed in favour of the dominant groups or socio-economic elites of<br />society. Thus, for instance, as Miliband (1969: 79, quoting Meynaud, 1964) states:<br />all measures taken by the state to develop and improve the national economy always end up by<br />being of the greatest benefit to those who control the levers of command of the production and<br />distribution sector . . ..<br />This statement could well be about the Cameroonian land reforms, which, we<br />contend, have invariably benefited the privileged members and/or groups in society,<br />ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998<br />The political economy of urban land reforms in a post-colonial state 415<br />including politicians, bureaucratic elites (comprising top members of the military,<br />gendarmerie and police forces), the educated salariat (including those in government,<br />parastatal and private employment), entrepreneurs and traditional elites at the expense of<br />women, the poor, and members of minority ethnic groups. Above all else, the reforms<br />have benefited the state in, amongst other ways, strengthening its hegemonic grip over<br />society. In the remainder of this article, we marshal evidence to buttress and substantiate<br />the foregoing claims.<br />Implications of the reforms for the state<br />As we have already hinted, actions such as the promulgation of land reform laws on the<br />part of the state in Cameroon cannot be seen simply as measures designed to promote<br />public interest. Rather, we contend that such actions are designed primarily to promote<br />the state’s own interest and serve as an instrument of class control. The state’s interest in<br />land reforms can be discussed at three levels, namely, political, economic and<br />ideological.<br />Political<br />A major concern of the state, especially in a developing country such as Cameroon, is<br />political stability. By declaring itself custodian of all lands in the country through, for<br />example, Ordinance No. 74–1 of 6 July 1974 (or Law No. 73–3 of 9 July 1973 and<br />Statutory Law No. 63–2 of 1963 before it), the state is able to sanction actions relating to<br />transactions in land that are capable of neutralizing real and potential threats to political<br />stability from interest groups in society. Arguably, the most serious threat to political<br />stability in the country is from bureaucratic and business elites. Cognizant of this, the<br />political leadership has, amongst other things, crafted the land reform laws to<br />disproportionately favour bureaucratic elites and the few financially well-off individuals<br />as a means of appeasing them and ultimately gaining their political support. The<br />prerequisites for land ownership certification, such as having the parcel of land<br />demarcated by a professional surveyor and defraying the necessary fees (see above), are<br />such that only the few economically powerful members of society can fulfil them.<br />Perhaps more noteworthy is the fact that the land reform laws were written in a manner<br />that renders their use as a source of political patronage by the leadership possible. As<br />DeLancey (1989: 62) has observed with respect to the 1974 Land Decree:<br />Among the various paragraphs and conditions of the law, there was the possibility of obtaining a<br />temporary grant of title to land that was ‘unoccupied or unexploited’. . . . The law stated, in<br />essence, that if an individual could present a plan to develop and utilize such land and if he or<br />she had the funds to undertake such exploitation, that person could gain temporary title of the<br />land. Small grants of land were given by the minister of lands, larger grants by the president.<br />Such could be considered rewards in many cases — another source of patronage.<br />As stated earlier, a notable feature of the land reforms discussed here is that they<br />concentrate the power to control all transactions in land in the centre specifically in the<br />hands of the Head of State. According to the 1974 Land Decree, ‘only the Head of State<br />can establish the rules governing the ownership and alienation of land throughout the<br />country’ (Njoh, 1992b: 25). From the state’s point of view, concentrating or centralizing<br />the power to control land is a strategy capable not only of reinforcing the executive’s<br />power but also of ensuring national stability (Njoh, 1992a).<br />Economic<br />Cameroon’s modern land management system requires that all transactions in land be<br />granted official authorization. Furthermore, unless such transactions, including all land<br />ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998<br />416 Ambe J. Njoh<br />transfers through sales and other means, are duly registered with the relevant state<br />institutional bodies, they will be considered null and void for official purposes. This point<br />is made more explicitly in Part II Article 4 of Ordinance No. 74–1 of 6 July 1974 and as<br />amended by Section (1) of Ordinance No. 77–1 of 10 January 1977 thus:<br />The holders of land register books or certificates of occupancy relating to land in urban areas<br />shall be bound, under penalty of forfeiting their rights, to convert the said books or certificates<br />into land certificates within a period of ten years from 5 August 1974, the date of publication of<br />Ordinance No. 1 of 6 July 1974; the said time limit shall be extended to 15 years for land in<br />rural areas (Republic of Cameroon, n.d.: 84).<br />One obvious implication of this for the state is that its ability to keep track of all<br />transactions in land is significantly enhanced. The importance of this effect of the reform<br />policy cannot be exaggerated. Land, as a fundamental factor of production, constitutes a<br />potent source of government revenue. Thus, to have complete and accurate information<br />on the country’s land inventory and all transactions therein is to maximize the utility of<br />this crucial revenue source. To be sure, the direct economic benefit to the state with<br />respect to land is not limited to the fees it derives from transactions in land, but includes<br />taxes it charges on land and landed property, business taxes paid by entities such as<br />professional surveys and/or cadastral firms, dealers in land survey and mapping<br />equipment, and so on. Additionally, and perhaps most important of all, the state derives<br />revenue from the direct sales of state-owned lands.<br />Ideological<br />Ideology has been a chief motivating factor in the state’s effort to reform the country’s<br />land tenure system. To be sure, the effort is largely in response to ideological instructions<br />and propaganda campaigns by western-based institutions such as the World Bank and the<br />United Nations Development Program (UNDP), rather than to a real or perceived need. In<br />fact, the state, in collaboration with such institutions and building on the foundation<br />established by colonial officials, has worked fervently to ensure a complete monetization<br />of the country’s economy. In this connection, one of the principal aims of the reforms has<br />been the conversion of a previously traditional factor of production, namely land, into a<br />commodity which can be exchanged on the ‘free market’. Thus, the reforms have sought<br />to individualize the ownership and control of land, thereby eliminating all claims that may<br />be rooted in kinship or community. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the reforms<br />constitute an ideological buttress designed to perpetuate the historical legacy which links<br />private property to the private ownership of the means of production characteristic of<br />capitalism (Burgess, 1985; Njoh, 1992a).<br />According to Ordinance No. 74–1 of 6 July 1974, the state may, in its capacity as<br />guardian of the country’s land, intervene in the land market ‘. . . to ensure rational use of<br />land or in the imperative interest of defence or the economic policies of the nation’. This<br />stated objective of the state’s activities in the land market has ideological overtones. It<br />serves as a sign of the state’s concern for the general welfare of the citizenry.<br />Implications for politicians, bureaucratic and business elites<br />As noted above, Cameroon’s land reform laws are deliberately slanted in favour of the<br />few economically powerful members of society. This group includes politicians,<br />bureaucratic and business elites, or what Kofele-Kale (1987) has called the national<br />bourgeoisie. As Kofele-Kale accurately observes, the national bourgeoisie in Cameroon<br />cuts across the country’s traditional cleavages, particularly the infamous francophone/<br />anglophone divide, and constitutes the albeit small segment of the population which<br />enjoys most of the country’s wealth and prestige. For instance, while the bureaucratic<br />ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998<br />The political economy of urban land reforms in a post-colonial state 417<br />elites comprise only a little more than 2% of all the actively employed population, they<br />consume as much as one-third of the national revenue compared to 40% of the national<br />income, which is shared by more than 89% of the labour force (Kofele-Kale, 1987: 156).<br />Thus, while the bureaucratic and business elites are able to easily defray the high costs<br />associated with purchasing and securing official titles to land, most of the other members<br />of the population are not. In effect, the bureaucratic and business elites are those best<br />positioned to derive the benefits associated with possessing official documents attesting<br />to one’s entitlements to land.<br />As a class, the bureaucratic elites have benefited from the fruits of the country’s land<br />reform policies in other ways. As Fisiy (1992) notes, they have been able to masterfully<br />manipulate the policies for personal gains. In this regard, and particularly with respect to<br />the 1974 reforms, he observes that:<br />. . . it has become common practice to acquire land in the name of the State and, in turn, convert<br />the same into private estates . . . Since the law provides for the State to own land like any other<br />private citizen, known as ‘le domaine prive´ de l’e´tat’, public servants then use State power for<br />their own private motives (Fisiy, 1992: 168).<br />The bureaucratic and business elites have further been able to take advantage of the<br />land reforms by indulging in land speculation. According to Decree No. 76–165 of 27<br />April 1976, owners of land in urban areas had until 1984 to register their titles or risk<br />forfeiture of their land rights. With the almost insurmountable difficulties faced by most<br />individuals trying to register land in the country, the bureaucratic and business elite<br />quickly moved to purchasing land at below market rates, using their connection and/or<br />financial resources to register the land and then turning around and reselling at exorbitant<br />rates (Fisiy, 1992).<br />It is therefore no accident that most of the land thus far registered in the country has<br />been by state and business elites. This group accounted for almost 83% or 1244 of the<br />1502 land titles registered in the North West Province during the first decade (1976–85)<br />following the passage of the law (Fisiy, 1992: 153). In the South West Province, the<br />proportion of land titles registered by members of this group alone was higher, at nearly<br />87% or 691 of the 795 titles registered during the same period (ibid.).<br />Although Fisiy (1992) rightly points out that the data set from which the above<br />percentages were computed has some limitations, especially because it lumps business<br />people with capital in the hundreds of thousands (CFA francs) together with those whose<br />capital may be in the millions, there is hardly any reason to believe that petty business<br />people constitute a significant segment of those acquiring formal titles to land. For one<br />thing, petty business people are typically illiterate and, almost by definition, function in<br />the informal sector, hence are unlikely to have access to information articulating the<br />importance of formal land entitlements (see below). For another thing, they are unlikely<br />to have the connection and/or financial resources necessary for surmounting the hurdles<br />associated with acquiring formal titles to land.<br />Implications for the educated salariat<br />Although the official income of members of this group — including mid- and low-level<br />employees of the state, parastatal and private sectors — is relatively modest, they are<br />amongst those who have benefited, and are likely to continue benefiting, substantially<br />from the land reforms. The privileged access of this group to the fruits of the reforms, by<br />design or otherwise, is guaranteed through a number of channels including, but not<br />limited to, their: (a) official position; (b) connection to, and contacts with, the arteries of<br />power; and (c) knowledge of the law.<br />ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998<br />418 Ambe J. Njoh<br />Official position<br />Some of the educated salariat working in public, para-public or private sector agencies,<br />such as the local services of Lands, Surveys, Town Planning and Housing, local<br />government councils, the Cameroon Housing Authority (or Societe´ Immobilier du<br />Cameroun —SIC) and so on, are directly involved in implementing the land reform laws.<br />In the jargon of administrative sciences, these individuals are called street level<br />bureaucrats. Street level bureaucrats, especially the calibre of interest in the context of<br />this discussion, have three main characteristics (Palumbo and Maynard-Moody, 1991).<br />First, they are usually located at or near the bottom of the bureaucratic ladder. Second,<br />they are always in direct contact with the public, especially the segment of the public<br />constituting the direct beneficiaries of the policy they are responsible for implementing.<br />Finally, they possess and exercise significant discretionary authority with respect to the<br />policies or laws they are charged with implementing. Thus, for instance, although field<br />staff such as technicians of the agencies mentioned above were not involved in crafting<br />the reforms, they are able to literally rewrite the laws in their own favour in the course of<br />implementation.<br />An example would serve to illuminate this point. Provisions of the land reforms law<br />grant the state authority to own land in the same manner as private citizens through what<br />is known as ‘le domaine prive´ de l’e´tat’ (see above). Street level bureaucrats habitually<br />manipulate this provision to serve their own private ends. In one case—that of Kumbo in<br />Bui Division, North West Province — reported by Fisiy (1992), officials of the relevant<br />local agencies, in collaboration with the mayor, designated part of the state’s private<br />estate as a local government or council layout scheme and then moved to put it to their<br />own private use. This feat was accomplished simply by restricting access to plots in the<br />layout, which were, by the way, sold for a token sum to individuals with a regular source<br />of income. Additionally, applicants for plots at the layout were required to complete<br />special lengthy application forms obtainable exclusively from the local Lands office,<br />where they were often told the forms were out of stock, or from the central Lands Service<br />in the national capital, Yaounde. These two requirements meant that only the few local<br />civil servants or formal sector employees, who have a regular source of income and were<br />able to make the contacts necessary for obtaining the special application forms, could<br />secure the very inexpensive plots. Thus, although projects such as ‘new layouts’ are often<br />masqueraded as a means of dealing with the problem of inner-city congestion, it is<br />actually a strategy carefully designed by street level bureaucrats and other local officials<br />to convert state estate for their own private benefits. It is therefore not surprising that civil<br />servants and other formal sector employees, despite their relatively modest incomes,<br />constitute, as revealed by Fisiy (1992), a significant segment of urban land owners in the<br />country.5<br />Implications for women, ethnic minorities and the poor<br />Women, ethnic minorities and the poor in Cameroon share several characteristics,<br />especially within the context of the present discussion. First, members of these groups are<br />conspicuously underrepresented in the formal sector of the economy. Second, and as a<br />result of this, they do not have a regular source of income. Finally, they are in large part<br />formally uneducated.<br />5 High salaries in the country are, as stated earlier, enjoyed exclusively by the bureaucratic elites. In fact, it<br />has been noted that the range of salaries between the highest paid labourer and the highest paid civil servant<br />is in the order of 1:30 (Kofele-Kale, 1987).<br />ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998<br />The political economy of urban land reforms in a post-colonial state 419<br />Women<br />Theoretically, the land reform laws that have been enacted in Cameroon prior to and<br />following independence in 1960, are supposed to facilitate the access of women to land.<br />Proponents contend that customary land tenure systems, which: (a) recognized the family,<br />and ultimately the community, as the landholding unit in society; (b) did not authorize the<br />sale and/or exchange of land; and (c) permitted only male offspring to inherit land and<br />landed property, effectively denied females access to land.6 By rendering the exchange<br />and/or outright sale of land possible, the land reform laws were therefore supposed to<br />guarantee women access to land. To be sure, this has not been the case. In fact, if<br />anything, the laws have significantly contributed to further alienating women from land<br />and landed property. It does not require a lot of imagination to figure out how this has<br />been the case.<br />Women constitute more than 51% of the country’s population but account for only<br />33% of its formal labour force. What this means is that most Cameroonian women lack a<br />source of ‘regular and verifiable’ income. One implication of this for access to land is that<br />women are less likely, if not unlikely, to take advantage of low-cost government land<br />sales programmes requiring potential buyers to present collateral and/or proof of regular<br />income. Thus, it is hardly surprising that since the 1974 landmark Land Reform<br />Legislation was promulgated, only very few women have actually registered any land<br />titles in their names. As a respectable World Bank report has noted (1995: 38):<br />Only 3.2 percent of all land titles issued in the Northwest Province were given to women; in the<br />Southwest Province the figure was 7.2 percent. For the country as a whole, it is estimated that<br />women obtained under 10 percent of all land certificates.<br />Furthermore, only a small percentage of Cameroonian women can read and write. In<br />fact, while approximately 67% of all males in the country can read and write, only 45% of<br />the females are able to do so. The implication of this for the purpose of the present<br />discussion is that only a few Cameroonian women have been able to acquaint themselves<br />with the procedures governing the registration of land ownership titles. Conversely, most<br />are therefore neither conversant with the complex procedures nor the merits of<br />participating in such a process.<br />Ethnic minorities and the poor<br />As disenfranchised members of the society, ethnic minorities and the poor in Cameroon<br />are almost completely disconnected from the levers of power. Yet, it is hardly any secret<br />that one’s ability to succeed in a developing country such as Cameroon is almost always a<br />function of one’s connection to the levers of command. As stated earlier, land has been<br />employed by high level politicians as a source of political patronage or as rewards for<br />political support. In this case, ethnic minorities and the poor emerge as losers. Politicians<br />see no risk in ignoring pockets of ethnic minorities, who, by definition, constitute a small<br />segment of the population. Similarly, they perceive no risk in ignoring the poor, who,<br />while numerically substantial, are unorganized, thereby constituting no significant<br />political threat.<br />Furthermore, and as in the case of women, the poor and ethnic minorities are likely to<br />have no formal education and therefore cannot read and write. Thus, they are also very<br />unlikely to be versed with the intricacies of the land ownership title registration as well as<br />the benefits associated with obtaining a certificate of land ownership. This problem is<br />compounded by the fact that most members of these groups are likely to be engaged in the<br />6 Although in most areas of Cameroon, only men could inherit land, it is misleading to hold, as most<br />proponents of land reforms contend, that under the traditional land tenure system, women were completely<br />denied access to land. Njoh (1998: 14) makes this argument more succinctly when he states that ‘. . . in the<br />absence of a husband, a woman’s access to land was guaranteed through her male offspring or where there<br />was no male, a woman could gain access through her father’.<br />ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998<br />420 Ambe J. Njoh<br />informal sector of the economy, where earnings are irregular. Yet, as we have already<br />observed, a regular source of income is a condition sine qua non for securing the very<br />inexpensive parcels of state-owned land that go on sale from time to time throughout the<br />country.<br />Recommendations<br />The tenor of this segment is cautiously prescriptive. The need to be cautious in dealing<br />with social and politico-economic quandaries of the genre identified in this paper is selfevident.<br />Unlike puzzles in, say, the physical or natural sciences, the questions raised to<br />prominence here have no categorical, solitary or easily identifiable answers. The task of<br />resolving riddles of the latter ilk is further compounded by what we would term a<br />‘transferability problem’ —that is, the difficulties inherent in transplanting solutions and/<br />or remedies for social and consanguine problematics from one geographic location to<br />another; or from one time period to another. With this peculiar nature of social problems<br />in mind, we proffer the following set of activities as a contribution to efforts designed to<br />enhance the outcomes of land tenure reform policies in Cameroon.<br />First, concerned authorities should seek to simplify the land title registration process.<br />Presently, as noted above, not only is the process tedious, it is also cumbersome and timeconsuming.<br />Simplification can include amongst other measures: (1) administratively<br />decentralizing the process; and (2) reducing significantly the number of institutional<br />actors involved. If the central government has anything to lose through decentralization, it<br />is certainly not its ability to keep abreast with land transactions and/or land inventory.<br />One reason for this is the increasing sophistication of the computer and other electronic<br />land data storage and retrieval systems that are no longer prohibitively costly for<br />governments of penurious developing countries such as Cameroon. However, it must be<br />noted that decentralization efforts are unlikely to yield any significant positive results<br />unless they are matched with a resolve to empower and strengthen the institutional<br />capacity of local governmental and non-governmental bodies.<br />Second, authorities must strive to eliminate ‘formal sector employment’ or ‘source of<br />regular income’ as a condition for securing access to state-owned land. To take this step is<br />to recognize one of the country’s most glaring economic realities, namely the<br />predominance of the informal sector. As noted above, the practice of tying access to<br />state-owned land to formal sector employment or source of regular income has been<br />exceedingly effective in denying the less privileged members of Cameroonian society<br />access to state-owned, hence subsidized land.<br />Third, authorities will also do well to start ‘small’ with, for instance, a ‘half way<br />cadastre’ system. The objectives of such a system, which by design is simple and<br />straightforward, are threefold (Mabogunje, 1992: 27): (1) achieving a complete coverage<br />of a municipality’s land inventory; (2) establishing land entitlements through land<br />registration; and (3) strengthening the state’s land management capabilities while<br />ensuring its ability to continuously improve such capabilities. The attainment of these<br />objectives may require no more than the initiation of minor bureaucratic reorganization<br />schemes, the introduction of inexpensive technology such as easy-to-use computer<br />programmes (e.g. simple spreadsheets), photogrametric equipment, simple survey<br />techniques and hands-on training and retraining of relevant staff. Additionally, such a<br />strategy may necessitate educating the citizenry, whose cooperation and participation are<br />necessary for effective institution building. Such a simple land survey strategy holds far<br />more promise than the tedious techniques, which seek to attain optimal accuracy at the<br />cost of frustrating potential land developers.<br />Finally, it is important to recognize the limits of modern land tenure systems. As<br />attested to by the preceding arguments, we consider efforts to hastily replace the<br />ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998<br />The political economy of urban land reforms in a post-colonial state 421<br />traditional with modern or, more appropriately, western-based land tenure systems to be a<br />fundamental source of the problem of socio-economic inequities prevalent in Cameroon.<br />To be sure, the market mechanism, entrusted with the function of land distribution within<br />the framework of western-based land tenure systems, is amongst the leading factors<br />accounting for such inequalities. As a means of diminishing these inequalities, authorities<br />should seek to actively preserve traditional land holding arrangements. One way of<br />effectuating this strategy is to discourage the outright sale of family or communal land<br />unless where it is absolutely necessary. In such cases the parties involved must present<br />specific investment plans containing elements such as employment generation that will be<br />of direct benefit to those likely to part company with their usufruct rights (cf. World<br />Bank, 1995). What this means is that family, communal and other group-held parcels of<br />land must be governed by traditional land tenure and/or customary laws as opposed to the<br />national or modern land tenure system.<br />Summary and conclusion<br />Some of the salient points of this paper warrant reiteration. First, we note that indigenous<br />authorities and their colonial predecessors in Cameroon have always been preoccupied<br />with efforts to nationalize land and formalize the land ownership process. Prominent<br />amongst the rationales for this preoccupation is the need on the part of the state to fortify<br />its hegemonic grip on society at large. Also underlying this preoccupation is a belief that<br />traditional land tenure systems constrain the functioning of the country’s land market.<br />Therefore, concentrating land in the hands of the state and replacing the traditional with<br />a modern land tenure system, it is believed, will result in a more functional land market.<br />Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Rather, the preoccupation has given birth to a<br />ubiquitous role for the state and its various institutions; a mammoth bureaucratic system;<br />inadequate institutional frameworks; and a glut of intemperate regulations in the land<br />policy field. Second, we observe that recent land law reforms in particular and land<br />tenure modernization efforts in general in the country have always been skewed in<br />favour of the few economically and/or politically well-entrenched members of society.<br />Finally, we note that rather than facilitating, the modern land tenure system has<br />effectively impeded access by women, the poor and ethnic minorities to urban land.<br />Thus, it is safe to conclude that modern land law reforms have accentuated socioeconomic<br />inequities in the country.<br />If modern land tenure systems have failed to facilitate the functioning of the land<br />market in Cameroon as advertised by proponents, it is not because the systems in and of<br />themselves are dysfunctional. Rather, it is because hardly any efforts have been made to<br />institutionalize the system as well as strengthen the institutional capacity for<br />implementing the reforms. Authorities will therefore do well to create some fit between<br />the ‘modern’ land tenure system and the traditions, culture and beliefs of the<br />Cameroonian society. Furthermore, and above all, serious efforts should be made to<br />redistribute wealth as well as revamp the country’s bureaucratic machinery, particularly<br />the institutional framework for land policy administration.<br />Ambe J. Njoh (njoh@stpt.usf.edu), Public Administration Program, University of South<br />Florida, 140 Seventh Avenue South, DAV 258, St Petersburg, Florida 33701-5016, USA.<br />References<br />Baron, D. (1978) Land reform in Sub-Saharan Africa: an annotated bibliography. US Agency for<br />International Development, Office of Rural Development, Washington, DC.<br />ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998<br />422 Ambe J. Njoh<br />Barrows, R. and M. Roth (1990) Land tenure and investment in African agriculture: theory and<br />evidence. 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(1982) The political economy of productivity: Thai agricultural development 1880–<br />1875. University of British Columbia, Vancouver.<br />Fisiy, C.F. (1992) Power and privilege in the administration of law: land law and reforms and<br />social differentiation in Cameroon. African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands.<br />Handelman, H. (1996) The challenge of third world development. Prentice Hall, New Jersey.<br />Inter-American Development Bank (1986) Jamaica land titling project feasibility report.<br />Washington, DC.<br />Kofele-Kale, N. (1987) Class, status, and power in postreunification Cameroon: the rise of an<br />Anglophone bourgeoisie, 1961–1980. In I.L. Markovitz (ed.), Studies in power and class in<br />Africa, Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford.<br />Mabogunje, A.L. (1981) The development process: a spatial perspective. Holmes and Meier, New<br />York.<br />—— (1992) Perspective on urban land and urban management policies in Sub-Saharan Africa.<br />World Bank technical paper no. 196, Africa Technical Department Series, World Bank,<br />Washington, DC.<br />Miliband, R. (1969) The state in capitalist society: an analysis of the western system of power.<br />Basic Books, New York.<br />Njoh, A.J. (1992a) The institutional framework for housing policy administration in Cameroon.<br />Habitat International 16, 43–57.<br />—— (1992b) Institutional impediments to private residential development in Cameroon. Third<br />World Planning Review 14, 21–37.<br />—— (1994) The land use policy implementation system in Cameroon: historical/contemporary<br />perspectives and implications for national development. Habitat International, 18, 81–98.<br />—— (1995) Building and urban land use controls in developing countries: a critical appraisal of<br />the Kumba (Cameroon) zoning ordinance. Third World Planning Review 17, 337–56.<br />—— (1998) Urban planning, housing and the socio-economic development of women in a<br />developing country. Planning Perspectives 13, 1–21.<br />Palumbo, D. and S. Maynard-Moody (1991) Contemporary public administration. Longman, New<br />York.<br />Republic of Cameroon (n.d.) Land tenure and state lands. Imprimerie Nationale [National Printing<br />Press], Yaounde´.<br />Rotchild, D. and N. Chazan (eds.) (1988) The precarious balance: state and society in Africa.<br />Westview Press, Boulder, CO.<br />Seligson, M.A. (1982) Agrarian change in Northern Ghana: public investment, capitalist farming<br />and famine. Inter-American Economic Affairs 35, 31–56.<br />Sorrenson, M.P.K. (1967) Land reform in the Kikuyu country: a study of government policy.<br />Oxford University Press, Nairobi.<br />Tomasugi, T. (1980) A structural analysis of Thai economic history: a case study of a northern<br />Chao Phraya Delta village. Institute for Developing Economics, Tokyo.<br />UN DESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs) (1973) Urban land<br />policies and land-use control measures: volume 1. Africa. United Nations, New York.<br />Williams, D.C. (1992) Measuring the impact of land reform policy in Nigeria. The Journal of<br />Modern African Studies 30, 587–608.<br />ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998<br />The political economy of urban land reforms in a post-colonial state 423<br />World Bank (1995) Cameroon: diversity, growth, and poverty reduction. Population and Human<br />Resources Division, Central, Washington, DC and Indian Ocean Department, Africa Regional<br />Office Report No. 13167–CM.<br />ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998<br />424 Ambe J. Njohland ownership in islamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05414932490344169940noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2263133053636924346.post-29116541738598273622008-12-11T17:24:00.000-08:002008-12-11T17:26:56.872-08:00A Non-Technical Primer on Private Ownership in IslamBy: *Amir Kia<br />72 Journal of Business Inquiry 2007<br />Utah Valley State College<br /><br />Islamic economics does not explain production, consumption or investment relationships. Islamic economics is<br />only a school of thought. In Islamic economics, in contrast with other schools of thought, resources are not<br />limited. Private ownership in Islam is absolutely respected, but the more an individual owns, the more<br />responsibility he has to the society. In Islam, everything belongs to God and so the accumulation of wealth is<br />not a goal, but a source of pleasing God. What individuals consume or give away to charity is what they own.<br />Keywords: Private ownership, Wealth, Responsibility, Distribution of income<br />Introduction<br />This paper is intended for readers with no<br />background in economic theory, and so no attempt is<br />made to provide any theoretical or empirical proof<br />for ideas raised in this paper. In a world where all<br />countries have open borders and operate under<br />international economic interdependence, private<br />ownership is one of the most important issues for a<br />country wishing to have independent and effective<br />monetary and fiscal policies. For example, if<br />monetary authorities of a country believe that a low<br />interest rate policy is an optimum way to achieve its<br />economic objectives, the country cannot implement<br />this low-interest policy if interest rates in the rest of<br />the world, everything else being constant, are above<br />what the country wishes to have. This is because the<br />capital of the country will be moved out as its interest<br />rate is below the rest of the world’s interest rate,<br />resulting in a shortage of capital in the country that<br />will put upward pressure on interest rates, and,<br />consequently, the economic objectives of the country<br />will not be achieved.<br />However, this problem does not exist under the Islamic<br />concept of private ownership because the rate of<br />interest is not pre-determined. The rate of return<br />(interest rate) on an investment is based on the profits<br />made and it is only known after the end of the period.<br />Such a rate is not comparable<br />with a predetermined rate of interest. Furthermore, all<br />other economic problems which arise from non-Islamic<br />private ownership, e.g., externality (diseconomy) in<br />consumption and production are nil or at their<br />minimum under private ownership in the Islamic<br />concept. The purpose of this paper is to explain the<br />theory of private ownership in Islam and its<br />implications in practice. The following section provides<br />a brief explanation about principles of Islamic<br />economics and is followed by a section on private<br />ownership in Islam. Finally, the last section is devoted<br />to some concluding remarks.<br />Brief Explanation of Islamic Economics<br />At the outset, we should mention that Islamic<br />economics is a school of thought. Islam does not talk of<br />production, consumption or other economic<br />relationships. Islam covers what is right or wrong<br />(Halal or Haram) in distribution, in relationships<br />between employers and employees, between buyers and<br />sellers, between landlords and tenants, among members<br />of a family, between the governments and individuals,<br />etc. Furthermore, Islam recommends a type of<br />government, principles of heritage, economic<br />relationship between parents and children, husband and<br />wife, etc. (Sader, 1349, pp. 9-17).<br />In comparison, human beings have complete freedom<br />in a capitalistic system while in a Marxist system,<br />society, not the individual, is important. The selfishness<br />of individuals is fully respected in the former system,<br />but not in the latter. Capitalism is<br />2007 Journal of Business Inquiry 73<br />based on logic while marxism is based on ideology.<br />Private ownership is permitted in an unlimited form in a<br />capitalistic system while everything belongs to the<br />government (society) in a socialistic system. Capital or<br />a commodity can be used any way the owner wishes,<br />both in production and consumption in a capitalistic<br />system.<br />Islamic economics is based on three principles (Sader,<br />1350, pp. 354-367):<br />1. Principle of Mixed Ownership<br />In both capitalistic and Islamic systems we have three<br />kinds of ownership: (a) private, (b) public and (c)<br />government ownerships. Public and government<br />ownership are the same in both the capitalist and<br />Islamic systems.<br />2. Principle of Economic Freedom within a Limiting<br />Framework<br />There are two limitations to economic freedom in<br />Islamic ideology:<br />(i) Intrinsic (internal) limitations. These limitations are<br />based on Islamic beliefs, but there is no force imposed<br />on individuals. Individuals, according to their Islamic<br />belief, impose the limitations on themselves by choice.<br />For example, the individual pays zakat which is a tax<br />on individual’s savings (wealth). There is no<br />government control on the payment of zakat. The<br />calculation and payment are done by the individuals.<br />The time of payment, the amount of zakat, the receiving<br />persons and/or institutions, etc., are only known by God<br />and the individual.<br />(ii) External limitations. These limitations (constraints)<br />are imposed by the government. For example, the<br />production and the transaction of alcoholic beverages<br />are prohibited. No individual can produce or trade<br />alcoholic beverages even if the individual does not<br />believe in the law. However, non-Muslims are<br />allowed to produce, trade among themselves, and<br />consume alcoholic beverages in Islamic societies.<br />3. Principle of Social Justice in the Society<br />The principle of social justice in Islam includes the<br />following: (a) The principle of cooperation among all<br />members of the society, and (b) the principle of social<br />balance. As Sader (1349, pp. 366-367) states, there is<br />no unrealistic concept in Islamic economics. For<br />instance, in Islamic economics, workers must have at<br />least an average standard of living (the principle of<br />social balance). However, such a standard of living is<br />not achieved by the market forces or cyclical variations,<br />etc. Such a state, according to Islam, is a requirement<br />for the economy and its achievement is a moral<br />responsibility for each member of the society (the<br />principle of cooperation among all members of the<br />society).<br />In an Islamic system, individuals try to please God and<br />only God. Note that when we consider any Islamic<br />economic principle, we should consider it in a<br />framework of a complete Islamic environment. An<br />individual by nature may be selfish and tend to<br />maximise his utility and/or profit subject to goods or<br />resources available to him. However, if the individual is<br />religious, he also attempts to incorporate awareness of<br />the responsibility to society in his decisions in the<br />process of utility or profit maximisation. This is<br />because all aspects of life have a religious connotation<br />for a practicing Muslim. Consequently, his economic<br />decision also has a religious connotation. In the absence<br />of religion, the utility or profit maximisation is purely<br />due to selfishness and does not necessarily consider the<br />society at all. In fact, to Muslims only religion can<br />make human beings aware of the society so that the<br />individual will consider the welfare of the society in his<br />utility/profit maximisation (Sader, 1350, pp. 383-396).<br />In Islam, a practicing Muslim, in his economic decision,<br />while maximising his utility or profit, tries to please<br />God. This Islamic economic concept is believed to lead<br />to a higher efficiency in the society.<br />For example, competition in a non-Islamic economic<br />system leads to an efficient production. However, in an<br />Islamic economic system, competition among<br />individuals is allowed, but this competition is toward<br />pleasing God while maximising utility and/or profit.<br />This kind of competition leads to super efficiency since<br />not only the utility/profit of one individual is<br />maximised but at the same time the social welfare<br />improves. Note that in a non-Islamic system, starting<br />from an efficient point, a higher utility of one leads to<br />74 Journal of Business Inquiry 2007<br />a reduction of the utility of another individual. In an<br />Islamic system, the individual’s utility is a function of<br />“God’s pleasure.” Since individuals are God’s<br />representatives (khalefeh) on earth, they please God<br />through helping (making happy) other individuals. In<br />this way, starting from an efficient point, a higher<br />satisfaction of one individual results in a higher<br />satisfaction for other members of the society and,<br />therefore, the welfare of society generally will improve.<br />As Sader (1350, p. 415) mentions, the relation between<br />individuals and society in Islam is not a force of<br />production. In other words, hiring, employing<br />connection, employer-employee relationship, etc., are<br />not the forces of production, but are based on welfare<br />maximisation and are assigned by God. For example, in<br />traditional economics, the demand for labour is derived<br />from a profit maximisation decision. Workers are hired<br />until their marginal product is equal to the real wage<br />rate they are paid. In supplying their services, workers<br />try to maximise their satisfaction and not the interest of<br />the employers or the society. The less they offer for a<br />given wage rate, the happier they are. In an Islamic<br />system, in supplying their services, workers incorporate<br />the interest (profit) of their employers as they constantly<br />witness God’s presence in their activities. Clearly, one<br />can see that society can operate more efficiently in an<br />Islamic system since cheating, shirking, etc., and,<br />consequently, policing, do not need to exist.<br />In general, there is no limitation of resources according<br />to Islamic economics. According to the capitalistic<br />system, each society maximises its welfare subject to<br />given resources. In Islamic economics, the resources are<br />unlimited since the limitation is believed to be created<br />by man. According to the Qur-an [ch. xiv (Abraham),<br />v. 32-34], “It is God Who has created the heavens and<br />the earth and sends down rain from the skies, and with<br />it brings out fruits wherewith to feed you; it is He who<br />has made the ships subject to you, that they may sail<br />through the sea by His Command; And the rivers (also)<br />has He made subject to you. And He has made subject<br />to you the sun and the moon, both diligently pursuing<br />their courses; and the Night and the Day has He (also)<br />made subject to you. And He gives you of all that you<br />ask for. But if you count the favours of God, never will<br />you be able to number them. Verily, man is given up to<br />injustice and ingratitude.”<br />We can see from these verses that it is man who, by<br />giving in to injustice and by being ungrateful, has made<br />the resources limited. According to Sader (1350,<br />p. 425), people, by using natural resources and their<br />energy in an inefficient way, together with an unjust<br />distribution of wealth and income, create limitation in<br />resources. Furthermore, I believe that the external<br />diseconomy created by economic units, the imposition<br />of distorting taxes by governments and economic and<br />non-economic wastes are examples of this injustice of<br />man.<br />The value (price) of a commodity in Islam is<br />determined, similar to capitalism, by its demand and<br />supply, and not labour embodied in it. However, in<br />contrast with capitalism, the share of labour from<br />production is determined by the number of hours<br />worked (labour embodied) in that production and not<br />by the market value of the output. The market<br />determines the price, but not the share of the factors of<br />production (Sader, 1350, pp. 430-431). In many<br />instances, in contrast to capitalism, workers and<br />employers are sharing risk and they are also partners<br />(Khan, 1989, pp. 63-69).<br />People are divided into three groups. The first group<br />includes those with the highest talent and capacity. The<br />share of this group from national income is according to<br />their work. This group is the rich class in the society.<br />The second group includes average or low talent and<br />capacity/skill people. The share of this group from<br />national income is determined by their work, but they<br />are also eligible to “Public Funds” (Principle of<br />Cooperation and Guarantee). Finally, the third group<br />includes those people with no or minor talent and<br />capacity/skill. The share of this group from national<br />income is also determined by the Principle of<br />Cooperation and Guarantee (Public Funds), (Sader,<br />1350, pp. 430-433). In sum, in Islam, techniques of<br />production and technology do not determine the<br />distribution of income, but the distribution of income is<br />determined by the non-secular government (Sader,<br />1349, pp. 64-65).<br />Private Ownership in Islam<br />Private ownership in this paper means the ownership of<br />whatever one can own, including skills, special ability,<br />knowledge, etc. Private ownership in Islam is a<br />2007 Journal of Business Inquiry 75<br />right for individuals (as is often the case under a<br />capitalist system), but a right which also includes<br />responsibility. Namely, it is not an absolute right<br />without any responsibility (Sader, 1350, p. 374). For<br />example, the Qur-an [ch. ii (Baqara), v. 188] says<br />“And do not eat up your property among yourselves for<br />vanities, nor use it as bait for the judges, with intent that<br />you may eat up wrongfully and knowingly a little of<br />(other) people’s property.” We can see from this verse<br />that there is a broader responsibility toward society for<br />personal property, and this limits its use. This Islamic<br />law is the opposite of the capitalistic form of private<br />property, which is used in any way the owner wishes.<br />We can also understand from this rule of the Qur-an<br />that nobody, including authorities, can invade other<br />people’s property. Furthermore, even authorities are<br />responsible to God for the public property.<br />It should be noted that while private ownership in Islam<br />is absolutely respected, it has its own characteristics<br />which make it completely different from any other<br />school of thought. Namely, (i) while individuals have<br />an absolute right to own property, their ownership is<br />limited, (ii) they can own a property permanently in this<br />world and/or benefit from its consumption in this world<br />and in the next world, (iii) while an individual owns his<br />property the society relationship with the property is not<br />disconnected, and finally, (iv) there is a time limitation<br />on the ownership. Let us discuss each of these<br />characteristics separately.<br />(i) The Limited Ownership<br />As individuals receive their shares of outputs according<br />to their labour input, they have full control of their<br />property to consume it, use it as a means of production<br />or save it. However, the Islamic law (not the<br />government, i.e., if the individual is a practicing<br />Muslim) puts some restrictions on the use of an<br />individual’s property as follows: The individual cannot<br />consume it wastefully, or use it in the production of<br />unlawful goods like alcoholic beverages, gambling, etc.<br />In fact, in Islam, individuals are only the trustee and not<br />the owner of their property. It should be mentioned that<br />some economists, e.g., Sader (1349, p. 176), suggest the<br />regulatory authority should design the regulations in<br />such a way to enforce this idea. For instance, the<br />Qur-an (ch. xxxv (Fatir), v. 39) says, “He it is the one<br />that has made you inheritors on the earth…,” or [ch. X<br />(Yunus, or Jonah), v. 14], “Then We made you heirs in<br />the land after them, to see how you would behave.”<br />As we can understand from these verses humans are<br />heirs of the earth, and own goods and skills solely for<br />the purpose of being tested. While God has created<br />everything, including knowledge and abilities, for our<br />uses, He has given to some people more than to others.<br />These are clear from the following verses in the Quran;<br />“It is He who has created for you all things that are<br />on earth…,” [ch. ii (Baqara), v. 29] and “It is He Who<br />has made you (His) agents, inheritors of the earth: He<br />has raised you in ranks; some above others: that He<br />may try you in the gifts He has given you: For the Lord<br />is quick in punishment: Yet He is indeed oft-forgiving,<br />most merciful” [ch. vi (An’am), v. 165]. In sum, wealth<br />is a gift from God, and so, those with more wealth carry<br />heavier responsibilities to God and society.<br />(ii) This World and the Next World Ownerships<br />The accumulation of wealth or the ownership of wealth<br />in Islam is not a goal, but a means of production and<br />satisfying needs (Sader, 1349, p. 181). In fact, men are<br />discouraged in the Qur-an from accumulating wealth<br />for the sake of accumulation, as the Holy Book foretells<br />a painful doom for the people who engage themselves<br />in such vices. The Qur-an [ch. ix (Tauba), v. 34-35]<br />says, “…And there are those who bury gold and silver<br />and spend it not in the Way of God: announce unto<br />them a most grievous penalty - On the Day when heat<br />will be produced out of that (wealth) in the fire of Hell,<br />and with it will be branded their foreheads, their flanks,<br />and their backs. This is the (treasure) which you buried<br />for yourselves: taste you, then the (treasure) you<br />buried.” See also Niazi (1977, pp. 12-13).<br />In Islam, one cannot consider owning a property unless<br />he uses it for consumption, investment, depreciation<br />and/or gives it away to charity. To support the idea, we<br />refer to a hadith (saying) of the Prophet Muhammad<br />which says “You do not have any right to your<br />properties, except the part you consume or give to<br />charity. The charity part remains forever” (Sader, 1349,<br />p. 182). We can immediately conclude that, (a) an idle<br />property cannot belong to anybody except the society,<br />(b) the only thing you really own in<br />76 Journal of Business Inquiry 2007<br />this world is what you consume, and, finally, (c) what<br />you give away as charity remains for you forever (in<br />this world and in the next world). Furthermore, the<br />Qur-an [ch. xxxiv (Saba), v. 39] says, “Say: Verily my<br />Lord enlarges and restricts the Sustenance to such of<br />His servants as He pleases: and nothing do you spend in<br />the least (in His cause) but He replaces it: for He is the<br />best of those who grant Sustenance.”<br />In another chapter, the Qur-an [ch. ii (Baqara), v. 272]<br />says, “…Whatever of good you give benefits your own<br />souls, and you shall only do so seeking the ‘Face’ of<br />God. Whatever good you give, shall be rendered back<br />to you, and you shall not be dealt with unjustly.” Even a<br />non-believer can understand why only what you<br />consume is truly yours. We may never be able to<br />consume what we have saved since the next minute of<br />our life is never guaranteed. Consequently, what we<br />consume is, in fact, ours. And as we saw earlier from<br />the words of God, that which is given for God will be<br />restored to the giver many times here and in the<br />hereafter.<br />(iii) The Society and Private Ownership<br />Another feature of private ownership in Islam is the<br />existence of a continuous connection between the<br />society and a privately owned property, human or nonhuman.<br />That is, the connection of the society and the<br />property, even if it is not a public good, is not cut as a<br />result of the individual ownership. The society should<br />still control or influence the way the property is used<br />(Sader, 1349, p. 178). Furthermore, certain things like<br />running water (rivers), lakes, oil, or similar resources,<br />(e.g., mountains, etc.), cannot be owned by any<br />individual, or by the state. Instead, every one is equally<br />entitled to derive benefit from them. These goods<br />belong to the whole community, and the state may<br />manage them on behalf of the community, as a trustee,<br />and be held accountable (Khan, 1989, pp. 7-8).<br />Furthermore, the society (needy individuals) has a right<br />to a portion of an individual’s property. The Qur-an<br />[ch. lxx (Ma’arij) v. 24-25] says, “And those in whose<br />wealth is a recognized right for the (needy) who asks<br />and him who is prevented (for some reason from<br />asking).” Note that here we are talking of “right,” not<br />charity. This Qur-anic law is unique to Islam. As Niazi<br />(1977, p. 25) also states, “…in contrast to social<br />stratification conscious conception of property, where<br />the beggar and the destitute are entitled only to charity,<br />the Qur-anic concept of trustee-ownership declares the<br />share of the poor and the needy in the wealth of others<br />as their right.” On this subject see also Shafi (1975,<br />pp. 7-8).<br />(iv) Time Limitation of Ownership<br />In Islam, the right to use, own and give away the entire<br />property of a person is limited to the time the person is<br />living, since the distribution of the property after death<br />has been determined in the Qur-an, see ch. ii (Baqara),<br />v. 180 and 240, ch. iv (Nisaa), v. 7-9, 11-12, 19, 33,<br />and 176, and ch. v (Maida), v. 109-111. In this way,<br />private ownership in Islam is different from that of<br />capitalism in which individuals have an absolute right<br />to their property before and after death.<br />It should, of course, be mentioned that individuals have<br />an absolute right to the distribution of some parts of<br />their property after their death, provided we define<br />private property in light of time limitation. For<br />example, in Islam, if an individual, by his work and<br />effort, makes an idle natural resource active, he has a<br />complete right, under the above mentioned limitations,<br />to use that natural resource. And by the time his action<br />makes the idle resource active he continues to have the<br />absolute right of using the property.<br />However, this right will be terminated immediately<br />after his death. In this aspect also private ownership in<br />Islam is different from private ownership in capitalism,<br />since in the latter the individual can own the natural<br />resource and determine its ownership(s) after his death<br />as he wishes. In general, according to many Islamic<br />scholars, individuals can only determine the ownership<br />(by writing a will) of one-third of their property after<br />their death. The rest will be distributed according to the<br />law of God in the Qur-an (see above verses). For<br />example, in one instance, the Prophet of Islam<br />recommended Sa’d b. Abi Waqqas to give away in the<br />name of God only one-third of his property after his<br />death (Muwatta’Imam Malik, ch. 58, p. 330). Note that<br />one of the outcomes of the Islamic law of inheritance is<br />the elimination of inequality in the distribution of<br />wealth, and so, income (Shafi, 1975, pp. 33-34).<br />2007 Journal of Business Inquiry 77<br />Concluding Remarks<br />Islamic economics does not explain production,<br />consumption or investment relationships except as a<br />school of thought. In Islamic economics, in contrast<br />with other schools of thought, resources are not limited.<br />That is, national income is not fixed, so that an<br />individual can have more of the national income<br />without other individuals having less. This idea looks<br />very unrealistic to many economists who are not<br />familiar with Islamic economic thought. A simple<br />explanation of this fact is that, in Islamic economics, the<br />resources are unlimited, and if there are any limitations<br />they are imposed by the injustice of man and not by<br />nature.<br />Furthermore, Islamic private ownership creates a kind<br />of externality (economy) where an increase of<br />consumption, e.g., of an individual leads to more<br />consumption for other individuals in the society. Private<br />ownership in Islam is absolutely respected, but the more<br />an individual owns, the more responsibility he has,<br />through what he owns, towards society. In such a<br />system, one can readily prove that in a country which<br />operates under free international trade, the economic<br />policy of a country can be completely independent of<br />the rest of the world.<br />In Islam, everything belongs to God. The accumulation<br />of wealth is not a goal, and if the wealth is accumulated<br />it is only to be used for worshipping God. What<br />individuals, in fact, consume or give away to charity is<br />what they own. Individuals can only determine up to<br />one third of their wealth to be given to any person or<br />source after their death. The rest of their wealth is<br />distributed as the Qur-an has prescribed. The poor and<br />destitute have a right to a portion of the property of<br />fortunate individuals in the society.<br />Finally, it should be emphasized that despite the fact<br />that private wealth is not the goal of individuals in<br />Islam, the sanctity of ownership in Islam is very much<br />emphasized. The Holy Prophet, in many instances,<br />recommended paying special attention to ones property,<br />to the point He said “He who dies in protection of his<br />property is a martyr,” and “Your blood, your property<br />and your honour are sacred to you like the sacredness of<br />this day of yours, in this city of yours and in this month<br />of yours…” (Khan, 1989, pp. 8-13).<br />*Amir Kia has a Ph.D. degree in Economics from<br />Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. He is<br />an associate professor of Economics in UVSC. He<br />would like to thank Dr. Greg Berry for his useful<br />comments on the earlier draft of this paper.<br />References<br />Muwatta’Imam Malik, translated with exhaustive notes<br />by Professor Muhammad Rahimuddin (1979).<br />Khan, Muhammad Akram (1989), Economic Teachings<br />of Prophet Muhammad, International Institute<br />of Islamic Economics, Islamabad-Pakistan.<br />Niazi, Kausar (1977), Economic Concepts in Islam,<br />Lahore, Pakistan, Sh. Muammad Ashraf.<br />Sader, Muhammad Bagher (1350 AH (Solar), Persian<br />year, translation’s date), Ightesadona, Vol. 1, a<br />Persian translation by Muhammad Kazem<br />Mosavi, Moassesseh Intesharat Islami and<br />Intesharat Borhan, Tehran.<br />Sader, Muhammad Bagher (1349 AH (Solar), Persian<br />year, translation’s date), Ightesadona, Vol. 2, a<br />Persian translation by Dr. A. Aspahbodi,<br />Moassesseh Intesharat Islami and Intesharat<br />Borhan, Tehran.<br />Shafi, Mufti Muhammad (1975), Distribution of Wealth<br />in Islam, translated by Muhammad Hasan<br />Askari and Karrar Husai, 4th Edition, Karachi,<br />Ashraf Publications.<br />The Holy Qur-an, Arabic text with English translation<br />and Commentary by Abdullah Yusuf Ali<br />(1968).land ownership in islamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05414932490344169940noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2263133053636924346.post-76762599913811882542008-12-11T17:15:00.000-08:002008-12-11T17:23:48.405-08:00Concept for Land Reform on JavaBy: <br />Roy Prosterman<br />Robert Mitchell<br />Rural Development Institute<br />May 2002<br /><br />At the outset we note that there are a number of important issues<br />that the Government should deal with in the area of land relations.<br />Many of these is sues fall within the scope of MPR Provision No. IX<br />of 9 November 2001 “On the Agrarian Renewal and Management<br />of Natural Resources.” The present paper addresses just one of<br />those issues, although it is an issue that many Asian societies have<br />found to be critically important: the issue of redistributive land<br />reform using existing cropland.<br />Land reform programs in Asia that were implemented effectively have provided<br />a number of benefits: increased crop production, improved nutrition and<br />improved social status for poor rural households, a foundation for sustained<br />and inclusive economic growth, reduced social unrest and instability, better<br />environmental management, a reduced flow of desperate rural families to the<br />cities, and improved access to credit for the new landowners. Land reform can<br />be one of the most targeted and successful kinds of anti-poverty programs. In<br />particular, land reform can provide meaningful financial resources and food<br />sources and an important safety-net (even when only a small area is distributed<br />to each family) to the very poor and landless.<br />Unfortunately, there has not been any effective or widespread land reform in<br />Indonesia. However, new possible approaches to land reform in Indonesia<br />could create widespread benefits.<br />This paper is divided into three sections: (1) an analysis of the rural land reform<br />conducted in Indonesia during 1960 - 2000; (2) an analysis of present<br />landholding patterns; and (3) an analysis of possible programs for further land<br />reform in Indonesia. Our subject here is redistributive land reform:<br />transmigration programs are not discussed.<br />1 This paper is prepared under the Land Law Initiative funded by the United States Agency for<br />International Development, grant no. 497-G-00-01-00031-00.<br />2<br />1. Land reform in Indonesia during 1960 - 2000<br />Although the Indonesian land reform made some progress during 1960 - 1965,<br />the activity did not result in the redistribution of much agricultural land and did<br />not affect many agricultural families, either on Java or off Java. Since 1965<br />there has been almost no land reform activity.<br />a. Extent of Indonesian land reform<br />During the period 1960 - 2000, BPN data shows that the Government of<br />Indonesia redistributed 850,128 ha under the land reform program.2 Of that<br />amount, 339,227 ha was on Java.3 As Table (a) shows, this represents only<br />3% of cropland in Indonesia and only 6% of cropland in Java as of the 1960’s.<br />By any standard, the land reform program in Indonesia has affected a very<br />small percentage of cropland.4<br />Table (a). Cropland distributed in Indonesian land reform.<br />Cropland<br />redistributed<br />Total cropland<br />in use<br />Redistributed land<br />as % of total<br />cropland in use<br />Indonesia 850,128 ha 26,000,0005 3%<br />Java 339,227 ha 5,800,000 6%<br />Source: BPN Directorate of Land Reform and Land Tenure, March 2000;<br />FAOSTAT available at http://apps.fa.org/page/collections?subset<br />=agriculture (visited May 2002).<br />2 The total amount acquired was 1,470,690 ha, which means that only 58% of the land acquired<br />was ever distributed.<br />3 BPN Directorate of Land Reform and Land Tenure, March 2000.<br />4 At present we do not have data regarding the percentage of cropland that was sawah and the<br />percentage of cropland that was tegalan. However, there is no reason to presume that all, or<br />even a majority of the redistributed land was sawah. To the extent landowners were allowed to<br />select which land to place in the redistribution land fund, they would presumably select the least<br />valuable land, which might be tegalan or other land that was less valuable than sawah.<br />5 According to FAO data, this total included 18,000,000 ha of arable land and 8,000,000 ha of<br />permanent cropland. The comparable FAO figures for 1998 are 17,000,000 ha of arable land<br />and 13,000,000 ha of permanent cropland. See FAO Production Yearbook, 1999, Table 1.<br />These contemporary FAO figures are roughly comparable to the figures of 17.14 million ha for<br />cropland and 16.54 million ha for agricultural estates from Indonesian statistical sources we cite<br />below. Based on this correspondence, we have estimated in Table (a) that the arable cropland<br />on Java in the 1960’s was approximately the same as at present (5.14 million ha), and that the<br />permanent crop area was comparable for agricultural estates (620,000 ha), with almost all of<br />the growth of that figure off of Java. This yields the estimate for Java, totaling 5,800,000 ha.<br />3<br />Chart (i). Javanese cropland distributed in land reform to<br />date.<br />6% of<br />Javanese<br />cropland was<br />redistributed<br />However, the fact that only roughly 6% of cropland was distributed on Java is<br />not the most important shortcoming of the land reform program. Even more<br />important was the fact that so few families benefited from the program.<br />In terms of households, the Indonesian land reform program has redistributed<br />land to only 1,292,851 families, including 816,849 families on Java. The<br />average recipient received 0.66 ha throughout Indonesia and 0.42 ha on Java.<br />In terms of 1963 population data for “farming” households (which does not<br />include agricultural laborer households), the land reform program affected<br />approximately 11% of farming families in Indonesia and approximately 10% of<br />farming families on Java.6<br />Moreover, if we assume that during the 1960’s that for every 100 farming<br />households in Indonesia there were 46 agricultural laborer households (which<br />is the proportion that exists today for all of Indonesia) and that for every 100<br />farming households on Java there were 64 agricultural laborer households<br />(which is the proportion that exists today for Java), then the percentage of<br />“agricultural households” (that is, farmer households plus agricultural laborer<br />households) that received land in Indonesia was 7% and the percentage on<br />Java was 6%. These percentages are very low, and represent a very small<br />proportion of the rural families that were landless or land-poor in the 1960’s.<br />But the results of the land reform are even less impressive if one considers that<br />the most vulnerable group -- seasonal agricultural laborer families -- were<br />largely excluded from the 7% of all Indonesian agricultural families that<br />received land. Such families were the lowest priority of the eight priority<br />categories of recipients described in Article 8 of PP No. 224 of 1961 “On<br />Implementation of Redistribution of Land and Compensation.” It is thus<br />reasonable to assume that only a very small percentage of the 5,600,000<br />6 Almost all land reform in Indonesia occurred prior to 1965. According to data of the National<br />Statistics Bureau [BPS], in 1963 there were roughly 12,236,000 farming households in<br />Indonesia (excluding East Timor, Maluku and Irian Jaya), of which approximately 7,935,000<br />farming households were on Java (“farming” households are those that control some cropland).<br />BPS 1993 Agricultural Statis tics, available at www.bps.go.id/census/ agh.shtml (visited March<br />18, 2002).<br />4<br />agricultural laborer households (which we estimate existed in the 1960’s)<br />received land in the Indonesian land reform program.7<br />Table (b). Families receiving land in Indonesian land reform.<br />Families<br />receiving<br />land<br />Total farming<br />families in<br />1963<br />(excluding<br />laborer<br />families)<br />Families<br />receiving<br />land as % of<br />farming<br />families<br />Estimated<br />total<br />agricultural<br />families<br />(including<br />laborer<br />families)<br />Families<br />receiving<br />land as % of<br />estimated<br />total<br />agricultural<br />families<br />Indonesia 1,292,851 12,236,000 11% 17,864,000 7%<br />Java 816,849 7,935,000 10% 13,013,000 6%<br />Source: Based on BPN Directorate of Land Reform and Land Tenure, March 2000.<br />Chart (ii). Javanese families affected by land reform to<br />date.<br />6% of<br />Javanese<br />agricultural<br />families<br />received land<br />International comparisons provide some perspective. The land reform<br />conducted in Japan during 1948 - 1951 redistributed a total of 41% of all<br />cropland to 81% of non-landowning families, while land reform conducted in<br />Taiwan beginning in 1953 redistributed a total of 44% of cropland to<br />approximately 100% of non -landowning families. As table (c) demonstrates,<br />the Indonesian land reform affected a comparatively small proportion of the<br />non-landowning households:<br />7 The estimate is made based on current ratios of agricultural laborer households to farming<br />households, both for Indonesia and for Java alone. See chart (iii) below. We estimate that<br />roughly 5 million of these laborer households lived on Java.<br />5<br />Table (c). Land reform in various Asian countries.<br />Country Year begun % of cultivated<br />land redistributed<br />% of nonlandowning<br />households<br />receiving land 8<br />Japan 1948 41 81<br />Taiwan 1953 449 ±100<br />South Korea 1948 33 64<br />South Vietnam 10 1970 44 75<br />Philippines 1972, 1988 4 11<br />India (overall) n/a 1.2 11 or 28 11<br />West Bengal n/a 27.7 12 [ ]13<br />Kerala [We will add these figures to the final version.]<br />Indonesia 1961 3 [ ]14<br />Java 1961 6 [ ]15<br />As the numbers indicate, broad and successful land reforms have been carried<br />out in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, South Vietnam, and the Indian state[s] of<br />8 The non -owning category includes both tenants and agricultural laborers. In Japan, Taiwan,<br />South Korea, and South Vietnam, nearly all non-landowning agricultural households were<br />tenants; there were very few households primarily dependent on some form of paid agricultural<br />labor.<br />9 These totals include 40% of tenants, on 14% of cultivated land, who acquired ownership-like<br />interests in land through one of the very rare instances of successful regulation of the landlordtenant<br />relationship – guaranteed permanent possession at fixed low rents – by a developing<br />country.<br />10 This non-communist land-to-the -tiller program was implemented during 1970 - 1973.<br />Concurrently, monthly communist recruitm ent in the South dropped by 70 - 85% (although the<br />land reform could not affect the divisions coming down from the North) and rice production<br />increased by 30%. See ROY L. PROSTERMAN AND JEFFREY M. RIEDINGER, LAND REFORM AND<br />DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT Ch. 5 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).<br />11 There are two different denominators for the base number of non-landowning households in<br />India, with the approximately 5 million total benefiting households India -wide constituting either<br />11% or 28%, depending on which base number is used.<br />12 As in Taiwan, a part of the land reform shown was successfully regulated tenancy, on 20% of<br />the cultivated land.<br />13 We have not separately calculated the percentage of non-landowning households receiving<br />land in West Bengal. Relative to all agricultural households, however, it was approximately<br />54% (including 20% who benefited from successfully regulated tenancy).<br />14 It is difficult to estimate the number of families who substantially depend on farming leased<br />land (tenant farming), both for Indonesia and for Java alone. Nevertheless, tenant farming<br />appears to involve substantially less land and a smaller proportion of Indonesian farmers than<br />in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea or South Vietnam. See note 18 below.<br />15 See note 12 supra.<br />6<br />West Bengal [and Kerala]. In each case there is ample documentation of the<br />major positive impact of land reform on agricultural productivity, farmer incomes<br />and status, household nutrition, rural stability, and other key features of rural<br />society.<br />2. Inequality of Indonesian landholdings in agriculture<br />The inequality in access to land persists, both with respect to cropland and<br />pekarangan.<br />a. Cropland<br />In 1993 approximately 19,713,000 households controlled some cropland,<br />including roughly 9,579,000 farm households that controlled less than 0.5 ha of<br />cropland, and approximately 10,134,000 farm households that controlled 0.5 ha<br />or more.16 In addition, in 1993 there were approximately 9,054,000 agricultural<br />laborer households, which, by definition, controlled no cropland.17 The<br />proportions of landless and land-poor agricultural households are much higher<br />on Java than off-Java, as shown in chart (iii).18<br />Thus, of the total of approximately 11,465,000 agricultural families outside Java<br />(farming families plus agricultural laborer families), about 17% are farming<br />families with holdings under 0.5 ha, and another 20% are agricultural laborer<br />families. By comparison, of approximately 17,302,000 agricultural families on<br />Java, about 44% are farming families with less than 0.5 ha, and another 39%<br />are agricultural laborer families.<br />16 Of the 9,579,000 families controlling less than 0.5 ha, roughly 2.8 million families controlled<br />less than 1500 m2. Of the holdings smaller than 1500 m2, approximately 80% were on Java.<br />Land Holding Farmers Sample Census (National Statistics Bureau [BPS], 1993 Agricultural<br />Census), Tables 2 and 19.<br />17 1993 Census Report on Household Registration in the Sub -Sectors of Paddy, Secondary<br />Crops and Horticulture, (National Statistic Bureau [BPS], 1993 Agricultural Census), Table E.<br />At page 24, the report defines “labor household in agricultural sector” as “a household [in<br />which] one member or more is working in the agricultural sector to obtain wage/salaries eith er<br />in cash or in kind.” This contrasts with the farming household, which the report defines at page<br />23 as a household “engaged in crop farming,” which is further defined as “growing plants (such<br />as paddy, fruits, [etc.]) intending to be sold or to obtain income with risk.”<br />18 It is difficult to estimate what proportion of farming households substantially depend on<br />cultivating land as tenants rather than as owners, although the proportion of leased farm land<br />does not appear to be high. On Java, about 20% of the 5,135,000 ha of cropland is<br />characterized as “land originated from other parties.” Off-Java, that figure is only 11%. 1993<br />Agricultural Census, Land Holding Farmers Sample Census, Table 16. It also appears that<br />roughly 316,000 farm households on Java and 429,000 farm households off-Java may depend<br />entirely on leased in land. Id.<br />7<br />Chart (iii). Farmer households and agricultural laborer households<br />on Java and Off-Java<br />2,962,000<br />6,732,000<br />7,152,000<br />7,608,000<br />1,991,000 2,322,000<br />Off Java Java<br />Farmer households holding 0.5 ha or more of cropland<br />Farmer households holding less than 0.5 ha of cropland<br />Agricultural laborer households holding no cropland<br />Source: Land Holding Farmers Sample Census (National Statistics Bureau<br />[BPS], 1993 Agricultural Census), Table 1; 1993 Census Report on Household<br />Registration in the Sub-Sectors of Paddy, Secondary Crops and Horticulture,<br />(National Statistic Bureau [BPS], 1993 Agricultural Census), Table E.<br />As of 1993, there were 17,145,000 ha of cropland in Indonesia (not counting<br />16,544,000 ha of agricultural estates), but on Java there were only 5,135,000<br />ha of cropland (as well as a mere 620,000 ha of agricultural estates). 19<br />b. Pekarangan<br />The cropland figures that we analyzed in subsection (a) do not include the<br />important category of pekarangan, which is also known as home-and-garden<br />land.20 There are 5,132,000 ha of pekarangan in Indonesia, of which 1,736,000<br />ha are on Java.21<br />Like the distribution of cropland, the distribution of pekarangan is very unequal.<br />Thus, for Indonesia as a whole, 40.28% of households have less than 100 m2<br />of pekarangan, 25.24% have 100 - 200 m2, 11.72% have 200 - 300 m2 and<br />22.76% have 300 m2 or more.22 Table (d) shows the distribution for the four<br />provinces of Java.<br />19 See Land Holding Farmers Sample Census, Table 16, and Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia<br />2000, Table 5.1.1.<br />20 As just indicated, the figures in sub-section (a) do not include land of agricultural estates,<br />which occupy 16,543,000 ha in Indonesia, including only 620,000 ha on Java.<br />21 Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia 2000, Table 5.1.1.<br />22 Hadi Susilo Arifin, “Study on the Vegetation Structure of Pekarangan and Its Changes in<br />West Java, Indonesia," doctoral dissertation for the Graduate School of Natural Science and<br />8<br />Table (d). Size distribution of pekarangan land in agricultural provinces of<br />Java (percentages of households that have pekarangan in the size groups<br />shown)<br />< 100 m2 100 < 200 m2 200 < 300 m2 > 300 m 2<br />West Java 52.29% 25.00% 8.77% 8.95%<br />Central Java 27.50% 27.57% 13.20% 31.73%<br />East Java 34.52% 25.83% 13.33% 26.31%<br />D.I. Yogyakarta 33.51% 17.48% 14.61% 34,40%<br />Source: Hadi Susilo Arifin, “Study on the Vegetation Structure of Pekarangan and<br />Its Changes in West Java, Indonesia,” doctoral dissertation for the Graduate School<br />of Natural Science and Technology, Okayama University, Japan, March 1998, at<br />Appendix Table 2 (citing 1995 Housing and Settlement Statistics, Indonesian<br />Statistics Center Bureau, 1996).<br />Microstudies can provide an even more specific sense of the differences in<br />pekarangan held by households in many parts of Java. For example, a 1988<br />study of the lowland rural village of Sukoharjo in Central Java found that of<br />1002 village families, 44 families owned no pekarangan or household plot, 347<br />families owned 50 m2 or less, 328 families owned 50 - 100 m2, 259 owned 100<br />- 500 m2 and only 24 families owned more than 500 m 2.23<br />Chart (iv). Percentage of families owning pekarangan in Sukoharjo<br />1 - 50 m2<br />35%<br />50 - 100 m2<br />33%<br />100 - 500 m2<br />26%<br />No land<br />4%<br />500+<br />2%<br />Moreover, over the years, if the village does not convert additional sawah into<br />pekarangan, the families use the existing pekarangan less and less for<br />Technology, Okayama University, Japan, March 1998, at Appendix Table 2 (citing 1995<br />Housing and Settlement Statistics, Indonesian Statistics Center Bureau, 1996).<br />23 E. Rajagukguk, “Agrarian Law, Land Tenure and Subsistence in Java: Case Study of the<br />Villages of Sukoharjo and Medayu” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1988), at pp.<br />202-203.<br />9<br />gardening, and the families instead build additional houses on the pekarangan<br />for sons and daughters who begin their own families.24<br />To reduce the poverty of agricultural laborer households, a land reform<br />program could be designed in which the Government would: (1) purchase small<br />amounts of sawah or tegalan located adjacent to the existing pekarangan land<br />in each Javanese village; (2) rezone the purchased sawah (tegalan) as<br />pekarangan; (3) divide the sawah (tegalan) into small plots; and (4) distribute<br />the new pekarangan plots to the poorest families in the village.<br />For example, in the village of Sukoharjo described above, if the government<br />decided to purchase enough sawah to distribute 200 m2 of pekarangan to the<br />719 households that now own pekarangan of 100 m2 or less, this would require<br />the government to purchase 14.38 ha.25 If the government decided to provide<br />200 m 2 to each of the 1002 village families, it would have to purchase 20 ha.<br />3. Recommendation regarding distribution of pekarangan<br />The figures in chart (iii) above illustrate how impractical it would be in the<br />twenty-first century to implement a “land reform” program that attempted to<br />redistribute even as much as 0.25 ha to all or most of the landless or land-poor<br />families on Java (or in Indonesia as a whole). (The figures in chart (iii) also<br />emphasize that the most significant lack of access of land is among families on<br />Java.)<br />For example, if the government were to attempt to distribute an average of 0.25<br />ha to just 50% of the 14,340,000 agricultural families on Java which chart (iii)<br />shows to be either farmer households who hold less than 0.5 ha of cropland or<br />agricultural laborer households who hold no cropland, this would require<br />1,792,000 ha (0.25 ha x 7,170,000 families). However, with only 5,135,000 ha<br />of cropland on all of Java, such a redistribution would require the government<br />to redistribute 35% of all cropland on Java. This is clearly an impossible task.<br />We may consider another possible model. Assume that the government<br />decided to redistribute an average of 0.10 ha (1000 m2) to each of the<br />6,732,000 agricultural laborer households on Java. This would require 673,000<br />ha, which is equal to 13% of all cropland on Java.26 This is somewhat easier to<br />imagine than the first example, but this would nevertheless be very difficult and<br />would require both strong political will and large financial resources.<br />24 See, for example, Hadi Susilo Arifin, supra note 22, at p. 85.<br />25 Village families cultivated a total of 232 ha of cropland, including 224 ha of sawah. See E.<br />Rajagukguk, supra note 23, at pp. 159-160.<br />26 This figure for percentage of cropland could be reduced if the Government were able to use<br />some of the 620,000 ha of Javanese agricultural estate land in the redistribution program.<br />However, the location of the agricultural estate land is an important consideration. To the<br />extent that the Javanese estate land is not located near where the Javanese agricultural<br />laborer families presently live, the Government would have to implement a difficult and<br />expensive program of resettlement within Java.<br />10<br />a. One possible approach<br />In order to ensure that land reform benefits the most vulnerable population, the<br />Government of Indonesia should perhaps consider a more targeted program to<br />provide basic pekarangan to the poorest agricultural households on Java.<br />According to this concept, assume the Government acquires Javanese sawah<br />(or tegalan) in appropriate locations, converts such land to pekarangan and<br />redistributes 0.03 ha (300 m2 ) of pekarangan to the poorest 5 million<br />households in rural Java. Extensive published scholarly research on<br />pekarangan in Indonesia and comparable house-and-garden plots in other<br />countries shows that garden plots can make a significant contribution to the<br />nutrition, income, status and overall well being of agricultural laborers and other<br />poor rural households.27 Such plots also provide special benefits to women,<br />giving them a place close to home to garden and perform other economic<br />activities -- such as tending animals, engaging in home industries, etc. -- that<br />can provide them with an important source of independent income.28 On Java,<br />research has shown that pekarangan produces 44% of total food calories, 32%<br />of total proteins and 65% of fuel consumed by rural households.29 If the land is<br />instead used for intensive production of grain, research has found that irrigated<br />plots as large as 400 m2 can yield enough paddy rice to provide 40 - 60% of the<br />basic yearly nutritional requirements for a family of four persons.30<br />We thus expect that the distribution of such pekarangan plots to landless<br />families could produce enormous economic and social benefits, even though<br />the land requirements for such a land reform program would be extremely<br />27 See, e.g., R. Marsh, “Building on Traditional Gardening to Improve Household Food<br />Security,” in Food, Nutrition and Agriculture, No. 22 (FAO 1998) at 1; Anne Stoler, “Garden Use<br />and Household Economy in Java,” in AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA<br />(Gary E. Hansen ed. 1981) at 244; Vera Ninez, “Introduction: Household Gardens and Small-<br />Scale Food Production,” in FOOD AND NUTRITION BULLETIN, Vol. 7, No. 3 (UN University Press,<br />Sept. 1985) at 2; Otto Soemarwoto, et al., “The Javanese Homegarden as an Integrated Agro-<br />Economic System,” in FOOD AND NUTRITION BULLETIN, Vol. 7, No. 3 (UN University Press, Sept.<br />1985) at 4; Keith Rosen, “Puerto Rican Land Reform: The History of an Instructive Experiment,”<br />73(2) YALE LAW JOURNAL 344 (1963); G.J.A. Terra, “Mixed-Garden Horticulture in Java,” in<br />MALAYSIAN JOURNAL OF TROPICAL GEOGRAPHY, Vol. 3 (Oct. 1954) at 36; William Thiesenhusen,<br />Tim Hanstad, Robert Mitchell and Erman Rajagukguk, “Land Tenure Issues in Indonesia”<br />(report prepared for USAID, 1997). See generally Hadi Susilo Arifin, supra note 22; Tim<br />Hanstad, Jen Brown and Roy Prosterman, “Larger Homestead Plots as Land Reform?<br />International Experience and Analysis From Karnataka, RDI REPORTS ON FOREIGN AID AND<br />DEVELOPMENT NO. 113 (Aug. 2001).<br />28 See, e.g., DAVID BORNSTEIN, THE PRICE OF A DREAM: THE STORY OF THE GRAMEEN BANK AND<br />THE IDEA THAT IS HELPING THE POOR TO CHANGE THEIR LIVES (1996) at 152 -154; NATIONAL<br />INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES (NIAS), S TATUS OF RURAL WOMEN IN KARNATAKA (1998) at 21.<br />29 Soemarwoto, supra note 27; Leslie Brownrigg, “Home Gardening in International<br />Development: What the Literature Shows, Including an Annotated Bibliography and Inventories<br />of International Organizations Involved in Home Gardening Projects” (League for International<br />Food Education, 1985) at ii.<br />30 William Thiesenhusen, Tim Hanstad, Robert Mitchell and Erman Rajagukguk, “Land Tenure<br />Issues in Indonesia” (report for USAID, 1997) at 38 n. 66.<br />11<br />modest. If the Government distributed 0.03 ha of pekarangan land to 5 million<br />households on Java, it would have to acquire only 150,000 ha of land, or only<br />3% of Java’s cropland.<br />If the Government program is based upon conversion of sawah to pekarangan<br />and the Government pays an average of Rp. 100 million (US $ 10,000) per ha<br />for sawah,31 the acquisition of 150,000 ha would cost approximately Rp. 15<br />trillion (US $ 1.5 billion). If the Government implemented such a program over<br />5 years, the annual cost for the land would be Rp. 3 trillion (US $ 300 million).<br />Under this plan, the cost of land per family benefited would be approximately<br />Rp. 3 million (US $ 300), which is about 1/10th of the per family cost for the<br />transmigration program.32 In addition, this scheme would require conversion of<br />only 3% of the total cropland (exclusive of agricultural estates) on Java.33<br />Table (e). Summary of pekarangan land reform scheme for Java.<br />Number of<br />families<br />receiving<br />land on Java<br />Size of<br />land for<br />each<br />family (ha)<br />Total land<br />required (ha)<br />% of<br />cropland<br />on Java<br />Total cost of land Cost of land per<br />family<br />5 million 0.03 ha<br />(300 m2)<br />150,000 3% Rp 15 trillion<br />($ 1.5 billion)<br />Rp 3 million<br />($ 300)<br />This land reform proposal could be based on the following principles:<br />First, the land reform should give top priority to the poorest households, which<br />are likely to be the seasonal agricultural laborer households that work for<br />various farmers and have no permanent employment. In the earlier land<br />reform, Article 8 of PP 224 of 1961 placed this class of agricultural family at the<br />bottom of the priority list.<br />Second, the land should be distributed in small plots in order to benefit the<br />maximum number of agricultural families. If the land reform described here<br />were conducted on Java, it would potentially affect 75% of agricultural laborer<br />families on Java.<br />Third, the Government should pay market value for the sawah (or tegalan)<br />acquired for conversion into pekarangan. The land reform program to date has<br />31 Based on BPN estimates and results of RDI April 2000 fieldwork in East and Central Java,<br />the equivalent of $10,000 per ha is a reasonable price for sawah.<br />32 These costs do not include the costs of administration of the land reform program, which<br />should be a small fraction of the cost of acquiring the land. There would also be small costs for<br />extending a simple road to the new pekarangan settlement (which should adjoin the existing<br />settlement), and costs for other basic infrastructure. These costs would increase the total cost<br />of the program to a range of Rp. 4 - 5 million per family receiving land.<br />33 If the land reform program acquired tanah bengkok rather than privately owned sawah, the<br />program might be less controversial. In that case, the Government would have to provide an<br />alternate source for salaries of village officials. See discussion in sub -section (c) below.<br />12<br />attempted to acquire land by paying less than market value, which has<br />generated vigorous opposition to the reform.34<br />Fourth, the Government must ensure that there is adequate financing for the<br />land reform. To date, the State has not provided adequate financing for land<br />reform, and the Government has paid for only a portion of the land acquired for<br />redistribution.35<br />Fifth, as part of program monitoring and administration, the Government must<br />ensure that it redistributes all land that it acquires.36<br />Sixth, the Government should not focus on excess land and absentee land, but<br />should instead purchase land near the village. If necessary, the law can be<br />amended to define the land reform as a “public purpose” so that the<br />Government can acquire the sawah (or tegalan) by compulsion under the laws<br />related to acquisition of land for public purposes. Because the new<br />pekarangan should be located close to the existing village, the Government<br />should acquire the sawah (tegalan) near the village. For this reason, it is not<br />necessary to acquire such land only from excess owners or absentee owners.<br />The Government should acquire the land located near the village, regardless of<br />the identity of the owner or the size of the owner’s total landholding.<br />Seventh, the land reform program should be focused on Java because that is<br />where the poorest agricultural households are most heavily concentrated. As<br />noted above, if the land reform program distributed pekarangan plots to 5<br />million agricultural families in Java, it could benefit three-quarters of Javanese<br />agricultural laborer families.37 Five million families would represent<br />approximately six times the 816,000 households on Java that benefited from<br />the previous land reform.<br />34 The original formula for compensation was reasonably adequate for the first 5 ha: it provided<br />for paying 10 times the annual net production, with gradually decreasing payments for larger<br />holdings. Annual net production was defined as half the gross production for sawah. PP No.<br />224 of 1961, art. 6. These payments were several times larger than the payments provided in<br />the Taiwan and South Korean land reform laws. E. Rajagukguk, supra note 23, at page 90.<br />However, an inflation rate of 650% during 1963 - 1965 caused the payment to be practically<br />worthless. E. Rajagukguk at page 96. Moreover, it appears likely that the Government did not<br />pay anything for a substantial part of the acquired land. See note 35 infra.<br />35 Although the 134,558 ha for which the Government paid is only 9% of the 1,470,690 ha<br />acquired for redistribution in Indonesia (according to data of BPN Directorate of Land<br />Arrangement and Land Tenure, March 2000), it is not clear how much of the total was acquired<br />from landowners (as opposed to state land, former land of princes, etc.).<br />36 Of the 1,470,690 ha the Governm ent acquired in the 1960’s, it apparently distributed only<br />850,000 ha, which is 58% of the total acquired. It is not clear how that undistributed land is<br />being used today. Perhaps the Government has granted it to plantation companies under<br />HGU, or perhaps state enterprises use the land.<br />37 This assumes that all, or almost all, of the beneficiaries are agricultural laborer families.<br />13<br />Chart (v). Javanese agricultural laborer families affected<br />under proposed pekarangan distribution<br />75% of<br />Javanese<br />agricultural<br />laborer families<br />receive land<br />Eighth, the land reform program must be streamlined to avoid unnecessary<br />processes and approvals. In the earlier land reform program, there were at<br />least 15 institutions that had to approve applications to receive land, which<br />indicates an enormously wasteful process.38<br />Ninth, the land reform program must be carefully monitored through<br />independent sample surveys and Rapid Rural Appraisal interviews39 to ensure<br />that it meets the program’s specific goals. In this kind of program, and to the<br />extent that any donor agency provides financing, it is entirely possible to use<br />the funding only as the program actually achieves results. According to this<br />approach, the financing should be released on a “progress payments” basis as<br />monitoring confirms that the progra m has achieved each increment of progress<br />in distributing land to families who are in the intended beneficiary group.40<br />38 E. Rajagukguk, supra note 23, at page 94.<br />39 In Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) interviews, rural interviewees are not responding to a<br />questionnaire, but actively participate in a semi-structured interview. The researchers use a<br />checklist of issues as a basis for questions, not necessarily addressing all questions in each<br />interview and som etimes departing from the basic questions to pursue interesting, unexpected,<br />or new information.<br />40 The Government could perhaps consider a second approach for distributing new pekarangan<br />land, which would be a “universal” distribution of additional pekaran gan land to rural families.<br />Under this approach, the Government would distribute new pekarangan plots averaging<br />perhaps 200 m2 to all, or nearly all, rural households on Java. Such an approach would take<br />into account several additional factors that might make it a viable alternative to the program just<br />described:<br />(1) This approach would eliminate the necessity of ensuring that an approach targeted to a<br />smaller number of families -- for example, the “5 million” suggested above -- actually reached<br />the poorest households and that the benefits were not diverted or “intercepted” by families who<br />were wealthier or more powerful.<br />(2) This approach would take into account the fact that pekarangan can provide unique<br />nutritional and ecological functions even for hous eholds that are somewhat better off, but that<br />most of the essential open area of even medium-sized pekarangan plots has been lost in<br />recent years due to widespread fragmentation through inheritance. Such fragmentation leads<br />14<br />b. An additional important variable: tanah bengkok<br />Under either of the models for land reform described in sub-sections (a) and (b)<br />above, there is another important variable that might significantly reduce the<br />amount the Government pays to acquire land for redistribution, and that might<br />facilitate the land reform program in other ways. That variable is the possible<br />use of land curre ntly designated as tanah bengkok (village salary land) as part<br />of the land redistributed in the land reform.41 It has been estimated that such<br />land may constitute 10% or more of the cropland in Central Java and East<br />Java, which would amount to roughly 300,000 ha of cropland. Tanah bengkok<br />probably exists in a very large majority of villages in those two provinces, and<br />such land is usually of good quality and located near the village.<br />If the Government undertook a land reform program of the type described in<br />sub-section (a), and if the Government acquired and used even one-quarter or<br />one-third of existing tanah bengkok (equivalent to roughly 75,000 - 100,000 ha<br />of existing tanah bengkok), this might significantly reduce the cost of such a<br />program. The appropriate price that the Government should pay for tanah<br />bengkok is probably the replacement of the flow of income produced by such<br />land currently (and used to pay village officials). The Government could pay<br />that price by opening a special trust account in a local bank in the name of the<br />village. The Government would deposit into the account an amount sufficient<br />to generate the same flow of income that the tanah bengkok currently<br />produces. It is very likely that the deposited amount -- the capitalized valu e of<br />the net income to be expected from the tanah bengkok taken, or perhaps the<br />capitalized value of the rent that a village official would have received by<br />leasing out such land -- would be significantly less than the full market value of<br />equivalent land held by a private owner.<br />Thus, the use of tanah bengkok might substantially cut land costs for the<br />program. It should also be possible for the Government to acquire such land in<br />a way that would minimize disruption or opposition from village officials. This<br />could be done by identifying tanah bengkok that village officials are leasing out<br />to building multiple houses on what had been a single parcel of pekarangan. See Hadi Susilo<br />Arifin, supra note 22, at p. 85.<br />(3) Virtually by definition, such a program would reach all of the rural poor on Java.<br />If the Government were to distribute pekarangan to all 17.3 million agricultural households on<br />Java, the program would require 346,000 ha (200 m2 x 17,300,000 families). This would<br />represent about 6.7% of the cropland on Java. While this would require more land and would<br />be more expensive than the alternative described in sub-section (a), it is possible that such<br />increased costs would be outweighed by the popular support for a universal distribution. Such<br />a program would require approximately Rp. 34.6 trillion (US $ 3.46 billion) for purchase of land,<br />or about Rp. 7 trillion a year if the Government carried out the program over 5 years. Cost of<br />land per family benefited would be about Rp. 2 million (US $200).<br />41 See E. Rajagukguk, supra note 23, at pp. 271-72. Other types of suitable non-private land<br />(suitable with respect to quality and location) might also be available in some circumstances.<br />15<br />(as is the case for most tanah bengkok) and then paying the official from the<br />trust fund an annual amount equal to the amount they receive from the lease.<br />The Government should also pay the existing tenant on such land some<br />amount in compensation for disturbing the lease agreement.<br />c. Contents of the land reform program<br />Regardless whether the Government adopts the land reform model described<br />in sub-section (a) above or chooses to adopt some other model, it is important<br />for the Government to select some actual model for land reform. To speak of<br />“land reform” in the abstract, without reference to an actual program, may be<br />counterproductive since it creates the illusion that land reform may be realized<br />in the near future without taking concrete steps to achieve the reform.<br />The Government’s response to MPR Provision No. IX of November 9, 2001<br />should consider formulating a land reform program that offers proposals on<br />each of the following issues:<br />(a) what kind of people should receive land;<br />(b) where in Indonesia will land reform be conducted;<br />(c) how much land will each recipient receive;<br />(d) approximately how much land is available for redistribution<br />from the various sources;<br />(e) what will be the method for identifying the land to be<br />redistributed;<br />(f) what will be the cost for acquiring such land (in each<br />category, if several categories of land are involved);<br />(g) how will the Government pay for the land acquired;<br />(h) over how many years will the Government implement the<br />program;<br />(i) who will make decisions regarding who receives land in each<br />village, and how will they make such decisions;<br />(j) will the State require recipients to pay for the land received,<br />and on what te rms (level of payment, over what term, etc.);<br />(k) will the law impose restrictions on the recipients' use of the<br />land or forbid the resale of the land for some period; and<br />(l) what will be the roles of the kabupaten governments and<br />village heads in the la nd reform.land ownership in islamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05414932490344169940noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2263133053636924346.post-34239336725927978042008-12-10T20:52:00.000-08:002008-12-10T20:56:07.864-08:00The Islamic Debate about Land Reform in the Iranian Parliament, 1981-86The issue of land reform divided the ruling establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the 1980s into two broad factions: radicals who favoured a redistribution of the lands of the large landowners, and conservatives who held fast onto the principle of the sanctity of private property. This article analyses the composition of these two factions in the Iranian Parliament and the arguments they used in the public debates. It shows how the radicals who invoked the spirit of Islam were finally defeated by the conservatives who were able to use the written text of the Shari'a against themland ownership in islamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05414932490344169940noreply@blogger.com0